Event Details: 

• Date: December 19, 2024 
• Time: 3:00 PM – 3:35 PM UTC 
• Format: Virtual Event (Online) 

About the Event

GreatFire’s App Censorship Project team is excited to invite you to the launch of the App Freedom Index 2024 (AFI), a groundbreaking initiative aimed at promoting transparency and accountability within the global app ecosystem. 

In an era where digital platforms play a pivotal role in information dissemination and communication, understanding and monitoring app censorship is more critical than ever.

The App Freedom Index (AFI) is being developed as an annual index that evaluates the level of app freedom across various countries and platforms. The 2024 AFI serves as a prototype. In 2025, the methodology and data collection will be refined, and the next version will include data from both the AppleCensorship and GoogleCensorship platforms. Additionally, qualitative measurements will be incorporated using external sources of information, covering legal, economic, and social indicators to provide a more comprehensive assessment of app freedom. 

By analyzing data from key sources and incorporating qualitative assessments, the AFI aims to:

• Measure Online Restrictions: Provide a comprehensive tool to assess and compare app freedom globally and contribute to the monitoring of online freedom of information and expression.

• Promote Transparency: Shed light on app access restrictions and censorship practices within app stores.

• Hold Tech Companies Accountable: Encourage responsible policies and actions from tech giants.

Event Agenda

1. Welcome and Introduction to the App Freedom Index

• Speaker: Benjamin Ismail, App Censorship Project Director 

• Overview of the AFI and its significance in today's digital landscape 

• The Need for Transparency and Accountability 

          • Discussion on the importance of monitoring app censorship 

          • How the AFI contributes to safeguarding digital rights and freedom of expression 

2. Methodology for the App Freedom Index 2025

• Speaker: App Censorship Project Researcher 

• Presentation of the comprehensive methodology planned for AFI 2025 

          • Integration of data from AppleCensorship and GoogleCensorship platforms 

          • Introduction of qualitative measurements through surveys covering technical, legal, and case study perspectives 

3. Unveiling the App Freedom Index 2024

• Presentation of the inaugural AFI 2024

          • Methodology based on data from AppleCensorship.com 

          • Explanation of the simplified approach for this first iteration 

• Key Findings and Rankings 

          • Brief commentary on the results 

          • Highlights of app store rankings 

          • Notable trends and observations 

4. Conclusion and Call for Collaboration

• Invitation for feedback and contributions to enhance the AFI 2025 

• Emphasis on the collective effort needed to promote app freedom 

5. Q&A Session

• Open floor for questions and comments from attendees 

Why Attend? 

• Insightful Discussions: Learn about the current state of app freedom and censorship globally. 

• Contribute to Change: Discover how you can help develop the AFI and make a tangible impact on promoting digital rights. 

• Share Your Perspectives: Provide valuable feedback and insights that will assist in refining the App Freedom Index 2025's methodology and focus areas. 

How to Join 

Please RSVP by December 12, 2024, by emailing us at Contact@AppCensorship.org. Upon confirmation, we will provide you with the virtual event access details. 

We look forward to your participation in this significant event as we work together to enhance transparency and protect digital rights within the app ecosystem.

Warm regards,

The GreatFire App Censorship Project Team 

About GreatFire's App Censorship Project 

The App Censorship Project (AppCensorship.org) is dedicated to exposing and combating app censorship worldwide. Through our platforms AppleCensorship.com and GoogleCensorship.org, we monitor the availability of apps across different countries and regions, identifying instances where apps are censored or removed from app stores. Our mission is to promote transparency, hold tech companies accountable, and advocate for the unrestricted flow of information. 

• AppleCensorship.com (launched in January 2019) allows users to search for apps and check their availability in various countries' Apple App Stores. By highlighting discrepancies and removals, we shed light on censorship practices and advocate for greater transparency from Apple. 

• GoogleCensorship.org (launched in September 2024) performs a similar function for the Google Play Store, monitoring app availability and censorship on Android devices globally. 

In the coming months, AppCensorship.org will evolve into a unified platform that integrates data from both AppleCensorship and GoogleCensorship. This will allow users to compare censorship trends and policies across the two largest app distribution platforms in the world. 

Feedback & Queries 

Your engagement and feedback are invaluable to us as we work to enhance openness and accessibility in the digital world. 

Feel free to reach out to us at Contact@AppCensorship.org or visit our website AppCensorship.org for more information. 

Join us in advancing transparency and protecting digital rights within the app ecosystem.

November 13, 2024 

GreatFire is excited to announce a significant update to AppleCensorship.com, introducing eight powerful new features aimed at enhancing the platform’s usability and transparency. These upgrades provide users with advanced tools to monitor, analyze, and compare app availability across global App Stores, making it easier to track censorship trends, identify unavailability patterns, and understand the broader impacts of restrictive policies on mobile app ecosystems.  

Key Upgrades on AppleCensorship.com

1. Enhanced Tagging System: Uncovering Patterns in Sensitive App Unavailability 

Our updated tagging system enables admins to group apps under custom categories, such as "LGBTQ+,”“Tibet,” or “Digital Security & Privacy.” This provides a more nuanced lens to explore app unavailability. Hundreds of apps have already been tagged, revealing trends around "sensitive" apps often targeted by authoritarian regimes.

The improved dashboard pie chart visualizes these tags, helping users quickly identify trends and systemic censorship patterns across sensitive app categories. 

2. New "Tagged Apps" Page 

Users can now access a dedicated "Tagged Apps" page to explore, filter, and sort apps by custom tags. This page also displays the latest changes for each app, allowing users to dig deeper into the details. 

3. Tags in Country-Specific Export Files 

Country-specific exports (CSV & JSON) now include tags, giving users a more comprehensive dataset for external analysis. 

4. Enhanced Data Visualization Features 

The homepage world map has been upgraded with three interactive tabs: 

• Status: Highlight App Stores by their App Availability Index rating. 
• Tags: Display the count of unavailable tagged apps per region, allowing users to visualize the impact of censorship by category. 
• Ranking: Rank all 175 App Stores by their current unavailability rate, providing a clear global view of censorship hotspots. 

These tools enable users to combine regional and category-specific data for deeper insights. 

5. New "App Store Comparison" Page 

Compare multiple App Stores side by side using the App Store Comparison page. This feature is particularly valuable for analyzing regional discrepancies in app availability and identifying censorship patterns across countries. 

6. Revamped "Detected Changes" Page 

The improved Detected Changes page includes filtering options for app status changes (deleted or restored) and supports filtering by region, tags, and official Apple categories. Users can now track removals and reinstatements with greater precision, aiding focused research and advocacy efforts. 

7. Detailed App Removal Timeline 

Each app’s details page now displays a timeline that includes dates and App Stores (countries) where changes occurred. This added context makes it easier to understand the timing and geographic scope of app removals. 

8. Coming Soon: Historical Data for Country Pages 

A new feature currently in development will allow users to view historical data on the world map (with a new "Trends" tab) and on each country page, providing a longitudinal perspective on app censorship trends and restrictions. 

We Value Your Feedback 

At AppleCensorship.com, we are committed to continuous improvement. In the coming weeks, we will expand the tagging system, but we also welcome your input: 

• Are there specific app categories we should monitor? 
• Are there apps missing from our platform that deserve attention? 

We also encourage you to report any bugs or share feedback via our Contact Us page. Stay updated with the latest news, research, and reports by subscribing to our new RSS feed. 

Commitment to Transparency and Digital Rights 

These upgrades underscore our ongoing mission to increase transparency in app ecosystems and empower users to monitor app availability in real time. By equipping stakeholders with better tools, we aim to drive advocacy for greater accountability and fairness in app distribution practices. 

Explore the new features at AppleCensorship.com and join us in the fight for transparency, digital rights, and the free flow of
information. 

For media inquiries, contact us at info@applecensorship.com or use our website's Contact Form. 

Early this morning, Amnezia VPN announced on its “Amnezia VPN News ” Telegram channel: 

“Friends, we have bad news. Just a couple of hours ago, we received a message from Apple that they are removing our Amnezia VPN app from the App Store at the request of Roskomnadzor. We can only say this: never buy an iPhone again, never buy Apple products again, or sooner or later you will simply lose access to the internet. Take this seriously.” 

GreatFire condemns Apple’s removal of Amnezia VPN and other tools vital to free access to information in Russia, calling Apple’s actions “a transformation into an arm of Russian censorship.” Benjamin Ismail, Campaign and Advocacy Director at GreatFire, stated: 

“Apple’s compliance with ‘local laws’ is becoming a façade for aiding censorship. This is the same behavior they exhibit in China, and it should be a global concern, not just a Russian one. By blocking VPN apps in Russia, Apple restricts the fundamental rights of app developers, many of whom reside outside Russia, from reaching their audience. The ‘walled garden’ nature of iOS means that users lose access to essential apps without alternative channels to access them.” 

Ismail added that Apple’s rationale of “complying with local laws” is insufficient: 

“Apple could push back against these censorship orders and demand better transparency from authorities. It has an obligation to respect human rights principles. If Apple continues to disregard its own commitments to user freedom, it should be held accountable under international human rights standards and, where applicable, U.S. laws.” 

On October 31, Sarkis Darbinyan, a specialist at Roskomsvoboda (RKS Global)—an organization dedicated to promoting and defending human rights and freedoms in the digital realm—shared his perspective, stating:

“Apple claims to have a strong focus on human rights and privacy in its operations. However, we do not know the exact details of the company's HRIA process, which are not publicly disclosed. Clearly, these processes should be disclosed and we urge the company to listen to human rights organizations and stop its actions which cause devastating damage to human rights in Russia, which are already facing
difficult times.” 

Data from AppleCensorship.com confirms that at least five other VPN apps were recently removed from Russia’s App Store: 

• VPN Bucks: Detected unavailable on October 2 (previously available on September 18);
• VPN Proxy: Detected unavailable on September 30 (previously available on September 27);
• Windscribe VPN: Unavailable from September 28 (previously available on September 25);
• Hotspot Shield VPN: Detected unavailable on September 26 (previously available on September 25);
• Lightning VPN: Detected unavailable on September 24 (previously available on July 22).

See all “detected changes” for the Russia App Store here. 

On September 24, GreatFire published a report titled "Unveiling the Silent Removal of VPN Apps from Russia's Apple App Store", highlighting that Apple had removed nearly 60 VPN apps over the summer, far exceeding the 25 apps Roskomnadzor had reportedly ordered removed. The ongoing purge of VPN apps from Russia’s App Store spurred a coalition of international human rights organizations and civil society representatives to issue an open letter to Apple, urging the company to end its compliance with Russian censorship orders.

The full text of the open letter and list of signatories can be found here. 

To date, Apple has not responded to the open letter. Instead, it further restricted Russian access to information by removing the Russian-language news platform “Current Time” TV (Настоящее Время), operated by Radio Free Europe, from the App Store. 

In its message on Telegram, Amnezia VPN, remarked: 

“We managed to overcome protocol blocks, we managed to bypass server blocks, but we can’t do anything against Apple. Right now, they are the largest provider of censorship in the world, willing to go to any lengths for profit. Let this be an open message not only to users in Russia but to users around the world. If censorship comes to your country, Apple will side with the forces of oppression and sell your freedom,disregarding any moral principles.” 

"When you next consider buying a smartphone, think about whether it will allow you access to the global internet. Will you control your smartphone, or will it control you?" 

GreatFire Releases Groundbreaking Study on VPN App Removals in Russia

GreatFire has published a groundbreaking study revealing the widespread removal of VPN apps by Apple from its Russia App Store. Utilizing data from the App Store Monitor (ASM) on AppleCensorship.com—a platform dedicated to monitoring app availability in Apple's App Stores—the research highlights significant discrepancies between media-reported figures and the actual number of VPN app removals, particularly during the summer of 2024. The findings emphasize the urgent need for transparency and accountability from both Apple and Russian authorities.

You can read the study here  

Key Findings

• Significant Discrepancy with Official Reports: While Roskomnadzor, Russia’s communications regulator, officially reported the removal of 25 VPN apps, our research uncovered that close to 60 VPN apps were silently removed by Apple between early July and September 18, 2024, bringing the total number of unavailable VPN apps to 98.
• Ongoing Silent Removals: More than 20% of the VPN apps tested were quietly removed without public acknowledgment, undermining transparency in the Russia App Store.
• Coordinated Removal Patterns: The removals were concentrated on specific dates, suggesting coordinated actions by Apple—potentially exceeding Roskomnadzor’s requests—and not voluntary withdrawals by VPN developers.
• Impact on Digital Access: Major VPN providers have been removed, severely limiting Russian users' ability to access secure communication channels and bypass government censorship.

Apple’s Accountability and the Need for Transparency

"Apple's silent removal of close to 60 VPN apps from the Russia App Store is not just alarming—it's a direct threat to digital freedom and privacy," said Benjamin Ismail, Director of the App Censorship Project at GreatFire. "By unilaterally restricting access to these essential tools without transparency or due process, Apple is complicit in enabling government censorship. We demand that Apple uphold its commitment to human rights and provide a clear explanation for these actions.”

The findings have raised concerns among digital rights advocates worldwide. Evan Greer, Director of Fight for the Future, the group behind the campaign at FreetheIphone.com, emphasized the broader implications:

"The fact that nearly 100 VPN apps are now unavailable in Russia's App Store highlights a disturbing trend of corporate complicity in state-sponsored censorship. VPNs are lifelines for journalists, activists, and everyday citizens striving to access information and communicate securely. Apple's actions not only undermine the privacy and security of millions but also set a dangerous precedent for how tech companies may collaborate with authoritarian regimes. It's imperative that Apple reverses this course and stands up for the rights of its users."

Study Overview

The study aimed to verify claims made by Roskomnadzor and relayed by Russian news agency Interfax that the regulator had ordered Apple to remove 25 VPN apps from its App Store. It also sought to assess the scale of VPN blocking by Russian authorities and determine the number of VPN removals and the extent of VPN unavailability in the Russia App Store.

Key Data

• Apps Tested: Over 360 VPN apps were monitored globally, with more than 63,000 individual tests conducted across 175 App Stores.
• Unavailable VPN Apps in Russia: As of September 2024, 98 VPN apps were found to be unavailable from the Russia App Store.

Removal Timeline

The research identified a pattern of removals predominantly occurring in July, August, and September 2024, following the first public reports of VPN removals by Roskomnadzor:

• Pre-July 2024: 32 VPN apps were already unavailable prior to the summer.
• Early July 2024: A wave of removals took place between July 4 and July 7, targeting over a dozen apps, including major services like CyberGhost VPN and ExpressVPN.
• Post-July 7 Removals: 30 more apps were removed between July 8 and August 11.

Implications for Digital Rights

VPNs play a crucial role in securing internet privacy and circumventing censorship. Their removal significantly restricts users' ability to access free information, especially in nations with extensive censorship like Russia. The research underscores that these VPN removals were not isolated incidents but part of a broader, coordinated effort.

Call to Action

GreatFire calls for full transparency from both Apple and Roskomnadzor:

• Disclosure of App Removal Requests: Roskomnadzor should clarify the specific VPN apps it requested to be removed and the rationale behind such decisions.
• Apple’s Proactive Role: Apple must provide an explanation for its removal of VPN apps, especially if it acted beyond the official requests made by Roskomnadzor.
• Restoration of Digital Access: Efforts should be made to reinstate VPN apps to ensure users have unrestricted access to the tools they need to protect their online freedoms.

Contact Information

• Benjamin Ismail Director, App Censorship Project, GreatFire
  Email: benjamin@greatfire.org

GreatFire is committed to advocating for freedom of information online and transparency in the tech industry. This effort underscores the critical importance of holding corporations and governments accountable for actions that impact users' access to information and online fundamental freedoms.

AC: Prateek, could you offer us insight into the broader context of the Indian government's involvement in the digital ecosystem, especially regarding app censorship and regulation? 

Prateek: The Indian state’s involvement is selective and subjective. 

If you zoom out a little, you can see this in the way a lot of India's laws around the internet are being written, rewritten, or enacted. Whether it's the data protection bill, the IT rules, the Digital India Bill, or the Telecommunications Act, these laws are written to give a lot of control and discretion to the executive branch. There's also an increase in their ability to restrict apps and websites. 

The framework lacks checks and balances, with a lot of control and discretion given to the executive branch. Everything happens within the executive branch. In most cases, they don't put out any reasoned orders that you can actually push back against, and there's a lot of opacity and discretion in the way the government is operating and can operate. That's where the challenge or concern for us is. 

For instance, the bans on Chinese apps often lacked demonstrated harm, with claims affecting sovereignty without detailed justification. In TikTok's case, the press release [issued by the government] said (the app) affects the integrity and sovereignty of the country, which is a nice bold-sounding claim, but they've not actually demonstrated that in any way. 

AC: What is the existing regulatory framework for blocking websites and apps? 

Prateek: The framework operates under the IT Act and the 2009 blocking rules, which allow the government to block URLs, domains, and apps. These blocking rules allow for confidentiality by default. When the government sends a request to block a URL, whether it's to an app store, a social media platform, or anyone else, they have the choice to tell the intermediary that the order is confidential and can't be disclosed to anyone. In most cases, they do this. This often leaves affected parties unaware of the reasons for the blockage. 

AC: It appears that the general government framework has become more coercive and restrictive. Would you agree? 

Prateek: Yes, but there’s also a narrative promoting Indian startups. Sometimes, they will say things like “Okay, we've passed these rules that seem crazy, but they don't really apply to startups in India.” The government aims to foster innovation while maintaining leverage over large tech companies like Google and Apple. The government also doesn't necessarily want any of the larger tech companies to exit the country, whether it's Google or Apple. On Apple’s side, there's also the added element of manufacturing that Apple is doing in India. It gives the government both leverage and something to lose if Apple were to leave over some differences. 

AC: How would you describe the Indian government's relationship with big tech companies? 

Prateek: Publicly, the government may threaten big tech companies, saying things like, "look, if you don't like the laws in India, you can leave the country," But in reality, they don't actually want any of them to leave because that can in some cases hit their perception as a business-friendly jurisdiction. 

We've also seen that companies view India as a market they cannot afford to be excluded from. So they also tend to be conciliatory wherever possible, at least in public. Now, a lot of the discussion actually happens behind closed doors, so we don't know to what extent they push back in private meetings. 

I think one exception to this has been Twitter. This goes back to early 2021 where you had the farmers' protests in India and the government asked Twitter to block a number of accounts. Twitter initially complied with a lot of the requests and then went back and decided not to take action against accounts that belong to activists, journalists, politicians, etc., reversing course on some accounts. The government was extremely unhappy with that, which is why you had the first iteration of the IT rules, coming into effect in February 2021. 

These rules introduced liability in the form of mandating that these companies with a certain number of users have an in-country grievance officer and in-country compliance officer, both of whom are personally liable if the company doesn't comply with government orders. 

That potentially changed the situation for a lot of companies because now, if they are getting into a fight with the government, they are risking the market and also potentially employees’ safety. 

However, this temporary relisting is not due to any court ruling but solely because of the government's intervention. Our legal battles continue in the Competition Commission of India and the Supreme Court. 

AC: Many apps have been taken down by Apple following the Indian government’s requests. How does this impact press freedom and freedom of speech within the mobile app ecosystem? 

Prateek: Free expression is broader than app censorship. The government’s regulatory structure allows it to exert significant influence over tech companies, social media platforms and press outlets, shaping narratives and applying pressure through various means (including financial pressure). Blocking or censoring apps is just one of the ways that the government can pressure different entities, different corporations into doing what they want them to do. 

AC: Has your organization engaged the government on issues of bans, censorship, and delisting of apps? 

Prateek: Our engagement includes issuing statements, writing to the government, and assisting petitioners in court. For example, we are involved in litigation challenges against the blocking of satirical websites and other cases of unjustified censorship.

GreatFire, along with a coalition of civil society organizations and individuals, has issued an open letter to Tim Cook, CEO of Apple, calling on the company to stop censoring VPN apps in Russia. Recent data from AppleCensorship.com reveals that Apple has removed several popular VPN apps from the Russian App Store, including Red Shield VPN , Le VPN , HideMyName , and others , in response to demands from Russian censorship authorities. The data also suggests that these removals are ongoing and may target additional VPN services.

 "By complying with Russian censorship demands, Apple is undermining digital freedom and the rights of individuals to access independent information," said Benjamin Ismail, Campaign and Advocacy Director and head of the App Censorship Project at GreatFire. "We urge Apple to restore these VPN apps and uphold its commitment to human rights, following the example set by Google, which is resisting similar demands." 

The letter emphasizes the critical role of VPNs in allowing Russian citizens to bypass government-imposed restrictions on free speech and access to information. It calls on Apple to assess censorship requests based on international human rights standards and to be transparent about its decisions regarding app removals. 

The full text of the open letter and list of signatories can be found here:

Open letter to Apple: Stop censoring Runet 

The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the country's top internet regulation body, requested Apple to remove it from the China App Store, citing illegal content. The CAC stated that Damus did not meet China's requirements for social networks to incorporate censorship tools and link user signups to real identities. This direct communication channel between the CAC and Apple led to the app's immediate removal following the takedown notice.

Damus is powered by the Nostr protocol, a decentralized social media protocol designed for censorship-resistant communication. Unlike traditional social media platforms such as X or Facebook, which are centralized and controlled by single entities, Nostr operates on a decentralized network of relays that can be run by anyone. This decentralization ensures that no single authority can censor or control the information flow, giving users full control over their data and communications.

In June 2023, Apple threatened to remove Damus from its App Store over its tipping feature, which allowed users to trade Bitcoin directly without using other apps. Although this dispute primarily arose from a conflict with Apple's payment guidelines, Damus ultimately removed the tipping feature, which it considers equivalent to having a censored version of the app, just to remain on the App Store.

We sat down with William Casarin, the developer and founder of Damus to discuss their challenges with app censorship. Casarin shared their experiences, detailing their engagement with Apple after being censored in China. He explained how the CAC swiftly ordered Apple to remove Damus from the Chinese App Store, affecting around 24,000 initial users. Casarin also discussed challenges with Apple's stringent policies, particularly regarding Bitcoin tipping features, emphasizing Damus’ commitment to providing a free speech platform despite these obstacles.

AC: Could you explain what happened when Damus was initially launched in the China and Hong Kong App Stores?

D: After launching Damus in China and Hong Kong on January 31, 2023, the app quickly went viral in the Hong Kong App Store, reaching the second most popular spot within a few days. During this time, the cybersecurity division in China sent an official notice through Apple, which was unusual. I assume they have some sort of direct integration with Apple to act quickly on such matters. They didn't want our app to spread any further, so we managed to get around 24,000 downloads from users in mainland China before it was pulled from the China App Store. The app was never removed from the Hong Kong App Store, only from the mainland. Despite not having any Bitcoin or overtly controversial features, the app was censored and cut off.

AC: Did Apple forward you the notice from the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) to take down the app?

D: Yes, exactly. It was an email from Apple stating that the cybersecurity division of China had instructed them to take our app down. There was no opportunity to appeal either; the notice basically stated that our app was deemed against the law in China, and we had to remove it from the App Store, without specifying any actual law or legal statute. We are really just providing a free speech platform, which seems to be the biggest problem for the Chinese government's restrictions.

AC: What about the initial 24,000 users in China who downloaded Damus before the ban?

D: Well, those who already had the app installed on their device could still use that old version. But the real power comes from the ability for them to interact with users on any of the other client apps, making it extremely difficult for the Chinese Communist Party to completely cut off access to the entire network.

In response to censorship, I implemented more countermeasures, with a key discovery being that individuals in mainland China with Hong Kong accounts could potentially continue using the app. This suggested that a Hong Kong account could serve as a simple firewall bypass. However, the CAC began to scrutinize the Nostr protocol more closely a month or two later, leading to a ban on the relay. As we were using basic tools like web sockets and servers, they could target the IP of the servers. An interesting aspect was the ability to switch out the relays, meaning users weren't tied to the Damus relay and could even set up a private social network.

To counter the censorship, the app code was modified. Initially, the app always used a hardcoded set of bootstrap relays, which were all banned, causing the app to fail to load. With the code update, if a user switched out their relay set, this new set would be used as the bootstrap relay, potentially enabling continued use of Damus within China, possibly with their own relays.

Users in Mainland China can, for instance, simply use a web client, which is quite hard to ban, and still be able to interact with the Damus users. That's the strength of building on decentralized protocols, and I've always been a strong advocate of protocols over platforms. So, I think it's probably a major nuisance for the CCP if we continue to make it increasingly difficult for them. However, it's a cat and mouse game as they can keep banning relays.

AC: Could you detail the direct censorship from Apple regarding the Bitcoin features added to your app and share your thoughts on Apple's rules about permissible app functionality?

D: We tried to add features related to Bitcoin and tipping, and they explicitly banned certain things. For example, I can't put a tip button on posts, so I had to remove that. In a way, I have a censored version of the app in the App Store, just so I can stay on the App Store, which is disappointing.
On June 13, 2023, we unexpectedly received a notice from Apple stating that our app would be removed from the App Store if we didn't remove the zap feature—considered "tipping" digital content—within two weeks. Despite our efforts to explain that the content was already present and users weren't paying for digital content, Apple wouldn't relent. We had to remove the zapping feature, completely restructuring the app within the given timeframe. Regarding Apple's guidelines, it's evident that they don't apply their rules consistently, leaving enough ambiguity for arbitrary enforcement.

Event Details:

• Date: Thursday, June 20, 2024
• Time: 12:30 PM UTC (30 to 40 min)
• Platform: Zoom

Agenda:

1. Presentation of the Report:

Michael Caster, Asia Digital Programme Manager at ARTICLE 19, will moderate the event and introduce the report, as well as the "Engaging Tech for Internet Freedom" project, under which the report was developed. “Although Apple’s human rights policy promises a ‘deep sense of responsibility to make technology for people that respects their human rights [and] empowers them with useful tools and information,’ with this report yet again we see how Apple’s supposed commitments to free expression and privacy are empty words when it comes to China,” he said. “We need more documentation on US tech company complicity to Chinese censorship and surveillance, and new models for accountability. This report is an invaluable contribution.”

Benjamin Ismail, Director of the AppleCensorship Project and member of GreatFire, will present the key findings of the report. Benjamin Ismail will discuss how the findings reveal Apple's role as a collaborator with an authoritarian regime, citing specific instances of app unavailability and censorship in China's App Store. "The data shows a significant digital isolation of Chinese users, with categories such as News, Books, and Social Networking being disproportionately targeted. This points to a troubling compliance by Apple with Chinese government demands, further entrenching state censorship," he notes. "More than two thirds of the most downloaded apps worldwide, are simply unavailable to Chinese users. This kind of digital isolation underscores the severity of the issue."

2. Discussion on Regulatory Framework:

Evan Greer, Director of Fight For The Future (FFTF), will talk about the need for policy changes and a new regulatory framework to regulate Big Tech companies like Apple. Evan Greer will emphasize the urgency for U.S. lawmakers to enact stringent regulations. "Big Tech companies have too much power, and they’re abusing that power in ways that undermine human rights across the globe. The findings of this report underscore the need for legislation now to ensure companies like Apple aren’t able to censor and restrict apps when operating in authoritarian environments," Evan Greer asserts. "Apple's willingness to comply with such restrictive measures highlights the critical need for new laws that protect digital freedoms and human rights."

3. Q&A Session:

An interactive session where attendees can pose their questions to the speakers.

Why Attend:

This event provides a unique opportunity to gain insights into the complex landscape of app censorship in China, understand the broader human rights implications, and explore actionable recommendations for policymakers. Your participation will contribute to a more informed and dynamic discussion on the future of digital rights and regulatory measures.

Key Findings from the Report:

• Among the 100 most downloaded apps worldwide, only four are also among the most downloaded in China’s App Store, all of which are Chinese.
• 66 out of the 108 most downloaded apps worldwide (61%) were found unavailable to Chinese iOS users. This number has recently increased.
• In contrast, only 8 apps (7%) were unavailable in the U.S. App Store.
• Categories such as Games, Utilities, Education, Entertainment, and Lifestyle are proportionally represented in the list of unavailable apps in China, aligning with their prevalence in the App Store. However, News, Books, and Social Networking categories are disproportionately unavailable, suggesting targeted censorship.
• Sensitive categories like VPNs, Privacy & Digital Security, LGBTQ+ & Dating, News & Information, Social Media & Communication, Tibet & Buddhism, Uyghur, and Religion apps are particularly affected by censorship in China.

Recent Developments: 

Adding to the report's urgency, recent actions by Apple have intensified the conversation about digital freedom and censorship. As of April 19, 2024, Apple has removed widely-used apps such as WhatsApp and Instagram from its China App Store, citing national security concerns in line with the Chinese government's stringent regulations. This move significantly updates the situation outlined in the report's section on "The Isolation of Chinese Users," illustrating an increasing trend of digital isolation for Chinese iOS users and creating even more barriers for foreign journalists and other members of civil society who used to access these apps via a VPN.

RSVP

To receive the link to participate in the event, please confirm your attendance by sending an email to at least one of the following email addresses by Wednesday, June 19, 2024.

We look forward to your participation in this critical discussion.

Benjamin Ismail,
Project Director, The App Censorship Project

benjamin@greatfire.org
GreatFire.org

Michael Caster,
Asia Digital Programme Manager,
michaelcaster@article19.org
ARTICLE 19

Svetlana Zens

ETIF Programm Manager

svetlanazens@article19.org 

Fight for the Future

Evan Greer, she/her
Director
evan@fightforthefuture.org

This recent announcement, though concerning, aligns with Beijing’s ongoing efforts to intensify control over online information, particularly on mobile devices which have become the primary access points for online information and services in China.

The eight apps targeted by the authorities in their message include six made-in-China encrypted chat and “VPN” apps: Lianxin, BatChat (Bianfu), Shimida, Seagull (Haiou), Papercraft (Zhifeiji), and Plane Booster (Feiji Jiasuqi), along with WhatsApp and Telegram, which are among the apps the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) ordered Apple to remove from its China App Store just in April.

This announcement primarily highlighted domestic apps, with only two mentions of foreign apps, suggesting that the authorities are facing challenges in controlling information even on domestic apps available in the App Store.

In the case of WhatsApp and Telegram, Chinese authorities likely recognize that despite blocking these apps and making them largely unusable for most iOS users without a VPN – a category completely purged from the App Store since 2017 – many users had already downloaded these apps before their removal and could still access them using a VPN. Thus, the recent campaign aims to target residual users for whom previous app removals were ineffective.

Domestic Chinese entities and app stores such as Huawei, Xiaomi, Tencent, and Oppo, as well as app developers like Zhejiang Jianxin Technology Co., Ltd (the developer of Lianxin) and ChengDu Ciyuan Zhishi Technology Co., Ltd (the developer of BatChat), are tightly controlled by the Chinese authorities. It is also assumed that the authorities generally face more challenges with foreign platforms like Apple and Google, and developers of foreign apps.

Therefore, one may wonder why these domestic apps aren’t simply banned like the foreign ones, if they do indeed challenge the authorities’s digital surveillance efforts. There are quite a few possible reasons: legal registration provided by the CAC may prevent local police from demanding their removal directly from the App Store; the perceived threats by these apps not yet warranting national-level CAC action, or the apps may be too embedded in daily life and business, making a ban problematic both economically and socially.

Ultimately, it is alarming to see authorities resort to real-life peer surveillance to clamp down on the last vestiges of privacy and information sharing among Chinese mobile users. The MPS message even encouraged parents and school teachers to bring their minors to nearby public security offices if they are found using these apps, to determine if they are involved in criminal activities.

Nonetheless, it is encouraging to see local platforms challenging this control, much like their foreign counterparts. It is also intriguing to discover so-called "VPN" apps. While these apps may not meet the exact definition of VPNs as understood internationally, they offer sufficient privacy and freedom to users, making them "problematic" in the eyes of the authorities.

The availability of these apps in the App Store indicates a continued appreciation for privacy and free information sharing in China. This sends a reassuring message to human rights defenders and highlights the need to continue providing Chinese citizens with tools for censorship circumvention and privacy protection.

In this context, AppleCensorship interviewed Matthias Pfau, co-founder of private encrypted email provider Tuta, previously blocked in Egypt and by Russian internet service providers. Pfau shared Tuta's perspective as an App Store app regarding Apple's DMA compliance and its impact on similar apps. The interview delved into how Apple's policies significantly hinder app development processes, making it challenging for developers to distribute apps outside the App Store. It also stressed efforts to combat tech giants' monopolistic control and emphasized the importance of privacy protection through encryption.

AC: Given the EU's DMA objectives to promote fair competition, how might Apple's high commission fees on sideloaded apps and third-party stores impact consumer choices and app diversity on iOS? Could these costs discourage smaller developers, thereby limiting innovation and the range of specialized apps available?

Matthias: If you want to offer your app outside the Apple App Store, Apple makes it extremely difficult for developers. The challenge isn't just the expense; it's also the requirement to display a "scare screen" to customers. This screen warns users that the app hasn't been reviewed by Apple, implying that the app might be insecure. This warning can significantly reduce downloads, upgrades, and revenues.

Although Apple theoretically allows developers to distribute apps via alternative channels, the practicalities make it nearly impossible from a business perspective. We're essentially stuck with the Apple App Store and can't realistically use an alternative. This is gatekeeping. A big chunk of the revenue you make goes to Apple because of their fees.

This practice not only affects current revenues but also stifles innovation. With so much of the earnings going to Apple, developers have fewer resources for development, marketing, and promoting new apps. Consequently, the high barriers imposed by Apple's power hinder the entry of new apps and ideas into the market, ultimately stifling innovation.

 AC: You have criticized Apple's restrictive sideloading policies versus Android's openness, highlighting impacts on competition, developers’ and users’ freedoms. What lessons can iOS learn from Android's approach, and how do developer and consumer experiences differ between the two ecosystems under the new regulations?

Matthias: If you compare it directly with iOS, Android is much more open and free. Android allows direct downloads, so people can go to our website and download the app to their Android phones. Because Android is more open, there are already other platforms, not just Google's Play Store. One very popular alternative app distribution platform in Germany is F-droid, which is an open-source platform. And this is a great example of how the internet should be, because this is a platform that only allows open-source apps. People going to this app store are those who are fans of open-source, who know how important open-source is for security, know that these apps have been vetted by experts, and there's no cost. There's no scare screen when you download the app from F-droid in comparison to sideloading on iOS. And yet it is still very secure because everything is open-source and well monitored by the developers behind it. This is the best example to show why and how the open system could be better in relation to iOS, and Apple should really copy this approach and give more power to the people and more choice for consumers. In fact, right now if you own an iPhone, you are basically held hostage by Apple, because you can only use apps that Apple allows you to use whether you like it or not. That's just how it is. And so far, the DMA has not changed this because of Apple's malicious compliance. For the consumer, nothing has changed.

AC: Tuta compares the DMA to Swiss cheese, criticizing Apple's evasive compliance and noting the EU's enforcement challenges. What measures could the EU adopt from an app developer's standpoint to ensure Apple's stricter adherence?

Matthias: The EU is going in the right direction with the DMA, and they have already announced that they will be investigating whether not only Apple, but also Amazon and Google are actually complying with the DMA sufficiently. We are really excited to see this happening. And we are curious to see the outcome because in our opinion, Apple's new policy does not comply with the DMA. It is not sufficient. The EU must look into this. And they are doing just that, which is great. I think this should also happen in a much more global space. The U.S. should also look into this monopolistic power and how to limit it because it affects everyone worldwide, given the power of these companies.

AC: How does Apple’s ‘compliance’ reflect broader trends and challenges in digital ecosystems and the fight against monopolistic practices which harm users’ fundamental rights?

Matthias: Apple is not alone in its monopolistic power abuse. We see this from a lot of big tech services, be it Google, Amazon, Microsoft. These organizations are so huge that they can prefer their own products, make advertisements for their own products. Take Google, for instance. They own search and whatever comes first in search results is being clicked most - if Google decides to show our Android app instead of our website, then the app will get much more clicks. Or they can decide to show their product first. And this self-preferencing is really dangerous. It's happening on Amazon as well. You hear that from sellers on Amazon that the Amazon owned products are often shown first. And this monopolistic power just makes it so difficult for any competitor to become known, to become broad, to get a broader usage. As a secure email provider, it is already difficult for us to compete against Gmail and Outlook because they are so big and they have other services where they can market their own products like Google Search or outlook packages. With this self-preferencing, it becomes close to impossible for us to ever leave the niche; but this is exactly what we must do because Tuta Mail is so much better in terms of security and privacy. We must try to leave the niche so that people have the opportunity to use something different and to protect their privacy while using the web.

AC: Has Tuta collaborated with other developers, industry groups, or human rights organizations regarding the DMA. What was the focus of your collaboration?

Matthias: Our collaboration was not directly related to the DMA, but it centered on the critical issue of undermining encryption. We partnered with other companies that prioritize privacy to help politicians understand the vital role of encryption in maintaining security. We typically engage through open letters or direct emails to politicians, emphasizing the technical infeasibility of combining client-side scanning with secure communication.

AC: Has the threat or experience of censorship influenced your decisions in app development, content creation, or market targeting? Has it led to self-censorship or changes in your development approach?

Matthias: We would never turn to self-censoring because we are here to fight for the right to privacy, and for freedom of speech because both are closely interlinked. So our mission is to fight for privacy with encryption, with technology. Politicians increasingly try to undermine encryption with legislations like client-side scanning. In our view, this is a severe threat to everyone's privacy and thus also to democracy itself. We, as societies, need to make the politicians understand that encryption is the only tool we have to protect our data online. Not just from state-sponsored snooping like what China and Russia are doing, but also from what threatens everyone, like identity theft and phishing attacks. All of these malicious acts online are much more easily conducted if your data is open and freely accessible. Only encryption can protect you.

In August 2023, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) announced that all mobile app providers must register their business details with the government. The MIIT said that apps without proper filings would be punished after a grace period ending in March 2024.

Apple now requires developers to submit an "internet content provider (ICP) filing" for publishing new apps on its App Store, as stated on its developer website, and has already removed several apps from its China App Store, including high-profile social media and communication apps such as Threads and WhatsApp.

However, Apple has not significantly pushed back on the coercive law. Apart from meetings with Chinese officials around the time of the announcement, the details of which remain unknown, Apple merely reiterated its compliance with the laws of each country where it operates.

Apple’s Double Standards

At the same time those regulations were announced last year, in July 2023, Apple was reportedly threatening to shut down iMessage and FaceTime in the U.K. in response to plans to increase government surveillance powers.

Apple's approach to China significantly differs from its interactions with Western governments or regulatory bodies such as the European Commission.

While Apple has systematically complied with Beijing's strict regulations—purging its China App Store of all VPNs since 2017 and removing messaging apps, human rights-focused media, and other services targeted by the Chinese state—it has deployed considerable efforts to push back on regulations it views as contrary to its interests.

Corporate interest is the crux of Apple’s every move, legal action, and statement. Even when Apple invokes “users’ rights,” it is always about the company's financial interests.

Apple's so-called “compliance” with the DMA has proved to be anything but genuine and driven by Apple’s desire to retain as much control as possible, not by users' interests.

The Digital Markets Act (DMA) became law on September 14, 2022, and designated gatekeepers were given six months to comply. Apple, expected to be a gatekeeper, had almost 18 months to make the necessary changes. Instead, Apple tried to undermine the DMA by claiming Safari is multiple browsers, separating iPadOS from iOS despite their functional similarity (a tactic that failed as the EU regulated iPad under the DMA), adding extremely onerous, unfair, and likely illegal terms to their API access contracts for third-party browsers using their own engine, locking changes to only the iPhone and the EU, and effectively banning browsers from listing on alternative app stores on iOS.

While Apple was revealing its bogus implementation of the DMA, CEO Tim Cook participated in the China Development Forum, an annual gathering of business leaders and Chinese officials. Cook enthusiastically remarked how “vibrant and so dynamic” China was, in an ironic juxtaposition to Apple's renewed cooperation with app censorship in China, underscoring a significant discrepancy between the company’s public expressions and its business practices.

Apple Can Do Much More to Push Back in China

Defenders of Apple, or “realists,” argue that Apple does what it can given the different contexts in which it operates, implying it pushes for users’ interests whenever possible. They claim that because Chinese authorities give Apple no room to negotiate, it must comply with the law, as it does everywhere else. This could not be farther from reality.

Apple can and has challenged regulations in China for many years, but only to protect its own interests, not users’:

• In 2011 and 2012, it defended its right to use the “IPAD” trademark in Guangdong after being sued by a Shenzhen-based company. Apple shares rose 1.3 percent following a $60 million court-mediated settlement.
• It also sued a Sichuan-based food company, Sichuan Fangguo Food Co., Ltd, for having a logo too similar to its own.
• In 2014, Apple sued the China National Intellectual Property Administration and a domestic company over patent rights for its "Siri" personal assistant.
• In 2017, Apple sued Chinese phone maker Baili and the Beijing Intellectual Property (IP) Bureau after the latter demanded stopping iPhone sales.

However, when it comes to users’ rights, Apple doesn’t take action. When the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) orders Apple to take down apps, whether targeted or en masse, Apple complies without challenging the authorities.

Apple Should Stand for Human Rights in China

By exploiting democratic norms and yielding to authoritarian demands, Apple sets a troubling precedent that threatens users’ rights and freedoms, risking the encouragement of similar practices among other multinational corporations.

To mitigate the negative impact of China's regulatory landscape and restore stakeholder trust, Apple should file legal challenges against unconstitutional decisions, as TikTok is doing in the U.S., or at least bring cases to lower-level courts initially.

Apple cannot claim it is trying to push back behind the curtains; that no longer works. Proof of its actions is needed.

While the results of these litigations might be predictable, the primary goal is to gain visibility and exposure for these issues. Even if the efforts are largely symbolic, they can ignite both local and international discussions, effectively making a strong point and potentially influencing future regulatory practices.

Furthermore, Apple should detail the specific reasons behind individual app takedowns, citing relevant laws and policies. Even if Apple must adhere to China's regulations, adopting a 'transparency strategy'—providing detailed explanations instead of vague references to legal or security issues—could open opportunities for public scrutiny of the Chinese government's actions.

Finally, implementing sideloading on iOS worldwide would significantly mitigate censorship efforts not only in China but also in other authoritarian regimes, expanding users' access to information and promoting digital freedom globally. Apple could adopt a unified approach that equally considers everyone's fundamental rights, fostering global freedom of information and thought. This strategy would incidentally empower Chinese users by providing broader access to diverse content and perspectives, which is crucial in an increasingly restrictive internet environment.

According to AppleCensorship’s App Store Monitor (ASM), the removals appear to have occurred around the 18th or early morning of the 19th of April.

WhatsApp App Details page on AppleCensorship.com: https://applecensorship.com/app-store-monitor/app/310633997

These removals underscore Apple’s ongoing and unquestioning compliance with the Chinese government’s directives, highlighting that its adherence to governmental orders is, at best, misconstrued as lawful obedience. Apple’s claim of following local laws does not stand when orders from the CAC overstep legal norms and venture into arbitrary enforcement. Furthermore, Apple has failed to provide a transparent legal justification for these actions.

Signal - Private Messenger App Details page: https://applecensorship.com/app-store-monitor/app/874139669

Telegram Messenger App Details page: https://applecensorship.com/app-store-monitor/app/686449807

"We are yet to discover how many apps have been targeted in this recent wave of removals, and we fear that other, less prominent apps may have also been removed alongside these popular messaging and information platforms. However, what is already clear is that Apple continues to serve as Beijing’s censorship arm, compromising the fundamental rights of millions of users to access information without hesitation," said Benjamin Ismail, Director of GreatFire's AppCensorship project.

"Complying with the law is fundamentally different from yielding to government's extrajudicial demands. The removal of these apps under the vague pretext of national security, without any clear legal mandate, reflects a compliance that prioritizes profit-driven motives to appease the Chinese government," Ismail added.

Threads App Details page: https://applecensorship.com/app-store-monitor/app/6446901002

Interestingly, other major apps like Instagram and Messenger remain available in the China App Store, underscoring the inconsistency and selectivity of Apple's compliance.

Instagram App Details page:https://applecensorship.com/app-store-monitor/app/389801252

The removal of these apps follows the CAC’s pattern of overreaching decisions, such as the notable crackdown on DiDi in 2021, which also saw Apple's compliance in removing the app from its platform.

“Such a policy of unquestioning compliance by Apple not only suppresses free expression and access to information but also contributes further to the splintering of the internet, creating a segmented digital world where access is dictated by political and economic agendas rather than user rights and freedoms,” Ismail concluded.

GreatFire demands that Apple take actions consistent with its stated commitment to human rights and start questioning its role in facilitating state censorship under the guise of legal compliance.

As we continue to witness the removal of vital communication tools, it becomes imperative to challenge and scrutinize the legal grounds of such compliance, advocating for a clear distinction between lawful adherence and complicity in suppression.
 

Empowering Ethical Shopping

According to the app description page, Boycat’s mission is to transform the way users shop by providing detailed insights into the ethical practices of companies. With features like a barcode scanner to reveal a product’s ethical status and a community-driven platform for submitting and voting on ethical alternatives, Boycat aims to promote conscious consumerism. The app’s latest feature, Zoomies, extends this mission to dining and shopping venues, encouraging users to support or boycott businesses based on their ethical standings.

Suspension Amidst Controversy

In a tweet reporting the suspension of Boycat and urging a boycott to support Palestine, Boycat’s owners called for public support to reinstate the app in the Google Play Store. Google’s decision was reportedly based on a specific message within the app, which claimed that Caterpillar D9 bulldozers were specifically designed for the IDF, and were used in the demolition of Palestinian homes. This message, deemed not compliant by Google, prompted the suspension, despite Boycat providing sources to substantiate its claims.

GreatFire’s AppCensorship project Director, Benjamin Ismail, stated: “Once again, Google assumes the role of arbiter of truth within the Play Store ecosystem—a role it is ill-suited to hold— and fails to demonstrate that the information provided by Boycat was indeed misleading, or that it was deliberately so. If the app has indeed violated legal statutes, then it should be the jurisdiction of the courts to decide its compliance. Should it not breach any laws, Google ought to abstain from unilateral actions driven by political biases.”

A Pattern of Censorship

This incident is not Google’s first foray into censoring apps related to boycott movements. In November 2023, an app called NoThanks was temporarily suspended for its description’s reference to the Israel-Hamas conflict, demonstrating Google’s tendency towards arbitrary and expedited measures without offering justification or transparency for its actions.

Broader Implications

The removal of Boycat from the Google Play Store raises significant questions about the balance between combating misinformation and preserving freedom of speech, especially within digital platforms that have become central to public discourse. As digital storefronts like Google’s Play Store wield considerable power over what apps can reach consumers, their decisions on censorship and app removals have far-reaching implications for developers, users, and the broader movement for ethical consumption and political activism.

“The removal of Boycat from the Google Play Store highlights a pivotal challenge: that tech companies should not be the arbiters of deciding when to uphold or restrict freedom of information and expression within crucial digital platforms,” said Ismail.

“Given the immense influence platforms like Google’s Play Store exert on app accessibility, their practices of censorship and app removals carry significant consequences not just for developers and users, but also for movements dedicated to ethical consumption and political activism. This situation highlights the urgent need for lawmakers to enact regulations preventing tech giants like Google and Apple from restricting information freedom based on their own sets of rules and interests.”

To address the critical need for more transparency and oversight in Google’s Play Store, we have initiated the development of the “Play Store Monitor (PSM)” to track app availability and censorship on Google’s platform, complementing our existing efforts with the AppleCensorship project. We are planning to launch the GoogleCensorship website around September this year, aiming to illuminate the practices of mobile app stores further. This will be followed by the introduction of the AppCensorship.org website, uniting both platforms’ monitoring efforts into a single, user-friendly resource.

Beyond the diverse legal frameworks of countries and varied responses from companies, a third factor further splinters the internet: regional bodies like the EU Commission, which recently enacted the Digital Markets Act, play a significant role. Institutions add complexity by ruling on cases or establishing new regulations solely within their jurisdictions.

This fragmentation, both in legislative frameworks and tech companies' practices, detracts from a uniform global internet experience and obstructs the establishment of global digital rights standards. The absence of a cohesive strategy to align tech operations with human rights principles means that isolated legal victories, such as Epic vs. Google may not suffice in fostering a digital landscape that universally upholds human rights.

Splintered Web: Global Digital Unity in an Era of Regulatory Divergence

The European Union's Digital Markets Act (DMA) and Digital Services Act (DSA) epitomize a provisional triumph in which Apple is compelled to modify its iOS app distribution model to possibly permit web-based app distribution. However, this departure from Apple's previously exclusive App Store ecosystem is limited to the EU, representing a loss in the wider context of internet fragmentation.

Region-specific enforcement fragments the global digital ecosystem through geographical disparities. An EU developer, whose main user base is outside the EU, benefits minimally from these regulations if their app is App Store-rejected and they can't provide it alternatively to their intended audience.

The problem of selective application and compliance extends beyond the EU. Globally, various jurisdictions implement distinct regulations, prompting tech companies to adjust their services, terms, and operations in specific markets to align with local laws, ranging from the UK and Japan to Italy and the Netherlands.

The fragmented state of internet governance undermines civil society and human rights organizations reliant on digital platforms for vital apps. In countries with heavy censorship like China and Russia, where human rights are often sidelined, there is an urgent need for tech companies to adhere to universal standards that surpass local laws.

Such standards would guarantee access to uncensored information, privacy protections, and support for marginalized groups and minorities. It is essential to establish universal principles, based on human rights standards like the UN’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, to ensure global accountability for tech companies.

Charting the Path Forward: Elevating the U.S.'s Role in Global Digital Regulation

“Jurisdictional differences highlight the need for companies like Google and Apple to follow global standards, such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights," stated Benjamin Ismail, Director of GreatFire's AppCensorship project. “Having consistent rules would help these companies deal with governments in the same way everywhere, preventing, or at least mitigating, authoritarian demands.”

The UN principles establish a clear framework aimed at mitigating the negative impacts of business operations on global human rights. Within this framework, Principle 11 emphasizes the responsibility of corporations to respect human rights, highlighting the incongruity of actions by companies such as Apple and Google, which, for example, limit app developers' capacity to offer alternative purchasing options. Such restrictions, currently imposed by both Apple and Google, are particularly detrimental for developers providing essential VPN services in authoritarian regimes, where payment alternatives are indispensable for protecting user privacy and ensuring access to information.

Principle 19 advocates for thorough due diligence to identify, prevent, and address human rights impacts adversely. It requires companies to proactively assess and rectify the potential human rights consequences of their policies. If Apple and Google were to adhere to these standards, it would impose regulation on their business operations. In the context of Principle 19, this means that the management and moderation of application distribution platforms, such as the App Store and Google Play, must evolve into processes that are transparent and governed by principles aligned with international standards—moving beyond the discretionary choices of the companies themselves.

Despite the obligations outlined in the UN guidelines, the current scenario underscores a significant reliance on tech companies to voluntarily adhere to these principles, a strategy that has proven insufficient. The necessity for an international regulatory framework has become apparent, compelling tech giants to commit to human rights, especially in situations where these rights are most vulnerable.

The Role of the US in Regulating US-based Transnational Corporations

The role of U.S. legislators is pivotal in leveraging the country's position as home to major tech companies to enforce UN guidelines through binding laws, creating a regulatory framework that ensures corporate accountability for human rights globally. This approach gains legitimacy as these tech giants are U.S.-based, making American oversight both relevant and significant.

Such regulation would also address concerns from lawmakers that repressive digital policies from abroad can infringe upon the fundamental rights of U.S. citizens. For instance, in compliance with demands from authoritarian governments, tech companies have implemented measures that limit users' rights on a global scale. For example, in 2022 alone, Apple removed 1,474 apps based on government takedown requests worldwide, with a significant portion, 1,435, originating from China. Furthermore, features like AirDrop have seen restrictions worldwide, too.

This approach would address legal inconsistencies and hold tech firms accountable in the U.S. for any human rights abuses worldwide, setting a global standard for digital rights protection. Championing such legislation would establish the U.S. as a leader in digital rights, fostering a digital environment that prioritizes human rights while addressing many of the antitrust concerns. It's a call to action for lawmakers, stakeholders, and tech companies to support democracy and human rights in the digital realm.

“The announcement of the Department of Justice  to sue Apple over antitrust violations is a watershed moment in the fight against corporate power and to protect human rights against powerful digital gatekeepers. Too often the problems with gatekeeper power are ignored, and people around the world pay the price. Apple has a track record of sacrificing the rights of their users when doing so benefits their ability to do business in authoritarian countries.

“The case against Apple is compelling and includes many examples of where Apple executives sacrificed user experience in the name of profits. They could not do this without monopoly power that forces users to accept a worse product, censored apps, and walled garden that eliminates choice.

“This abuse of monopoly power leads to real human rights consequences. Apple has a history of helping governments isolate, silence, and oppress political opposition, protesters, and minority groups. Apple’s restrictive app store policies have enabled the censorship of Tibetans & religious groups in China and LGBTQ+ content on a staggering scale globally. Local laws may require this, but being a censorship chokepoint is Apple’s choice, a choice made for profit that destroys lives. The App Store also requires elaborate systems of control that let Apple install unremovable spyware on iPhones. This control is an existential threat to privacy and endangers everyone from LGBTQ+ youth to human rights activists fighting authoritarianism.

“We applaud the DOJ and state attorneys general for filing this lawsuit and encourage Congress to take any action necessary to break up Apple’s gatekeeper power so that people in the United States and around the world can access the information and apps they want at fair prices. Surveillance capitalism and monopoly abuses are at the root of Big Tech harm. We need more actions like this from the federal government. It’s critical to address the root of the problem rather than more misguided calls for censorship and expanded surveillance.”

Charlie Smith, co-founder of GreatFire, added, “Apple’s anti-competitive business practices are being hijacked by authoritarian governments around the world to aid in censorship and surveillance. Forcing Apple to change their business model would not only benefit developers and shareholders, but also the hundreds of millions of Apple customers who are unable to freely access information because they use an Apple device.”

As the Hong Kong government pushes for Article 23 to pass, discussions about the Special Administrative Region’s autonomy and liberty of its local and foreign residents alike caught the attention of international press. The prospect of the security-focused laws target espionage, state secrets and foreign influence — on top of the 2020-enacted National Security Law — sending chills to rights advocates and defenders, as well as for foreign businesses and investors.

Eric Yan-ho Lai is a veteran human rights scholar and advocate from Hong Kong. He left in 2020 for London, where he received his PhD in law. He is now a research fellow at Georgetown Center for Asian Law in Washington D.C.

“The broad and vague definition of national security would make free speech and information access become more difficult,” Lai told AppleCensorship.com in a recent interview.

A clear definition of state secret and acts of espionage, or what constitutes foreign interference are all lacking in the Article 23 consultation paper, most likely intentionally in order to allow maximum room for interpretation by the HK government.

For example, “state secret could cover not just national defense or military intelligence, but information about economic and social development in Hong Kong and China,” Lai said. Publicizing statements which the government determined to be fake news or disinformation could be considered a threat to national security. Such conditions easily generate a chilling effect in the public discourse, discouraging the expression of voices critical of the government.

“Somehow, the government has a way to control all this information flow if they deem a piece of disinformation as threatening their security,” he added.

From bad to worse

The removal of the HKMap.live app from Hong Kong’s App Store amid the pro-democracy protests in October 2019 stands out as the quintessential case of mobile app censorship to date. Apple said the app violated the firm’s guidelines and Hong Kong’s local laws, while the app’s developers refuted the accusations.

“The app mainly provided information, instant information of how the city was going on, right? So even for non-protesters, even for citizens, they also want to know which area they shall avoid going for their own assessment. There was no ground for the taking down because the creators of the app were not even arrested,” Lai commented.

Nine months after HKMap.live was removed, the Hong Kong government enacted the National Security Law. Under the new law, a climate of fear began to spread, and self censorship began to grow. Lai explained that under the NSL, the government has the authority to conduct investigation or interrogation against individuals, who are then forbidden from disclosing their interrogation to the public. This suggests that more government-initiated investigations and potential censorship can occur behind the scenes, away from public scrutiny.

A transparency report from Google revealed that the Hong Kong government made requests to remove 183 items — mostly from YouTube — in the second half of 2022 alone, including 55 related to national security. As for Apple, the firm didn’t bother to include app removals in Hong Kong during the same period in its transparency report. This omission, previously highlighted by AppleCensorship.com, raises questions about the deliberate neglect and extent of undocumented activities.

With the upcoming Article 23, Lai believes it would make such public disclosure even more challenging, as such information could potentially be perceived as ‘state secret’ if the authorities were to interpret it that way, thus disclosing it would break the law.

When asked to give recommendations as to how tech giants operating in Hong Kong should respond, Lai said to “be more transparent of government requests is always helpful to the public, and allow the public to recognize how the government in Hong Kong is restricting information access.”

Worse and beyond

In July 2023, users found out that the ‘Punish Mee’ app on their phone was no longer working.The app, which gathered information about shops and restaurants supportive of the democracy movement in Hong Kong, had been removed from both Hong Kong’s App Store and Play Store, with its social media accounts also inaccessible.

The same week Hong Kong national security police arrested five people who were linked to both Demosisto (political party advocating for Hong Kong’s self-determination, now disbanded) and the app. Accusations against them include funding rights activists who had left Hong Kong with income from operating the app.

“No one could know whether they removed it by themselves or Apple did…The Hong Kong government can request Apple to provide any information of these apps and its creators or owners. So in a way, there's also a threat to these people,” Lai remarked.

Indeed, the NSL has accelerated the demise of the ‘one country, two systems', with Article 23 further enhancing the Hong Kong government’s control over its citizens. The outlook for rights advocates and defenders in Hong Kong appears bleak, while foreign companies would tread carefully to avoid accusations of ‘foreign interference.’

How to cope with the increasingly challenging legal circumstances? Lai stresses the importance of updating risk assessments for rights defenders. “The consultation document has a lot of ambiguities. And the government has to codify these ambiguities into a new legislative bill. So rights advocates could only assess their risk of continuing their work or assess their current settings of digital security until the bill is out.”

The same for commercial companies, they have to reassess risk and conduct due diligence in terms of their investments in Hong Kong, because “the new legal framework could make them having the same risk as in mainland China,” Lai added.

Apple's response to the DMA introduces limitations on sideloading and alternative app stores within the European Union, indicating a desire to maintain control over its ecosystem. While the DMA encourages diversity in the app market, Apple's conditions for alternative app stores and payment service providers may hinder competition and innovation. 

The DMA's emphasis on interoperability and sideloading broadens app access, especially for those reliant on niche apps not present in major app stores due to censorship or similar restrictions. Sideloading, in particular, serves as a workaround to government or corporate censorship, offering access to a wider range of uncensored apps and services, a critical resource for individuals in countries with severe government censorship. 

However, Apple's interpretation of ‘sideloading’ as per the DMA is quite restrictive. They describe it as "the process of downloading iOS apps from places other than the official app marketplace. In the EU, users will have the option to access alternative marketplaces offering apps for download." This implies that direct internet downloads of apps are not permitted, underscoring Apple's intent to retain significant control over its app ecosystem.  

Benjamin Ismail, director of the AppleCensorship project, highlights a significant contradiction. He points out, “Apple boldly challenges the EU Commission, claiming that 'Across every change, Apple introduces new safeguards that reduce — but don't eliminate — the risks the DMA poses to EU users.' Yet, it cooperates directly with censorship regimes worldwide without attempting to mitigate, challenge, or find workarounds for the impact.” 

Financial Disincentives for Developers 

Furthermore, Apple's new commission structure poses a potential financial burden on developers. It includes a reduced commission, a payment processing fee for using the App Store’s system, and a Core Technology Fee (CTF) for high-volume apps.  

The CTF, in particular, could disproportionately place greater financial burden on developers with popular but low-revenue apps, such as human rights or security related apps, undermining benefit from reduced commissions. This complex fee structure, which will undoubtedly deter developers from exploring alternative distribution or payment methods, further consolidates Apple's control over the app market. 

Superficial Compliance Sets Damaging Precedent 

Apple's restrictive responses limit developer freedom and consumer choice, reinforcing its app distribution dominance and undermining the DMA's aim for a fair, competitive digital market. This necessitates further regulatory scrutiny and intervention. 

Apple's superficial compliance strategy not only endangers developers and users but also carves a perilous path, showing how companies can cunningly bend the system for their own gain. 

If Apple's approach is allowed to stand, it may serve as an incentive for other tech firms to emulate these tactics and feign compliance with regulations while maintaining a stranglehold over their digital realms. It would eventually bolster the dominance of big tech companies, directly contradicting the core principles of the DMA – to bring contestability and fairness in digital markets. 

Potential Spill-over Effect 

As other countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom craft their regulatory policies, the global community closely observes the DMA's implementation. This heightened attention may inspire regions worldwide to adopt similar measures, extending benefits such as interoperability and sideloading to users beyond the EU. GreatFire emphasizes the need for Europe's influence to safeguard digital rights globally. 

It is critical to acknowledge the potential spill-over effect, especially for users under authoritarian regimes. We advocate for regulations akin to the EU's DMA, calling for more robust frameworks to protect developers' and users' rights, often compromised by tech giants' monopolies.  

Apple's evasion of the DMA requires a firm, immediate response from the EU Commission. To avert such a scenario, it is imperative that the European Commission takes on a more assertive role in ensuring that tech giants like Apple wholeheartedly adhere to the DMA's principles.

Lhakpa Kyizom, a seasoned journalist dedicated to covering Tibet, grapples with the challenge of disseminating information from heavily surveilled regions without endangering sources or messengers. The confluence of limited app access, stringent censorship, and severe penalties has significantly impeded her work.

For most global mobile users, everyday activities like sharing life updates pose no risk. However, in Tibet, these seemingly innocuous actions can lead to imprisonment. Recent events, such as the three-year jail sentence handed to Tibetan singer Golok Palden for performing a patriotic song on a popular Chinese video app, highlight the grave consequences of such restrictions—incidents that have unfortunately occurred all too frequently over the past decades.

From the mid-2010s, mobile usage has become present across Tibet and Tibetans were actively sharing information through their devices. Android users rely on various Chinese app stores as Google Play Store is not accessible in China, while iOS users primarily access apps via Apple’s China App Store or locally developed third-party app stores. Regrettably, all these avenues fall under the stringent censorship of the Chinese regime, posing enduring challenges to secure and private communication.

Kyizom, who has covered Tibet from outside for over 15 years, witnessed a time when Tibetans had relatively more access to commonly used apps like Gmail and Skype, aiding her information gathering before 2010. However, even employing safety-conscious measures such as encrypted messaging apps led to the arrest of her sources, prompting Kyizom to revise her information request and retrieval methods.

Minimizing direct communication with individuals inside Tibet, Kyizom established a trust-based network of Tibetans-in-exile with connections within Tibet. Yet, she observed a distressing transnational repression against these intermediaries, leading to harassment or persecution of their relatives and friends within Tibet.

“The impact from transnational repression is huge; they [exiled Tibetans] are not communicating anymore, neither with their families nor with us. That's a challenge,” she explained.

Censorship by political ambitions

Examining AppleCensorship's findings on unavailable Tibetan apps, Kyizom attributes the censorship to the Chinese government's sinicization campaign, aiming to erase Tibetan language and culture. Apps that bear the Tibetan spiritual leader’s name, such as “Dalai Lama” and “Dalai Lama Quotes” are available in all 174 Apps Stores around the world except for the China App Store. The same goes to a range of news apps, including “Tibet Times,” “Voice of Tibet,” as well as Radio Free Asia’s Tibetan service and Voice of America’s Mandarin service.

In an earlier interview with Director of Technology at Tibet Action Institute, Lobsang Sither, it was established that all Tibet-related apps allowed on the China App Store align with the government's official stance on the region, and that stance evolves with current affairs.

On a social backdrop where a million Tibetan children are forced to go to boarding schools set up by the Chinese government in the pursuit of assimilation, political censorship on Tibet-related apps seems to only be the tip of the iceberg.

"These incidents mirror a broader political agenda outlined in the white paper published in November by the Chinese Communist Party on policies and governance in Tibet. It is not the first time such a white paper has been published, but this edition sets the precedent of replacing “Tibet" with its pinyin "Xizang" (Chinese romanization of the Mandarin script for “Tibet”) in the English translation. Since then, “Xizang'' has appeared much more frequently than “Tibet” in official documents and in the state-controlled news agency Xinhua."

This linguistic alteration reflects CCP's control of media outlets like "Tibet Daily," a daily newspaper published by the CCP Tibet Autonomous Regional Committee, whose app is available on the China App Store, uncoincidentally. According to CCP leader Xi Jinping’s directive, the media run by the party and the government are the propaganda fronts and must have the party as their family name. This is a guarantee that the newspaper would put the government before its readers. Independent news apps, particularly those covering Tibet, face insurmountable odds in surviving on Chinese app platforms.

If Kyizom could wish for an app accessible to Tibetans, she wants “one in the Tibetan language with a server located outside China” as it would facilitate safe communication, alleviating fears for personal safety. Yet, major tech companies have failed to provide such crucial tools in China.

And it appears that Kyizom's ideal app will face an even harsher regulatory setback due to the new rules by China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology: Starting in March 2024, all apps in China are required to "register" with mainland authorities—a requirement that Apple has started to enforce.

“They [big tech companies] compromise with the Chinese government. I don’t trust them to actually help humanitarians. At the end of day, they are commercial companies,” Kyizom asserted.

Apple's reliance on China for manufacturing and as a significant market is challenging, but not insurmountable. Contrary to some experts' views that Apple cannot or will not leave China, we contend that Apple has a range of options for ethical conduct, extending beyond the prospect of leaving China.

While exploring options for ethical conduct may not be cost-free, maintaining the status quo is also expensive for Apple. In the past decade, Apple has invested over $65 million in lobbying efforts in the United States alone, with annual expenditures increasing each year.

Last year, the company spent nearly $10 million, a steep rise from $3.37 million in 2013, and is likely to surpass this figure in 2023. In the EU, Apple's lobbying expenses doubled to about €7 million from October 2020 to September 2021, as per lobbyfact.eu.

We propose three strategies for Apple to address its situation in China and the problematic role it plays as an "app censorship bureau" for the Chinese Communist Party.

These strategies aim to strike a balance between operational continuity and honoring the fundamental freedoms and rights to information of Chinese users.

Strategy 1: Diversifying Production and Markets

Consider the possibility of Apple swiftly relocating its production out of China to escape Beijing's censorship demands.

While experts like the Financial Times or Bloomberg highlight the complexity of Apple's Chinese-built supply chain, suggesting a lengthy transition period, J.P. Morgan's estimates indicate that by 2025, about 25% of Apple products could be made outside China, up from 5% currently.

Contrary to the belief that exiting China is a long-term process, we argue that, if necessary, Apple could expedite this move, mirroring tech giants like Samsung and LG who have already transitioned their production to regions like India and Southeast Asia.

Apple's rapid response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, which included halting sales and limiting services in Russia, demonstrates its capacity to quickly adjust its market strategy in response to geopolitical events.

This precedent suggests Apple's potential to adapt its operations in China more swiftly than anticipated.

There are compelling financial reasons for Apple to accelerate its "decoupling from China." With diminishing cost advantages in China and projections that a third of electronics manufacturing may move abroad soon, Apple has an incentive to explore this shift.

While diversifying production locations to places like India and Vietnam, Apple should also seek new market opportunities beyond China, bracing for potential backlash. Initial financial setbacks are likely, but the long-term gain of independence is substantial.

Currently, Apple's relocation efforts are modest, with a significant portion of its products still manufactured in China. Recent political developments, such as the investigation into Foxconn, Apple's primary iPhone supplier, over tax and land use issues, underscore the urgency for Apple to reevaluate its China strategy.

This probe, considering Foxconn's established relations with Chinese authorities, highlights the complexities Apple faces and the need for decisive action. 

Strategy 2: Maintain Presence in China but Implement Sideloading 

If exiting China isn't currently feasible for Apple in terms of production or market presence, a viable alternative is implementing sideloading. This change, already enacted in iOS 17.2 due to the Digital Markets Act, albeit limited to EU countries, marks a shift from the App Store’s exclusivity.

Apple benefits from using third-party distributors for its physical products, allowing for competition and a broader reach alongside its flagship stores. This model should inspire a similar approach in app distribution.

As it stands, app developers are limited to distributing through Apple's App Store, with no direct distribution option. Implementing sideloading in China could challenge the App Store's monopoly, thereby enhancing user access to a wider array of apps and information, a critical step towards ensuring digital freedom.

Yet, introducing sideloading in China is a delicate process, requiring Apple to tactfully navigate local laws without violating them. Apple's history in China shows its capability in dealing with complex legal environments.

This step, while challenging, would align with Apple's commitment in its Human Rights Policy to engage in dialogue and tackle tough compliance issues.

Thus, while sideloading presents its challenges, it could be a significant step towards empowering Chinese users within Apple's ecosystem, aligning with global shifts in digital rights.

Strategy 3: Increase Transparency in the Interim

As Apple deliberates on its future actions, a crucial interim step is enhancing transparency about app removals at the behest of authorities. Current Transparency Reports fall short, offering vague and incomplete information that often aligns more with public relations than genuine disclosure.

Apple must shift its approach, providing comprehensive details in its Transparency Reports, thereby offering a clearer view of its compliance with Chinese regulations and the specific nature of content censorship.

Increased transparency may not undo censorship, but it can apply pressure on China and better inform the global community, potentially fostering more ethical practices.

Each proposed strategy, whether immediately actionable or requiring more time, presents its own set of challenges and opportunities.The current situation demands that Apple make a bold, well-informed decision in response to the growing challenges in China. It's crucial for Apple to act decisively, choosing a path that navigates these complexities while upholding its ethical standards.

We have initiated the development of a novel tool, the "Play Store Monitor (PSM)," designed to track the availability and removal of Android apps from the Play Store. This complements our ongoing efforts to enhance transparency in Apple’s App Store through the existing App Store Monitor (ASM), which has been documenting iOS app censorship since 2019.

Project Phases and Objectives

"Our objective is straightforward: to increase the transparency of mobile app store ecosystems globally," explains Benjamin Ismail, Project Director. "We aim to empower end users, app developers, CSOs, and other stakeholders worldwide with tools, data, and insights to effectively respond to app censorship trends." 

"We also hope this project will motivate tech giants like Apple and Google to embrace transparency in their operations, particularly in countries known for repressing political and other types of content," adds Ismail.

The project will unfold in two phases:  

First Phase:  

• Development of the Play Store Monitor (PSM), paralleling the success of our existing App Store Monitor (ASM). 
• Launch of the GoogleCensorship website, slated for summer 2024, which will host the PSM. 

Second Phase:  

• Creation of the AppCensorship website by summer 2025, amalgamating data from both the AppleCensorship and GoogleCensorship projects, allowing users to test app availability across both major platforms globally.

Enhancing Research and Advocacy

The upcoming websites will not only provide raw data, such as lists of unavailable apps, but will also feature articles, research reports, and news updates on project progress and activities. Our research will focus on the availability of sensitive apps in repressive countries, underpinning our advocacy and awareness campaigns. This will arm activists and civil society with valuable data to confront censorship.

Partnerships

the AppCensorship Project is proud to collaborate with a diverse array of partners. These partnerships, encompassing both individuals and organizations worldwide, play a crucial role in our targeted research initiatives. Each partner brings a unique focus, enhancing our ability to delve into specific areas of app censorship and its impact on various communities.

We are actively welcoming new partners, including human rights CSOs, both international and local, who are keen to investigate or bring to light app censorship issues. These collaborations are essential for exploring the effects of censorship on vulnerable groups such as human rights defenders, religious minorities, and others. 

By joining forces, we can provide a more comprehensive and impactful analysis, contributing to a greater understanding and awareness of digital rights issues globally. 

Digital Presence Updates

• Our X (Twitter) handle @applecensorship is changing to @AppCensorship.
• The applecensorship newsletter will evolve to cover both Apple and Google's censorship activities. Subscriptions are open at applecensorship.com until the launch of the AppCensorship website.

About GreatFire

For over a decade, GreatFire has been actively monitoring and combating censorship in China and beyond. Our efforts focus on nations governed by repressive regimes, where we tirelessly advocate for an internet characterized by free expression and unrestricted access to information. To learn more about our organization's endeavors and ongoing projects, visit www.greatfire.org.

Contact us

For inquiries or more information about the AppCensorship Project, please reach out to us at contact@applecensorship.org or use our formular here . We welcome your questions, suggestions, and partnership opportunities.

We are a mission-driven organization committed to monitoring and combating app censorship on a global scale. We are in search of a dedicated and proficient Web Developer to lead the development and ongoing maintenance of three distinct projects: a new website for our Play Store Monitor (PSM), improvements to our existing App Store Monitor (ASM) website, applecensorship.com, and a completely new website that will host our Mobile App Censorship (MAC) monitor.

The Play Store Monitor, currently in development, aims to let users test app availability in over 140 countries where Google Play is operational. This initiative complements our existing ASM, which is already operational on applecensorship.com and offers similar functionalities for Apple’s App Store. The MAC monitor will be an integrated platform that combines data from both Apple and Google stores, offering users a comprehensive view of app availability across these major platforms.

If you are passionate about digital rights and possess the technical skills to contribute to our vision, we invite you to join our team.
 

Job Role

Responsibilities:

• Lead the development and ongoing maintenance of our new Play Store Monitor (PSM) website, adhering to the UX design and guidelines set forth by our design team.

• Collaborate with multidisciplinary teams to deliver a comprehensive suite of website functionalities, such as real-time app availability testing, archival of historical test data, and in-depth pages for specific countries, apps, detected changes, and vanished apps.

• Ensure the website's optimal performance, scalability, and reliability to deliver a seamless user experience.

• Provide actionable suggestions for UI/UX improvements based on user feedback and performance metrics.
 

Requirements:

• Expertise in front-end technologies.

• Mastery of back-end technologies.

• Familiarity with database management systems.

• Solid understanding of API integrations for data retrieval and manipulation.

• Demonstrable experience in responsive web design and ensuring cross-browser compatibility.

• Exceptional problem-solving abilities and meticulous attention to detail.

• Capability to work autonomously, effectively managing multiple responsibilities.
 

Bonus Points:

• Previous experience in digital rights, advocacy, or human rights projects.

• Contributions to open-source development initiatives.
 

Benefits:

• Competitive compensation package.

• Work remotely.

• Engage in meaningful work as part of a team committed to social impact.

• Access to professional development opportunities.
 

How to Apply:

1. Review the existing AppleCensorship website and come prepared with suggestions for improvements, along with recommendations for the software tools that could facilitate these enhancements.

2. Submit a link to one website you have developed that you're particularly proud of and that is relevant to this role.

3. Email your resume and portfolio to benjamin@greatfire.org, using the subject line "Mobile App Censorship Web Developer Application – [Your Name]."

If you're a skilled web developer with a commitment to digital rights and a desire to drive meaningful change, we encourage you to apply. Join us in our global endeavor to combat mobile app censorship; we are excited to see how you can contribute to our mission.
 

GreatFire is a China-based, anti-censorship organization that’s worked since 2011 to expose digital censorship by the Chinese government and help Chinese citizens freely access information. Today, we’re throwing our weight behind two Big Tech antitrust bills minutes away from a vote in the United States Congress because we want to make clear to policy makers, academics, lawyers, and society at large that taking action on antitrust will improve human rights for people facing government censorship around the world. 

In 2019, our team began investigating Apple’s relationship with Chinese state censorship—and we found piles of evidence that Apple’s App Store gatekeeps information access in China. Our project, AppleCensorship.com, reviewed iOS App Store data, interviewed developers, and fact checked Apple’s statements and policies. So far, our partners and contributors have identified almost 10,000 apps that are unavailable in China’s App Store, including Apple’s own News app. In fact, two hundred of these unavailable apps are news apps—a critical sign of ongoing oppression of access to information.

App takedowns from Apple’s app stores are just one example of the well-documented censorship policies resulting from Apple’s relationship with Beijing (those policies also include censorship of media, design, emojis, engravings, and more). And while other tech companies like Meta and Google have considered country-specific measures that would feed Chinese state repression in similar ways, Apple has gone the farthest in terms of implementing these policies. 

Fortunately, two bills in the US Congress offer real hope in the fight to limit Big Tech’s human rights violations in authoritarian states: the Open App Markets Act (OAMA) and the American Innovation and Choice Online Act (AICOA).

OAMA and AICOA would bring about a number of critical challenges to Big Tech monopoly rule. Most significantly for Chinese communities and others living under authoritarian rule, they would give people freedom to choose their tools and devices themselves, instead of being constrained by the choices made for them by Big Tech monopolies. Local activists, journalists and lawyers would finally gain access to robust VPN apps that do not share their information with authorities. LGBTQ+ community members, ethnic minorities and persecuted religious groups could download tools to organize their communities, like secure messaging apps. Everyday people would be able to use independent media apps to access uncensored information, including information about the COVID-19 pandemic that has been suppressed by state censors. 

OAMA would finally allow the international developer community to offer their apps to Chinese users who have, until now, been prevented from accessing thousands of apps considered “illegal” by China’s Cyber Administration. Both OAMA and AICOA prohibit companies from applying their terms of service in discriminatory ways. Such prohibition may allow for ways to fight back against Apple’s strong inclination to abide to authoritarian governments’ requests to remove LGBTQI+ or religious apps due to “local laws” (including when said laws do not even exist).

In other words, by undercutting Big Tech’s top-down control of digital infrastructure, OAMA and AICOA would create powerful new ways to resist China’s “Great Firewall.” While we’ll continue to monitor and challenge Big Tech’s collusion with the Chinese government for the foreseeable future, Apple would no longer exercise such a disturbing chokehold on the modes and methods of our resistance.

Apple and Big Tech regularly claim to value freedom of the press, free speech and human rights, but we think it’s telling that none of these companies have acknowledged the positive human rights impacts of OAMA and AICOA—specifically for people living in countries under authoritarian rule, mass surveillance, and government crackdowns. 

Instead, they’ve tried to hijack the narrative around these bills by arguing that breaking up Big Tech “will only help China.” Painting antitrust reform as a threat to national security is a cheap, stale argument thrown around by Big Tech to obscure their own complicity in global state violence. These are bad-faith critiques because Big Tech companies will say anything to maintain their monopolistic control over our tools and devices, at any price.

In 2021, antitrust bill sponsor Rep. David Cicilline told the press that the “evidence is just the opposite” of what Big Tech argues about the national security impacts of antitrust legislation. He argued that competition drives innovation, and innovation will only boost US national security (as well as the US’s position within the global digital marketplace). We agree. 

If anything, China’s authorities would likely consider these bills threatening to China’s own national security, given that Beijing views marginalized communities and social movements as “national security threats” – and as we’ve argued, these are the groups that would be strengthened by the increased choices and freedoms that OAMA and AICOA create. 

As we’ve told Congress, Apple’s App Store censorship policies constitute a serious abuse of the company’s power and are emblematic of its monopoly status. Although AICOA and OAMA will not solve every problem with global information access, they will absolutely reduce the scale and scope of Big Tech censorship. OAMA and AICOA are worth supporting not only because they’ll even the competitive playing field in the US, but also because they’ll have a net positive impact on human rights across the globe.

Ashley Gjovik, Researcher

Benjamin Ismail, Project Director

This video will help any user of the website understand how to test specific apps, groups of apps, keywords, how to read the results, and how to verify the current status of 155 global Apple app stores. A new, upgraded version of the website is planned to be released this summer. If you would like you provide us feedback, comments are available on Youtube.

(Registered users can watch the video and read the recorded chat session directly on the RightsCon’s website)

Video Presentation

June 8, 2022 | 5:15 – 6:15pm CEST

Apple Censorship project addresses a lack of transparency around app removals and censorship by Apple. It uses a testing tool, called the App Store Monitor (ASM), to monitor and compare availability of apps by country across Apple’s 155 App Stores. This information was not readily available before. The ASM also allows users to easily test the availability of any iOS apps around the world.

Apple complies with authoritarian governments (e.g. China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, etc.) to censor apps without any good reasons. Many civil society organizations have asked Apple to stop removing apps at the request of censors. To support this work, the ASM can provide data on what and how many apps are unavailable in different countries. Using the ASM, for instance, we recently found out that many Bible and Quran apps are unavailable in China’s App Store.

Read April 21st Press release / Read the Report online / View the data : here and here

Dissecting the four Transparency Reports covering “Worldwide Government App Store Takedown Requests” from January 2019 until December 2020, AppleCensorship uncovered scores of missing data, incoherence and contradictory information presented in the most deceptive way, making it impossible for the public to have a clear understanding of Apple’s government-led and proactive removals of apps from its App Stores. In presenting such reports as its effort to be transparent to the public, Apple is deceiving its users and the public on the reality of its takedown policy, both in terms of its nature and true scale.

AppleCensorship’s report demonstrates that despite the publication of these so-called “transparency” reports; Apple is still operating in the most opaque way, unaccountable for the decisions it takes regarding certain content, information and tools unavailable on the App Store.

Although information contained in “Taken Down: A Look into Apple’s Transparency Reports” must be taken as a whole to obtain a clear picture of Apple’s wrongdoings in its App Stores, the following highlights can be extracted from the report:

Hidden Reality of Worldwide Government Takedown Requests:

• Apple’s Transparency Reports are the antithesis of any genuine attempt at transparency:
• No information on the apps being removed, their category, the type of content and functions they offered, and the App Stores in which they were present before being removed.
• No information on government bodies issuing the takedown requests, the dates of requests, their legal basis, and the reasons invoked by these bodies for app removals.
• Only ten vague and shortly phrased reasons were used repeatedly by Apple to describe the reasons for app removals: “apps operating without government licence”, “illegal gambling” and “illegal content” account for 32 out of the 41 brief explanations provided by Apple.
• Apple purposely uses the wrong metric to communicate on app takedowns from the App Store. Although Apple discloses that 1060 apps were removed over two years, this is not equivalent to 1060 removals. In fact, even if we only consider those 1060 apps, more than 30,000 removals occurred across all 155 (175 since 2020) App Stores operated by Apple.
• Apple cites two reasons for app removal requests:

1. Legal Violation Takedown Requests (LVTR): these requests are related to apps which allegedly violated the law(s) of the country which initiated the takedown request.
2. Platform Policy Takedown Requests (PPVTR): these requests are related to apps which allegedly violated Apple’s App Store Review Guidelines. Although Apple often blurs the line on this matter, apps targeted by these requests have not been found in violation of the law(s) of the country requesting their takedown.

LVTR vs. PPTVR 

• Apple is misleading the public by saying LVTRs “only” trigger removals in the App Store of the requesting government. For example, if the News app TouTiao (今日头条), which was only released in the China App Store, was deleted, its removal, albeit from only one App Store (the App Store of the requesting government’s country), would in fact mean the app’s total disappearance from the App Store and for all its users.
• Rather than constituting a substantially less impactful removal than a worldwide PPVTR, such LVTRs have the potential to harm millions of users, with no hope of circumventing this removal by changing device or App Store location.
• Since no information is given on the apps being removed, it is impossible to know if certain groups of users (such as Human Rights activists, journalists, ethnic minorities or vulnerable communities such as LGBTQ+) have been targeted by such removal.
• Apple has been intentionally simplifying the situation each time it has justified its App Store curation policies by saying the company has to “comply with local laws” wherever it operates. In fact more than 20% of the requests it received over the last two years (more than 25% in 2019) concern Platform Policy violations (i.e. Apple’s App Store Guidelines) and therefore do not have anything to do with legal compliance.
• PPVTRs trigger many more removals despite accounting for far fewer ‘Apps Removed’. Over two years, the 869 apps removed following LVTRs generated 948 removals worldwide, while the 191 apps removed for PPVTRs generated 29,605 removals worldwide.
• In other words, 96.90% of all removals were made following Apple’s own decisions. Only 3.10% of all removals were made because of Apple’s legal obligation to comply with local laws.

Collateral Censorship

• By not providing any figures on app removals, Apple conceals the existence of “collateral censorship” on the App Store: cases whereby one government’s request, motivated by Apple’s own guidelines and, in some cases, by local laws, result in removals in other countries, and frequently across the entire world.
• A large majority of countries (133) never made a single app takedown request to Apple but saw between 191 and 194 apps removed in their App Stores.
• Although China is the App Store that saw the highest number of apps removed, it is also the App Store which was, by far, the least affected by “collateral” removals. China initiated 167 “Platform Policy” removals while it was affected by only 24 other such removals.
• Russia initiated 19 “Platform Policy” removals, while Brazil, Canada, Kuwait, Netherlands and Saudi Arabia each initiated one removal.
• “Collateral removals” constitute 96.53% (29,493) of all removals worldwide while self-imposed removals constitute only 3.47% (1060) of all app removals that occurred in 2019 and 2020.
• Over the last two years, 186 unknown apps were removed by Apple from 155/175 App Stores at the request of China and Russia, without providing any legal justification. Users worldwide are left with no option but to trust that Apple “knows [the line] when [it] sees it”.

On compliance:

• Apple’s average compliance rate with app takedown requests over two years is 73.76%. Apple has a 100% compliance rate with 17 countries out of the 22 that made takedown requests. Apple has not rejected any takedown request from any government since January 2020.
• Apple complied with the vast majority of app takedown requests made by China and Russia, respectively, refusing only 20 removals out of 810 requested by China and 2 out of 42 removals requested by Russia over two years.
• The number of takedown requests and the number of apps specified by those requests decreased significantly from 2019 to 2020, with 166 requests concerning 935 apps in 2019 compared to 117 requests (29% decrease) concerning 502 apps (46% decrease) in 2020. However, with a compliance rate of 100% in 2020, the total number of apps removed by Apple in 2020 (502 apps removed) is almost equal to the number of apps removed in 2019 (558 apps removed) despite the significant decrease in requests.
• Apple removed 69.74% of all apps specified in LVTRs, while it removed 100.00% of all apps target by PPVTRs. This is significant, as despite Apple’s justification for app removals being that it must comply with local laws everywhere it operates, the rare cases where the company decided to refuse to remove apps were in fact cases where laws were allegedly violated.

Categorical Bans

• Categorical bans – referenced in the New York Times investigation published in May 2021- allow Apple to circumvent the spirit of their own commitment to transparency, by omitting figures for large numbers of government-mandated app removals from the biannual transparency reports.
• It is likely that the huge number of takedowns recorded by the ASM is a further indication of a system of blanket requests: demands from governments for Apple to do the work of state censors and identify all apps of a certain kind without needing to be notified in each case by the government in question.
• Although only monitoring a fraction of the nearly 2 million apps populating the App Store, AppleCensorship’s App Store Monitor (ASM) was able to record no less than 2933 removals (of 1159 unique apps) between January 1^st 2019 and December 31^st 2020.
• In the studied period, the ASM recorded no fewer than 6,458 apps that were removed from all 155 App Stores (175 in H2 2020). That’s the equivalent of 1 million removals if we assume that all apps were originally available in all App Stores.
•  Drawing from its data on “Detected Changes” (ASM: DETECTED CHANGES) and “Disappeared Apps” (ASM: DISAPPEARED), AppleCensorship identified several hundred high-risk apps which may have been censored by Apple on behalf of governments. These apps were, regrouped in the following categories: “VPNs & browsers”, “LGBTQ+” related apps, “Security & Privacy” apps, “News” apps, “Religion” apps and “Other” apps and include sensitive content or functions that could be deemed controversial or illegal by national authorities or by Apple itself.

Dear candidates: We really appreciate the time and effort you put in throughout our selection process. As of today, this position is no longer vacant. If more opportunities come up in the future, we will also post them on Applecensorship.com

Job Title: Researcher/Writer

Location: (Flexible)

Date of Joining: as soon as possible

Duration: until end of October 2022

Reporting to: Project Director

Summary: 

The mission of AppleCensorship is to track down and expose occurrences of censorship and arbitrary removals of apps from Apple’s App Store. We monitor and report on instances when Apple removes apps from certain country-based app stores, often in compliance with requests from repressive governments. We also advocate for Apple to change their App Store Review Guidelines, which in their current form violate the fundamental human rights of millions of Apple users around the world. Most notably, human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers and activists who operate in China and other repressive environments are most impacted by Apple’s arbitrary censorship and compliance with authoritarian governments worldwide. In accordance with the U.N Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, AppleCensorship seeks to encourage Apple to place respect of human rights ahead of its financial interests. AppleCensorship is actively engaging with stakeholders on these issues, including human rights organizations and community members, app developers, and local groups most affected by Apple’s harm. AppleCensorship is a project of GreatFire.org, which monitors and challenges internet censorship in China.  

Duties/Assignments:

The Researcher/Writer will:

• Write 2 in-depth reports and supervise the editorial processes.
• See here and here for examples of reports published by AppleCensorship.
• Produce high quality and varied research for a range of audiences including data analysis, report writing and visual presentations.
• Conduct in-depth studies and investigations, using data gathered by AppleCensorship’s App Store Monitor tool. as well as external sources and materials.
• Conduct online and offline research on censorship of apps by Apple as well as on the impact of the company’s processes which lead to such cases of app unavailability and censorship.
• Interview and engage with stakeholders (end-users, developers, human rights organizations, tech specialists, Apple executives, etc.) to collect information. 
• Analyze the local context and environment on both macro and micro levels as it relates to censorship by Apple. Conduct quantitative and qualitative analysis on specific groups of apps and cases of confirmed or alleged arbitrary removal of apps and their impact.
• Conduct research and analysis of the legal framework in authoritarian regimes and countries where cases of app censorship have been reported and how this relates to Apple’s business practices in these countries.
•  Provide recommendations and suggest best practices in order to expand or adjust AppleCensorship’s advocacy efforts with the end goal of ending Apple’s censorship.
• Maintain record of research process, including written log of methods and actions employed, data sourced used, and raw data produced for subsequent analysis.
• Supervise illustration (including data visualization, charts, graphs, tables, pictures, infographics, and diagrams) work throughout the editorial process.
•  Assist in report dissemination and the creation of promotional materials, such as press releases, social media posts, and media blurbs…

Qualifications (must have):

There is no degree requirement for this position. However, we will consider applicants with relevant skills and experience, in particular those with specialization in digital mobile industry or human rights and censorship or Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) or International law; Advanced knowledge of iOS and the App Store environment; Current PhD degree seekers are encouraged to apply.

• Ability and willingness to work under tight deadlines;
• Familiarity with MS Office applications or Google suite, data analysis;
• Excellent English oral and written communication skills;

Qualifications (nice to have):

Advanced knowledge of China is helpful, including Chinese language skills;  

Job level: Experienced

Hours: Full Time

Contract: Freelance Contract / fixed term contract

Minimum Salary: 4000$ – 6000$ / month (deliverable based contract)

Application process: Send an email to contact@applecensorship.com

All applications are handled with utmost care for privacy and security of applicant. For additional security, create a free ProtonMail account before sending your email to us.

This legislation aims to prevent big technology companies (Big Tech) from engaging in anticompetitive practices in app markets. This would directly impact how Apple and Google respectively run the App Store and the Play Store.

Although largely focused on the economic impact of Apple’s and Google’s abuse of their dominant positions, the Open App Markets Act contains a crucial element which, if the bill were to be passed, would drastically limit the power these companies have to censor apps and content, often on behalf of authoritarian regimes such as China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and others. In January 2022, we wrote a letter to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, drawing attention to Apple’s active collaboration with authoritarian regimes and the rampant censorship on the App Store and to ask members of the Committee to take the necessary measures to end Apple’s unethical and immoral behavior.

As the bill will soon be discussed and submitted to a vote by members of Congress, we are calling on you to join the global effort to fight against censorship by Apple by supporting the Open App Markets Act.

On April 4th, Fight For The Future, a leading U.S.-based group advocating for digital rights, is launching Antitrust Day to support the bill. This will help give app developers more power to reach their customers without the control of the app stores run by Apple and Google and will also allow users from all parts of the world to access the apps and information they need freely.

Join us and many others – from non-profit organizations such as the TOR Project, Electronic Frontier Foundation, to private groups like DuckDuckGo and ProtonMail – to demand that freedom of information and expression be protected from censorship by Apple, Google and the repressive regimes that they work with.

https://www.antitrustday.org/

在俄罗斯军队入侵乌克兰之后，欧洲理事会针对俄罗斯政府、俄罗斯金融机构以及俄罗斯寡头实施了一系列经济制裁。

除了在战争的头几天采取的许多经济和金融制裁外，2月27日，理事会宣布在欧盟禁止今日俄罗斯（以下简称RT）和Sputnik新闻社。详细说明这一禁令的法律文件于3月1日通过，并于次日公布。禁止这两家俄罗斯国有媒体的决定详见两段。

1. 禁止经营者播放，或促成、协助或以其他方式帮助播放附件九所列法人、实体或机构的任何内容，包括通过有线电视、卫星、IP电视、互联网服务提供商、互联网视频共享平台或应用程序等任何手段进行传输或分发，无论是新的还是预先安装的。

2. 应暂停与附件九所列法人、实体或机构的任何广播许可证或授权、传输和分销安排。

一份附件将 “RT “的所有五个分支机构以及 “Sputnik “列为禁令的目标。正如理事会的决定所明确指出的，Sputnik和RT的应用是所有平台上的制裁目标，包括谷歌Play商店和苹果的应用商店。

欧洲的制裁制度借鉴了三种不同的机制：欧盟的自主制裁计划、联合国安理会的制裁计划以及欧盟以更严格的措施实施和加强的特定联合国制裁。为了遵守欧盟的规定，并避免为犯罪活动提供便利，在欧盟经营的私营公司必须检查他们对制裁的义务，并确保他们不因与制裁对象的实体或个人接触而违反任何义务。

同一天，在加拿大，主要的有线电视运营商宣布了他们自己的决定，从他们的频道阵容中删除RT，以回应俄罗斯对乌克兰的入侵，而加拿大广播电视和电信委员会保持沉默。与此同时，在英国和美国，虽然英国的媒体监管机构–通信管理局（Ofcom）宣布对RT的战争报道发起额外的调查，但这两家媒体仍在运作。

根据欧盟的制裁规则，苹果在法律上有义务删除这些应用程序，且时限在2月28日和3月1日之间。然而，由于制裁只规定RT和Sputnik不能在任何欧盟地区运营，苹果可以决定将应用留在非欧盟的应用商店。毕竟，该公司在俄罗斯的应用商店中保留了这两个应用。因此，这些应用在非欧盟应用商店的审查可以归因于这家位于库比蒂诺的科技公司自己的决定。换句话说，苹果的法律义务只是在欧盟的27家应用商店中删除的内容，而非全世界。

苹果并不是唯一一个取消这两家国有媒体平台的大科技公司。谷歌从YouTube上删除了他们的频道，Facebook也删除了他们的账户。这些科技公司巨头的删除行为和其他公司所做的如出一辙。苹果也停止了在俄罗斯的产品销售。

然而，苹果将RT和Sputnik的应用从除俄罗斯以外的所有应用商店中删除，同时限制其在该国的苹果支付服务，这不是一个选择，而是为了遵守欧洲的制裁。在一封简短的内部邮件中，苹果含蓄地表示，所采取的所有措施都是公司决定支持乌克兰并向俄罗斯施压以停止入侵的结果。

“我们已经暂停了在俄罗斯的所有产品销售。上周，我们停止了所有出口到我们在该国的销售渠道。苹果支付和其他服务已被限制。RT和Sputnik在俄罗斯境外的App Store中不再提供下载。而且，作为对乌克兰公民的安全和预防措施，我们已经在乌克兰禁用了苹果地图中的交通和实时事件。”

在这种情况下，苹果和其他大科技公司被欧洲理事会用来审查RT和Sputnik。但这并不是苹果第一次以这种方式被“裹挟“。苹果对实施政府主导的审查制度非常熟悉。

一个令人担忧的共识

尽管国有媒体经常从事被其反对者称为 “宣传 “的活动，但对媒体机构的审查也不应该被轻视。获取信息的自由，传播新闻和表达各种意见的权利，以及人民从多种选择中选择其信息来源的权利，是所有欧洲民主国家的基石。

所有致力于新闻自由和言论自由的民间社会组织都应该注意到，在欧盟对RT和Sputnik实施禁令的决定在这几个方面与欧盟其他制裁不同。

首先，信息是一种非物质产品，本质上不能被贴上危险的标签。我们并不拥有信息，我们只是获取它。它不是一种供应品，因此不能像汽车或电脑那样被限制。

其次，理事会的禁令并不直接针对俄罗斯政府、俄罗斯当局或接近权力的个人。它甚至不影响俄罗斯公民，他们仍然可以在俄罗斯的应用商店中访问这两家媒体。这项禁令只影响欧盟国家的公民。

最后，安理会对这两家媒体实施禁令所援引的理由也应引起关注，因为它们远远超出了入侵乌克兰的范围。除了对 “虚假信息”、”宣传 “和 “严重歪曲和操纵事实 “的指控外，安理会还列出了一系列理由，这些理由本身就可以作为永久禁止这些媒体的理由，而且没有任何战争背景：

“俄罗斯联邦参与了一场系统的、国际性的媒体操纵和歪曲事实的运动，以加强其破坏邻国和欧盟及其成员国稳定的战略。特别是，这种宣传一再持续地针对欧洲政党，特别是在选举期间，以及针对民间社会、寻求庇护者、俄罗斯少数民族、性少数，以及联盟及其成员国的民主机构的运作”。

这些标准实际上允许欧盟理事超越所有成员国的媒体监管机构，而在任何自由的新闻环境中，这些机构都是有能力和技能来确定违反道德的媒体并撤销媒体机构的广播执照。

然而，在RT和Sputnik短暂存在之前和期间，这些监管机构几乎都没有采取认真的措施来监管这些媒体的道德失误。他们还没有对欧盟理事会代表他们做出的决定做出反应。只有英国的通信管理局（Ofcom）对这些媒体机构进行了调查。

虽然主流媒体对这两家媒体的禁令进行了大量报道，但它被模糊地称为只是欧盟为应对俄罗斯的攻击而采取的众多措施之一。很少有声音对这一决定表示异议。记者Ella Whelan讨论了当被认为是 “宣传 “的内容却被欧盟压制时产生的负面影响。

“我们需要知道俄罗斯正在发生什么。在试图了解普京的下一步行动时，能够接触到未经审查的莫斯科前线是至关重要的。

[…]

多里斯、冯德莱恩和克莱格把这称为危险的’错误信息’，是在阻止欧洲公民了解克里姆林宫的政治阴谋的全貌。”

荷兰数字部长Alexandra van Huffelen在接受Politico采访时指出：”我们应该尽量缩短它（禁令）的时间，并尽量确保它是否必要。”它应该仅仅是一个非常时期的非常例外，因为有一场战争。”

欧洲记者联合会（EFJ）也在3月1日发布了一份新闻稿，认为 “用审查制度打击虚假信息是一个错误”。然而，许多记者协会和新闻自由组织迄今对这个问题保持沉默。

一个危险的先例

禁令背后明确的逻辑似乎与包括苹果在内的各平台所有者采取的行动不一致。苹果实施的禁令，以及该公司在制裁之外的额外行动，引出了一些重要问题。

首先，这种禁令错误地预设了欧洲公民没有鉴别信息的能力。通过禁止这些频道，欧盟理事会暗示剩余的信息环境现在是 “干净的”。事实恰恰相反。正如NewsGuard所解释的那样，目前有一百多个俄罗斯宣传网站在活动，那些被禁频道的许多观众很可能最终会从这些网站中获得信息。其结果可能导致虚假信息更广泛的被传播，因为这些平台大多不透明其所有权或对俄罗斯官方的忠诚度，这与RT和Sputnik相反，它们被称为官媒，并在一些平台上被贴上标签。

巧合的是，这与苹果对其应用商店的 “策划 “采取的方法相同。苹果以保护客户免受有害信息影响为名，任意审查应用。尽管任何国家的苹果用户都可以简单地在他们的设备上打开Safari浏览器，访问RT和Sputnik。

该禁令没有针对其他国家新闻机构，如塔斯社或俄新社，这些机构可以继续在欧盟自由运作，这一事实也表明欧盟理事会作出决定的仓促性。

此外，如果安理会的目标是阻止RT和Sputnik传播的宣传和谎言的负面影响，在欧盟领土上实施其禁令是无效的，因为受负面影响最大的人群是俄罗斯公民。他们是世界上最受俄罗斯国家宣传影响的人。欧盟国家的公民可以获得许多信息来源，他们并不会在俄罗斯虚假信息的毒流中戒断。

相反，俄罗斯公民亟需查阅更多新闻来源的能力。3月1日，俄罗斯总检察长下令该国媒体当局限制访问Ekho Moskvy电台和Dozhd电视频道。这些媒体被指控发布 “呼吁极端主义活动和暴力的信息”。几天前，VK-媒体集团旗下的几家报纸在发布反战信息后被警方突击检查。

与此同时，俄罗斯立法者即将通过立法，对有关克里姆林宫在乌克兰战争的 “虚假 “信息处以最高15年的监禁。该法案旨在惩罚那些故意 “歪曲俄罗斯武装部队的目的、作用和任务 “的人，甚至可能适用于有关俄罗斯战争损失的 “假 “信息。

当欧盟从独裁政权借水推船

除了俄罗斯政府和立法者针对自己的新闻界，而欧盟针对外国媒体之外，欧盟对其处理虚假信息计划的手法，与俄罗斯当局压制他们的媒体并无区别。

2月26日，俄罗斯媒体管理局Roskomnadzor发表声明，指责10家媒体传播 “不可靠的公共重要信息”，并宣布对这些媒体进行行政调查。Roskomnadzor还威胁要封锁这些媒体机构的网站，以限制对虚假信息的访问。

在2月27日举行的一次演讲中，欧盟委员会主席乌苏拉-冯德莱恩说：

“ ‘RT‘和 ‘Sputnik‘以及它们的子公司将不再能够传播它们的谎言，为普京的战争辩护，并在我们的联盟中散播分裂。因为我们正在开发工具，在欧洲禁止他们虚假和有害的信息。”

俄罗斯和欧盟在 “虚假信息 “和 “宣传 “问题上仓皇措辞的这种相似性应该引人质疑。不幸的是，这种比较并没有到此为止。为了执行其禁令，欧盟理事会依靠世界上最强大的三家科技公司。Facebook、谷歌和苹果。通过与这些公司合作，欧盟理事会采用了与俄罗斯和中国完全相同的策略，同时也失去了谴责其他不自由政权的权利。

更令人担忧的是，考虑到这个超国家机构可能在未来重申这种信息禁令，巩固与大科技公司的临时性、无管制和法外的伙伴关系。大科技公司无疑会上施下效，以证明他们与镇压性政权的合作是合理的。

我们已经可以想象，当苹果被要求为其在中国或其他地方任意删除应用和信息的行为进行辩护时，它的言辞。”我们在中国的运营方式与我们最近在欧盟的运营方式并无不同。我们必须遵守所有的法律义务，无论我们在哪里经营。” 

届时，谁会告诉苹果，欧盟对RT的制裁是滥用权力，媒体监管不属于欧盟的职权范围，欧洲理事会无权发放或撤销广播许可证？

西方民主国家不应通过将技术公司用于政治目的而对媒体进行审查。宣传和虚假信息不是通过审查来解决的，而是通过促进符合公众利益的信息。欧盟必须发挥其作用，保障基本自由。这些自由受到独裁政权以及将利润置于人权之上的私人行为者的威胁。

Following the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian military, the European Council has imposed a series of economic sanctions aimed at the Russian government, Russia’s financial institutions as well as Russian oligarchs.

In addition to the many economic and financial sanctions it adopted in the first days of the war, on February 27^th the Council announced a ban on Russia Today and Sputnik in the EU. The legal document detailing this ban was adopted on March 1^st and published the following day. The decision to ban the two Russian state-owned media outlets is detailed in two paragraphs:

1.   It shall be prohibited for operators to broadcast, or to enable, facilitate or otherwise contribute to broadcast, any content by the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex IX, including through transmission or distribution by any means such as cable, satellite, IP-TV, internet service providers, internet video-sharing platforms or applications, whether new or pre-installed.

2.   Any broadcasting licence or authorisation, transmission and distribution arrangement with the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex IX shall be suspended.

An annex lists all five branches of Russia Today as well as Sputnik as targets of the ban. As the Council’s decision clearly states, the Sputnik and RT apps were targeted by the sanctions on all platforms including the Google Play Store and Apple’s App Store. 

The European sanction regime draws from three different mechanisms: the EU’s autonomous sanctions programs, the UNSC’s sanctions programs and specific UN sanctions that are implemented and reinforced with stricter measures by the EU. In order to achieve compliance with EU regulations, and avoid facilitating criminal activities, private companies operating in the EU must check their obligations vis-à-vis the sanctions and ensure they do not violate any by engaging with entities or individuals targeted by the sanctions.

On the same day, in Canada, major cable operators announced their own decision to remove Russia Today from their channel line-up in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, while the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission remained silent. Meanwhile, in the UK and the U.S., the two media remained operational, although UK’s media regulator, the Office of Communications (Ofcom), announced its launch of additional investigations into RT’s coverage of the war.

Under EU sanction rules, Apple was legally obliged to remove the apps and did so between February 28^th and March 1^st. However, as the sanction only provided that RT and Sputnik could not operate in any of the EU territories, Apple could have decided to leave the app in non-EU App Stores. After all, the company kept the two apps available in Russia’s App Store. Therefore, the censorship of these apps in non-EU App Stores can be attributed to the Cupertino-based tech company’s own arbitrary decision. In other words, only the removals from the 27 EU-based App Stores are a result of Apple’s legal obligations.

Apple was not the only Big Tech company to deplatform the two state-owned media. Google removed their channels from YouTube and Facebook deleted their accounts. Those removals by Big Tech are now presented alongside the actions taken by other private companies who have decided to cut their ties with the Russian Federation. Apple also halted product sales in Russia. 

However, Apple’s removal of the RT News and Sputnik News apps from all App Stores except Russia’s, along with its limitation of its Apple Pay service in the country, was not a choice but was done in order to comply with European sanctions. In a short internal email, Apple implicitly presented all measures taken as the result of the company’s decision to support Ukraine and to pressure Russia into stopping its invasion:

“We have paused all product sales in Russia. Last week, we stopped all exports into our sales channel in the country. Apple Pay and other services have been limited. RT News and Sputnik News are no longer available for download from the App Store outside Russia. And we have disabled both traffic and live incidents in Apple Maps in Ukraine as a safety and precautionary measure for Ukrainian citizens.”

In this case,  Apple, and other Big Tech, have been instrumentalized by the European Council to censor Russia Today and Sputnik. But this is not the first time that Apple has been co-opted in this way. Apple is well versed in implementing government-led censorship.

A worrying consensus

Censorship of media outlets, albeit state-owned media regularly engaging in what is labeled by their detractors as “propaganda”, should not be considered lightly. Freedom of access to information, the right to impart news and express opinions of all kinds, as well as the right for the people to choose their source of information from a plurality of choice, are cornerstones of all European democracies.

The decision to impose a ban on RT and Sputnik in the EU differs from other EU sanctions in several ways. All civil society organizations working on press freedom and freedom of speech should take notice.

First, information is an immaterial product that cannot intrinsically be labeled as dangerous. We do not own information, we access it. It is not a supply and therefore cannot be restricted in the same way as cars or computers. 

Secondly, the Council’s ban does not directly target the Russian government, the Russian authorities or individuals close to power. It does not even affect Russian citizens, who still have access to RT News and Sputnik News in Russia’s App Store. This ban only affects citizens in the European Union.

Finally, the reasons invoked by the Council to impose the ban on the two media should be an equal source of concern, as they venture well beyond the scope of the invasion of Ukraine. Adding to the accusations of “disinformation”, “propaganda”, and “gravely distorting and manipulating facts”, the Council listed a set of reasons which could serve, by themselves and without any context of war, as justification for a permanent ban of these media outlets:

“The Russian Federation has engaged in a systematic, international campaign of media manipulation and distortion of facts in order to enhance its strategy of destabilisation of its neighbouring countries and of the Union and its Member States. In particular, the propaganda has repeatedly and consistently targeted European political parties, especially during election periods, as well as targeting civil society, asylum seekers, Russian ethnic minorities, gender minorities, and the functioning of democratic institutions in the Union and its Member States.”

These criteria effectively allowed the EU Council to bypass media regulators in all member states, which, in any free press environment, are the main institutions with both the ability and the skill set to determine a breach of ethics and to revoke the broadcasting license of media outlets.

Yet, almost none of these regulators, which have existed long before and during the short existence of RT and Sputnik, have taken serious steps to regulate the ethical failures of these media. They have yet to react to decisions taken on their behalf by the EU Council. Only the Office of Communication (Ofcom) in the UK has opened an investigation into these media outlets. 

While the ban of these two media has been largely covered by the mainstream press, it was indistinctly referred to as merely one of the many measures taken by the EU in response to Russia’s attack. Very few voices expressed reservations about the decision. Journalist Ella Whelan did discuss the negative impact when content deemed “propaganda” is suppressed by EU officials.

“We need to know what is going on in Russia. Having access to the unfiltered Moscow line is vital when trying to understand Putin’s next steps. 

[…]

By labelling this as dangerous ‘misinformation’, Dorries, von der Leyen and Clegg are preventing European citizens from getting the full picture on the political machinations coming out of the Kremlin.”

Dutch Digital Minister Alexandra van Huffelen noted in an interview with Politico: ”We should try to keep it [the ban] as short as possible and as long as necessary,” said van Huffelen. “It should be the one very, very exception because there is a war.”

The European Federation of Journalists (EFJ) also published a press release on March 1, arguing that “fighting disinformation with censorship is a mistake”. However, many journalists’ associations and press freedom organizations have thus far remained silent on this issue.

A dangerous precedent

The expressly stated logic behind the ban seems at odds with the actions taken by the various platform owners, including Apple. Apple’s implementation of the ban, and the company’s additional actions, in addition to the sanctions, raise some important questions. 

First, such a ban wrongly presupposes the inability of European citizens to exercise their capacity of discernment. By banning the channels, the EU Council implicitly suggests that the remaining information environment is now “clean”. The opposite could not be more true. As NewsGuard explains, there are more than one hundred Russian propaganda websites currently active, and there is a strong probability that many viewers of the now banned TV channels will end up getting information from one of these sites. The result might be an even wider spread of disinformation as the majority of these platforms hide or do not explicitly state their ownership or loyalty to Russia’s official line, contrary to RT and Sputnik News, which were known to be affiliated to the regime and, on some platforms, were labeled as such.

Coincidentally, this is the same approach that Apple takes to the “curation” of its app store. Apple arbitrarily censors apps in the name of protecting their customers from harmful information. Although any Apple customer in any country can simply open the Safari browser on their device and access both RT and Sputnik.

The fact that the ban did not target other State news agencies, such as TASS or Ria Novosti, which can continue to operate freely in the EU, also gives an indication of the haste with which the EU Council made its decision.

Furthermore, if the goal of the Council was to stop the negative effect of the propaganda and lies spread by RT and Sputnik, imposing its ban on EU territories is ineffective as the most negatively impacted population are Russian citizens. They are the people in the world most subjected to Russian state propaganda. Citizens of EU countries enjoy access to many sources of information and are not in a position where they must be weaned off a toxic flow of Russian disinformation.

On the contrary, Russian citizens desperately need the ability to access a wide variety of news sources. On March 1^st, Russia’s Prosecutor-General ordered the country’s media authority to restrict access to the Ekho Moskvy radio station and the Dozhd TV Channel. These outlets had been accused of publishing “information calling for extremist activity and violence“. A few days earlier, several newspapers owned by VK-Media group were raided by the police after publishing anti-war messages.

At the same time, Russian lawmakers are about to adopt legislation that would punish “fake” information about the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine with up to 15 years in prison. The bill aims to punish those who knowingly “distort the purpose, role and tasks of the Russian Armed Forces” and could even apply to “fake” information about Russia’s war losses. 

When the EU borrows methods from authoritarian regimes

Apart from the fact that the Russian government and legislators are targeting their own press, while the EU targets foreign media, there is not much difference between how Russian authorities repress their media and how the European Union presents its plan to address disinformation in the future.

On February 26, the Russia media authority, Roskomnadzor, issued a statement accusing ten media outlets of disseminating “unreliable publicly significant information” and announced that it had launched an administrative investigation of the media. Roskomnadzor also threatened to block the websites for these media outlets in order to restrict access to false information.

In a speech held on February 27, the president of the European Commission, Ursula Von Der Leyen, said:

 “Russia Today and Sputnik, as well as their subsidiaries, will no longer be able to spread their lies to justify Putin’s war and to sow division in our union. So we are developing tools to ban their toxic and harmful disinformation in Europe.”

Such similarities in the hastily elaborated rhetoric from both Russia and the EU on the matters of “disinformation” and “propaganda” should raise questions. Unfortunately, the comparison does not stop there. In order to enforce its ban, the EU Council relied on three of the most powerful Tech companies in the world: Facebook, Google and Apple. By co-opting these companies, the EU Council has resorted to the exact same strategies used by Russia and China, and has lost at the same time all credibility in condemning the use of such methods by other, less free, regimes.

It is even more worrying to contemplate the possibility that the supra-national body could reiterate such a ban on information in the future, consolidating an ad hoc, unregulated and extra-legal partnership with Big Tech. Big Tech will no doubt point to such a relationship to justify their collaboration with repressive regimes.

We can already picture Apple’s rhetoric when it will be asked to justify its arbitrary removal of apps and information from the App Store, in China or elsewhere: “How we operate in China is not different from how we operated in the EU recently. We have to comply with all legal obligations, wherever we operate.” 

Who will then tell Apple that the EU sanctions on RT were abusive, that media regulation does not fall within the competence of the European Union and that the European Council had no right to grant or withdraw broadcasting licenses? 

Western democracies should not resort to censorship of media by instrumentalizing technology companies for political ends. Propaganda and disinformation are not solved by censorship, but by promotion of information made in the interest of the public. The European Union must live up to its role to safeguard fundamental freedoms. Freedoms which are threatened by authoritarian regimes as well as private actors who prioritize profits over human rights.

Download the letter as PDF.

January 28, 2022

Subject: Censorship by Apple

Dear Chair Durbin, Ranking Member Grassley, and Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee,

As the Committee considers legislation to address the power of Big Tech, we write to share our research and longstanding concerns regarding Apple’s censorship on behalf of the People’s Republic of China and other repressive regimes.

GreatFire, an organization dedicated to fighting internet censorship, started monitoring Apple’s censorship in November 2013, when Apple decided to remove our “FreeWeibo” application from the Chinese App Store. [1] Apple did not even wait for the intervention of any Chinese judicial authority to determine if our app had actually broken any Chinese law. It collaborated with the Chinese authorities and dealt with our app the same way it has continued to deal with many more apps: by enforcing arbitrary and politically motivated censorship to ensure its financial interests.

In 2019, we launched AppleCensorship.com, a website monitoring Apple’s removal of apps on its App Stores around the world. Over the last three years, we have uncovered numerous cases of app removals, particularly in China, where Apple collaborates with the Chinese authorities by enforcing arbitrary and politically motivated censorship to protect its financial interests.

Our research [2] has produced the following key findings:

• Apple proactively removes apps that allow Chinese citizens to circumvent censorship, all without the need for the authorities to intervene. None of  the top 100 “virtual private network services” (VPNs) in the United States App Store are available in China.
• In October 2019, during the Hong Kong protests violently suppressed by the police, Apple removed HKmap.live, an app used by protesters to report aggressive police movements and the use of tear gas. [3]
• AppleCensorship.com counts 191 “News” apps currently unavailable in China’s App Store. The New York Times app was removed in January 2017. Quartz was removed during the Hong Kong protests in 2019.
• More than 26% of all apps tested were found to be unavailable in China, when the average for other countries is around 11% and when less than 5% of all apps that we tested in the U.S. App Store were unavailable.
• A study that we conducted with Tibetan human rights groups and released in June 2019 revealed that at least 29 Tibetan-themed apps dealing with news, religious study,  tourism and even games are being censored by Apple. [4]
• In September 2021, we detected the removal of Bible and Quran apps in China.
• In June 2020, Apple removed two podcast apps, Pocket Casts and Castro, after the developers refused to censor content on their platforms.
• Two RSS reader apps, Reeder and Fiery Feeds, were removed in September 2020 for content deemed “illegal in China”.

Apple’s censorship is not limited to China and affects all countries where Apple operates:

• In November 2021, Apple’s removed the “Smart Voting” app developed by the team associated with Russian political opposition leader Alexei Navalny. The app, which informed its users about candidates for the Parliamentary elections and their political affiliation, was removed just as polls opened. Apple went further by contacting private messaging app Telegram to request the removal of content (i.e. a chat bot) related to Navalny’s campaign. Telegram published a statement condemning the move but stating it had to comply with Apple in order to avoid being removed from the App Store.
• In June 2021, our research on LGBTQ+ related apps revealed that, out of approximately 150 LGBTQ+ apps identified, 61 apps were partially unavailable. China came second in terms of unavailability, with 27 LGBTQ+ apps unavailable in the country, just behind Saudi Arabia (28 apps unavailable) and before United Arab Emirates (25 apps unavailable). In total, 1377 instances of LGBTQ+ app’s unavailability were found in 152 countries (only Australia’s, Canada’s and US’ App Store contained all the tested apps). [5]
• In addition to targeted removal, that is to say removals of apps in the App Store of the requesting country, which result from alleged “legal violations”, Apple also responds to governments’ requests made on the basis of alleged violations of Apple’s own “Platform Policy”. Such takedown requests, mostly originating from authoritarian regimes like China and Russia, led to approximately 30,000 removals in 175 countries between January 2019 and December 2020.

The list of compromises by Apple over the last five years is not limited to censorship on the App Store. For example, Apple’s own podcasting app remains available in China, as Apple proactively removes “sensitive” podcasts. [6] Although there are too many compromises that threaten human rights to be fully listed here, in 2021 only, Apple:

• facilitated access by the Chinese authorities to iCloud data for Chinese users;
• decided not to release its new “Private Relay” feature in China and other countries[7]; and
• censored Chinese consumers by preventing them from engraving “sensitive” content on their Apple products (iPads or Airtags). [8]

Apple discloses almost no information on app removals, hiding the full scope of compliance with Chinese censorship. In some cases, apps’ developers or publishers were not aware of their app’s unavailability until we contacted them. In October, 2017, Senators Cruz and Leahy wrote to Apple asking questions about censorship in its China App Store. In Apple’s response, the company admitted to having removed 674 VPNs from the China App Store at the request of the Chinese government. These VPNs would have allowed Chinese citizens to skirt censorship restrictions.

Apple was widely condemned after this revelation – yet five years later Apple has only increased its censorship efforts in China and has continued to proactively work to restrict freedom of expression for its Chinese customers.

Apple has even hosted apps on its App Store run by a China Paramilitary Group (the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps) accused of participating in forced labor of Uyghurs and under U.S. Magnitsky sanctions. [9]

Apple’s so-called Transparency Reports do not reveal which apps have been censored, and remain questionably vague on the reasons, legal or not, behind this censorship.

The resulting opacity has become Apple’s true trademark: from how it curates content on the App Store; to how it implements its arbitrary “App Store Guidelines”; to what data it communicates to governments; to the deals the company makes with even the most repressive regimes in the world. [10] Apple conceals almost everything about its operations.

Apple’s record-high financial results are the result of a strategy that has relied significantly on Apple’s alliance with the Chinese authoritarian government. This alliance comes with a cost. In order to do business in China, Apple has abandoned its values, ethical standards, and principles. Apple has actively worked to suppress the rights and freedoms of their customers, even when the company was not pressured to do so by Beijing. We believe that the time is overdue for Apple to put a halt to such unethical and immoral behavior.

We remain at your disposal should you have any additional questions.

With warmest regards,

Benjamin Ismail                                                                                                   Charlie Smith

Project Director                                                                                                   Co-Founder

AppleCensorship.com                                                                                         GreatFire.org

[1] Our app was republishing censored posts from Weibo, the Chinese equivalent of Twitter.

[2] https://applecensorship.com/censored-on-the-app-store-new-report-shows-the-staggering-scale-of-app-censorship-by-apple/

[3] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/apple-hkmap-live-app-hong-kong-china-police-protesters-used-target-ambush-police-2019-10-10/

[4] https://en.greatfire.org/blog/2019/jun/apple-censoring-tibetan-information-china

[5] https://applecensorship.com/apple-is-enabling-censorship-of-lgbtq-apps-in-152-countries-new-report-finds/

[6] https://techcrunch.com/2019/06/04/apple-restricts-chinese-podcasts

[7] Belarus, Colombia, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkmenistan, Uganda, and the Philippines.

[8] https://citizenlab.ca/2021/08/engrave-danger-an-analysis-of-apple-engraving-censorship-across-six-regions/

[9] https://www.theinformation.com/articles/apple-hosts-apps-run-by-china-paramilitary-group-accused-of-uyghur-genocide

[10] https://www.theinformation.com/articles/facing-hostile-chinese-authorities-apple-ceo-signed-275-billion-deal-with-them

As a public statement made by the head of an international organization and business corporation, Simon’s words are extraordinary:

“There are too many times in our world today when we get into issues like this, that we let business, politics, and money dictate what’s right and what’s wrong. When we have a young person who has the fortitude to step up and make these allegations, knowing full well what the results of that are going to be, for us to not support that, and demand justice as we go through it, we have to start as a world making decisions that are based upon right and wrong, period. And we can’t compromise that. We’re definitely willing to pull our business and deal with all the complications that come with it, because this is bigger than the business.”

When the Chairman of an organization is willing to risk a billion dollars worth of business to pull out of a market like China in an attempt to ensure the safety of one person, then, suddenly, the demands of the human rights community cease to be naïve, unrealistic and idealistic. Steve Simon’s statement illustrates what it means to make the right decision, and to stand up for what really matters. 

Tim Cook needs to pay attention to Peng Shuai’s case and to the reaction from the WTA in particular. The WTA has chosen a path that stands in direct contrast to the choice that many Western companies have made in the past. Regardless of how this situation unfolds – the WTA might very well have to withdraw from the China market – the WTA’s decision and the words of its Chairman are exemplary and prove that there is actually a choice for companies who operate in China. 

It is irrelevant to reference Apple’s financial stake in China to justify the decisions that the Cupertino-based company has made. The WTA is risking billions of dollars with their decision. If the size of the market is the criteria that Apple uses to make its decisions, then the company could have adopted a different policy in Russia, where it makes substantially less money than it does in China. Apple could have refused to remove apposition leader Alexei Navalny’s app from its App Store. But it didn’t, because Apple’s willingness to collaborate with repressive regimes is influenced by more than the political and financial weight of the censors. Apple thinks differently.

Although it is conceivable that, initially, Apple believed the best strategy was to engage with every country and everyone despite fundamental differences and views on freedoms and human rights, it is clear that this is no longer the reason why Apple “complies with local laws” when censoring the App Store following government requests.

Tim Cook has had more than enough time to conclude that Apple is not inducing any positive change in China. Apple is not changing China, but China is severely altering Apple. During the Fortune Global Forum in Guangzhou in  2017, Tim Cook said:

“When you go into a country and participate in a market, you are subject to the laws and regulations of that country. Your choice is, do you participate or do you stand on the sideline and yell at how things should be. My own view very strongly is you show up and you participate, you get in the arena, because nothing ever changes from the sideline.” 

Apple’s repeated censorship of content and apps, including the recent removal of religious apps from China’s App Store, on behalf of the Chinese government, shows that Beijing got the better of Apple’s intentions.

As for the current international outcry over Peng Shuai’s situation, we strongly hope that the coming days and weeks will show that, contrary to Tim Cook’s belief, things can change from the sidelines. In this case, change is coming from the baselines, and from people and organizations outside China who have refused to compromise with an authoritarian regime. 

The WTA is showing Apple what it means to put values and people before business. If he refuses to hear the thousands of voices of the human rights community, Tim Cook should nevertheless listen to Steve Simon and to immediately start to make decisions “based upon right and wrong”. 

Read further about Apple’s system of values: /latest/636e43ce55a0db629cabda48

At the top of this scale of rules are the decisions of Apple CEO Tim Cook and Apple management, sometimes brought together in a committee called the App Store Review Board. Cook involves others to encourage collegiality and lend legitimacy to his decisions. Regardless of whether an application meets international standards, local law, or even developer guidelines, Tim Cook and Apple management have the right to determine the availability of any application.

Many applications which serve the public’s interest, host a pluralism of opinions, or strengthen democracy, have seen this sword of Damocles descend upon them. This was the case for the censorship of the New York Times application in 2017. The app’s removal from China’s App Store had nothing to do with compliance with Chinese law or a violation of Apple’s internal rules. This was merely a case of Apple aiding the efforts of the Chinese authorities to censor an independent and critical voice. Ultimately, it was Tim Cook who gave his approval for this baseless removal.

The application of billionaire Guo Wengui, the Chinese Communist Party critic who is self-exiled in the United States, was also removed from the Chinese App Store after the intervention of several senior Apple executives. One of these executives claimed, without providing proof, that the app’s content was illegal in China.

The second most important set of rules involved in the removal of apps is contained in the “App Store Review Guidelines”. These guidelines are used as the irrefutable justification for Apple to explain the censorship of any app. In fact, all decisions to remove apps from one, several, or all App Stores could technically be justified by these guidelines. The guidelines include a catch-all super law, which can apply to every censorship decision:

“We will reject Apps for any content or behavior that we believe is over the line. What line, you ask? Well, as a Supreme Court Justice once said, “I’ll know it when I see it”. And we think that you will also know it when you cross it.“

In 2015, Metadata+ and Ephemeral+, which both provided news alerts on drone attacks launched by the US military, were removed from all App Stores. In January 2021, the social network Parler was removed from all 155 App Stores for allegedly violating Apple’s vague and opaque rules.

It is now a well-established fact that Apple works closely with the most authoritarian regimes on the planet to ensure the economic sustainability of its operations. Also, it is becoming more and more commonplace for the firm to comply with the censorship requests of said governments. Apple justifies its political censorship decisions by invoking its obligation to “comply with the laws” of the countries in which it operates. Apple conveniently refuses to question the legality of the requests submitted to it by these regimes.

Thousands of apps, including several hundred VPNs, Tibetan and Uyghur religious and cultural apps, apps containing essays on politics, social media apps, and privacy tools have been blocked in China on charges of being illegal in the country.

In August 2021, Apple removed the gay social networking app Hornet from the App Store in Turkey, even though the court ruling used by the firm to justify its censorship did not require the removal of the application from its platform. On September 13, 2021, the tactical voting application of Russian political opponent Alexey Navalny, was removed by Apple in order to appease the authorities. It also aided Vladimir Putin, who was worried about the popular support enjoyed by his main opponent, who has been imprisoned since March 2021.

Meanwhile, human rights and international standards remain the least considered reasons for the removal of apps by Apple. Apple states its “Commitment to Human Rights” in its – almost hidden – human rights policy document. Although Apple has shown many times that when the  ’legal” demands of repressive governments and human rights are at odds, the company will side with governments.

The end result is that there are a number of apps in Apple’s App Store which directly infringe on human rights, fundamental freedoms, and privacy, yet enjoy full availability in the App Store without fear of meddling by Apple. 

The Saudi Arabia government-owned Absher let Saudi men track the movement of women and also allowed men to prevent women from leaving the country. A number of apps developed by a Chinese State-owned economic and paramilitary organization, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, which has been sanctioned by the US government, remain in the App Store.

This chart reflects the inequity of how Apple applies international, national, and internal regulations and standards, and in particular the arbitrariness that prevails in their decision-making. We encourage Tim Cook to use this chart as a basis to find a coherent, fair, ethical, and responsible scale of norms. 

But for that to happen, Apple must start by flipping its own scale of values upside down. Only then can Tim Cook say, hand on heart “We are not afraid to say that our values drive our curation decisions“.

An open invitation to open minds.

Come to AppleCensorship, where few individual imaginations gather together to pave the way to a digital world free from censorship. Here, you’ll do more than join something — you’ll add something.

Job Title: Researcher/Writer (Part-Time)

Location: (Flexible)

Date of Joining: ASAP (End of September or October 2021)

Duration: Approx. 7 months (until end of April 2022)

Reporting to: Campaign and Advocacy Director

Summary:  

The mission of AppleCensorship is to track down and expose occurrences of censorship and arbitrary removals of apps from Apple’s App Store. We monitor and report on instances when Apple removes apps from certain country-based app stores, often in compliance with requests from repressive governments. We also advocate for Apple to change their App Store Review Guidelines, which in their current form violate the fundamental human rights of millions of Apple users around the world. Most notably, human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers and activists who operate in China and other repressive environments are most impacted by Apple’s arbitrary censorship and compliance with authoritarian governments worldwide. In accordance with the U.N Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, AppleCensorship seeks to encourage Apple to place respect of human rights ahead of its financial interests. AppleCensorship is actively engaging with stakeholders on these issues, including human rights organizations and community members, app developers, and local groups most affected by Apple’s harm. AppleCensorship is a project of GreatFire.org, which monitors and challenges internet censorship in China.  

Duties/Assignments:

The Researcher/Writer (Part-Time) will:

• Write in-depth reports and supervise the editorial and translation processes.
• Produce high quality and varied research for a range of audiences including analysis, report writing and visual presentations.
• Identify and frame research topics to conduct in-depth studies and investigations, using data gathered using AppleCensorship.com’s App Store Monitor tool. as well as external sources and materials.
• Conduct online and offline research on censorship of apps by Apple as well as on the impact of the company’s processes which lead to such cases of censorship.
• Interview and engage with stakeholders (end-users, developers, human rights organizations, tech specialists, Apple executives, etc.) to collect information. 
• Analyze the local context and environment on both macro and micro levels as it relates to censorship by Apple. Conduct quantitative and qualitative analysis on specific apps and cases of confirmed or alleged arbitrary removal of apps and their impact.
• Conduct legal analysis and comparative studies of the legal framework in authoritarian regimes and countries where cases of app censorship have been reported and how this relates to Apple’s business practices in these countries.
•  Provide recommendations and suggest best practices in order to expand or adjust AppleCensorship’s advocacy efforts with the end goal of ending Apple censorship.
• Maintain record of research process, including written log of methods and actions employed, data sourced used, and raw data produced for subsequent analysis.
• Supervise illustration (including data visualization, charts, graphs, tables, pictures, infographics, and diagrams) work throughout the editorial process.
•  Assist in report dissemination and the creation of promotional materials, such as press releases, social media posts, and media blurbs…

Qualifications (must have):

• There is no degree requirement for this position. However, we will consider applicants with relevant skills and experience, including those with degrees in political science, International law, or a closely related field. Current Master’s or PhD degree seekers are welcome to apply.
• Ability and willingness to work under tight deadlines;
• Familiarity with MS Office applications or Google suite, data analysis;
• Excellent English oral and written communication skills;

Qualifications (nice to have): Specializations in digital mobile industry OR human rights and censorship OR Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) OR International law; Advanced knowledge of iOS and the App Store environment; Advanced knowledge of China is helpful, including Chinese language skills;  

Job level: Fairly experienced to Experienced

Hours: Full-time

Contract: Freelance Contract

Salary:  3500 $

Application process: Send an email with your resume and cover letter to contact@applecensorship.com

All applications are handled with utmost care for privacy and security of applicant. For additional security, create a free ProtonMail account before sending your email to us.

To view the full results and methodology, click here.

New findings from United States-based Fight for the Future and China-based GreatFire reveal that Apple has been enabling government censorship of LGBTQ+ content, most directly 1,377 documented cases of app access restrictions, in 152 App Stores around the world. Moreover, at least 50 LGBTQ+ apps, including the majority of the most popular ones, are currently unavailable in one or more App Stores. Most of the App Stores where the most number of apps are blocked, coincide with countries already low on the list for human rights for the queer community. Underscoring Apple’s role in enabling this censorship is cases such as Malaysia, whose government criminalizes homosexuality but where only 7 LGBTQ+ apps are removed from its App Store; or Niger and South Korea, whose governments have legalized homosexuality, but whose App Stores are within the top 10 with most unavailable LGBTQ+ apps. 

Other high level findings include: 

• Saudi Arabia is the App Store with most LGBTQ+ related apps unavailable (28 apps) followed by China (27). 
• 6 out of the top 10 App Stores with censored LGBTQ+ content are in Sub-Saharan Africa.
• The least available LGBTQ+ apps, globally, are: 
• weBelong – Find Your Community (unavailable in 144 App Stores)
• Hinge: Dating & Relationships (unavailable in 135 App Stores)
• #open ENM + Polyamorous Dating (unavailable in 125 App Stores)
• Qutie – LGBT Dating (unavailable in 115 App Stores)
• Adam4Adam Gay Dating Chat A4A (unavailable in 80 App Stores)
• Among the top 20 LGBTQ+ Apps (as identified in the U.S. App Store), 13 are unavailable in one or more countries, including the top 3: Grindr, Taimi and OkCupid. The majority of these most popular apps are unavailable in more than 20 countries.

“Apple is plastering rainbow flags across their marketing operation in the U.S., but in the meantime they are actively helping governments around the world isolate, silence, and oppress LGBTQ+ people,” said Evan Greer (she/her), Director of Fight for the Future and a transgender musician and writer based in Boston. “Apple may claim that blocking apps where LGBTQ+ people can find community and safety is just the ‘cost of doing business’ in repressive countries, but the fact is that Apple’s draconian App Store monopoly — especially its decision to prevent users from installing apps from the open web to maintain control and profits — makes this discrimination and censorship possible.”

“The results we have obtained after conducting several thousand tests are damning. They are, however, only the tip of the iceberg of Apple’s censorship of its App Store,” said Benjamin Ismail (he/him), GreatFire’s Campaign & Advocacy Director and AppleCensorship project coordinator. “Apple’s biannual “Transparency Reports” and the recently published “Human Rights Policy” appear to be just a smokescreen for investors, and only aim to improve Apple’s image. We know that many countries have hostile policies and laws towards their LGBTQ+ communities, but by enabling this shameful discrimination, Apple’s responses to its obligations to comply with local law are yet another smokescreen.”

There are 1 billion iPhone users around the world who cannot choose the apps to install on the phones they own. In 2008, Apple made the unprecedented decision to limit iPhone users to running software approved and distributed through their App Store. If a government demands an app’s removal from the App Store and if Apple complies, it is near impossible to install an app on an iPhone through another mechanism. If Apple, like Google’s Android, allowed installations from the open web, there would be no conflict with local law, but Apple isn’t doing this in order to protect its monopoly and the stream of free money it extorts from app developers.

“This is a matter of life and death for many queer and trans people around the world, who often find community and safety through these apps,” added Utsav Gandhi (he/him), Campaigner with Fight for the Future. “It’s unacceptable for Apple to continue this business practice, which is fundamentally incompatible with basic human rights and safety for LGBTQ+ people.”

Fight for the Future urges readers to visit abolishtheappstore.org to read more about Apple’s App Store monopoly and demand that lawmakers further investigate its implications for access to content.

Two years ago, Apple was removing a song by Hong Kong singer Jacky Cheung from its Chinese streaming service, along with the songs of other Hong Kong singers (Anthony Wong and Denise Ho).

Since 2019, thousands of apps have disappeared from Apple’s App Store in China. As described by the New York Times, “Apple has created an internal bureaucracy that rejects or removes apps the company believes could run afoul of Chinese rules. Apple trains its app reviewers and uses special software to inspect apps for any mention of topics Apple has deemed off limits in China, including Tiananmen Square, the Chinese spiritual movement Falun Gong, the Dalai Lama, and independence for Tibet and Taiwan.”

Apple regularly claims it removes apps in China to comply with local laws, but, to date, the firm never substantiated those claims.

Tim Cook

Apple, Inc.

1 Infinite Loop

Cupertino, CA 95014 USA

Subject: Apple’s policy regarding China’s App Store management and user privacy.

Dear Tim Cook,

We are writing to you following the profoundly concerning revelations published by the New York Times on May 17, 2021. 

While we have been aware of (and have strongly denounced) Apple’s arbitrary management of its App Store and the double standards by which it operates in countries such as China, new information has been brought to light regarding Apple’s inability to uphold its international human rights commitments regarding freedom of expression, access to information, and privacy, especially as it relates to Apple customers in China.  

What is the “China hide process”?

According to Apple’s own internal report, the company has established a “China hide process,” which involves a team of “Chinese language specialists” who have been trained to censor and remove apps which deal with certain topics in the Chinese App Store. Internal communications also reveal the existence of a “China sensitivities list” as well as a “Chinese App Store Removal wiki page.”

Equally disturbing is the fact that former App Store director, Phillip Shoemaker, admitted that “Apple lawyers in China gave his team a list of topics that couldn’t appear in apps in the country, including Tiananmen Square and independence for Tibet and Taiwan.” 

Taken together, these elements depict the existence of an internal and sophisticated censorship mechanism dedicated to controlling content in China’s App Store. Apple systematically answers that its censorship measures are meant to fulfill its obligations under Chinese law. But these processes and blacklists clearly indicate that Apple is proactively removing apps from the China App Store, even before the company receives requests from the Chinese authorities. 

As you are likely aware, under Chinese law, there are no “illegal topics.” Specific content and opinions are forbidden such as calling for Tibet’s independence but not the mention of Tibet itself. In fact, freedom of speech, publication, assembly, protest, and religious freedoms are protected by China’s constitution in articles 35 and 36. When you approved the decision to remove the New York Times application back in 2017, you actually violated the Chinese Constitution. When you preemptively remove apps that are not illegal under Chinese law, but merely offend the Chinese government, you demonstrate that Apple’s real concern is appeasing the Chinese government instead of following Chinese law. 

How many apps have been removed from the China App Store?

We are aware that Apple releases transparency reports where it details the number of apps removed pursuant to government requests. However, Apple does not release figures regarding apps it removes either through informal government channels or pre-emptively, such as through the “China hide process.” 

In its most recent two years of transparency reports, Apple states that it has removed 1,217 apps from the China App Store. GreatFire’s AppleCensorship App Store Monitor, however, currently shows that at least 5,781 apps which are available in other App Stores are unavailable in China, while the New York Times, which conducted its own analysis, reported that almost 55,000 apps have been removed from the Chinese App Store since 2017. 

In fact, such opacity in Apple’s App Store management seems to be the default rule. The general public, including Apple customers, only become aware of the extent of censorship when the company is pressured to be more transparent.

Whether in so-called “transparency reports,” or in statements and public correspondence, Apple’s figures not only remain vague, but also seem to contradict themselves and empirical observations. 

According to the New York Times, Apple said that it had taken down 70 news apps in response to Chinese government demands since 2017. Yet the Times counted more than 600 news apps unavailable in China. In April this year, responding to a letter sent by US representatives Mike Lee and Ken Buck, Apple Senior Director of Government Affairs Timothy Powderly explained that Apple reviews more than 100,000 apps per week and rejects about 40% of them. Of those rejected apps, 80% ultimately make it in the App Store, which implies that 8% of all reviewed apps are definitively rejected. 

On an annual basis, that equals approximately 416,000 apps being removed or rejected from the App Store. 

Apple, however, only provides the reasoning behind the removal of several thousand apps, leaving the public in the dark regarding its rationale behind the removal or rejection of hundreds of thousands of apps per year. 

In a self-praising statement released by Apple on May 11th, coincidentally published during the Epic v. Apple trial, Apple claimed that it rejected nearly one million problematic new apps, in addition to removing nearly one million app updates, for technical reasons. Apple finds it sufficient to vaguely enunciate categories of reasons why apps get removed. But in light of the censorship mechanisms at play in the Chinese App Store, we cannot but wonder if we are yet to discover that the scale of arbitrariness is much larger than we previously imagined.

For those reasons, we are asking you the following questions:

Can you explain how the “China hide process” is not a violation of Apple’s self-proclaimed values and ethical rules? Do you believe that the “China hide process” is a betrayal of commitments made by Apple to its shareholders via the adoption of its human rights policy? 

What is the list of topics and individuals that are included in the “China hide process?”

How many “Chinese language specialists” work on the “China hide process?”

Why were you personally involved in the decision to remove the New York Times app? Was the removal of this app, like the removal of thousands of other apps, a simple matter of complying with Chinese law?

What role do Apple lawyers in China play in the curation of the App Store? 

Do others, such as employees from the government affairs department or those involved in the redaction of your human rights policy, play a role in these decisions?

What is the legal basis for the removal of apps such as the New York Times, or dozens of apps related to Taiwan and Tibet? Which Chinese laws were those apps infringing? 

What is the rationale behind the removal of apps even before any request by the Chinese government is made?

In addition, we are requesting that Apple release precise statistics regarding the apps that it removes from every App Store worldwide and in particular give information on:

• The number of apps that have been removed from the China App Store since 2017;
• the breakdown by app category  (i.e. News, Reference, Productivity, Games, etc.)
• The number of apps concerning China’s religious minorities that have been removed;
• The number of apps related to Hong Kong and Hong Kong protests that have been removed.

We are requesting that Apple truly show transparency by:

• publicly sharing  the “China sensitivities list;”
• publicly sharing  the “App Store Removal” wiki page;
• publicly sharing the list of “topics that can’t appear in apps”  elaborated by Apple’s lawyers in China  if it is different from the lists above.
• Publicly sharing a list of all apps removed from the China App Store.

Yours sincerely,

GreatFire

Bombshell after bombshell dropped from the lips of Apple’s representatives during the first week of the trial between Epic and Apple—exposing a human rights disaster shrouded in security theater. Apple’s testimony has been revelatory in terms of the company’s eagerness to accede to authoritarian and corporate interests, complete disregard for meaningful review of apps submitted to their store, and in terms of the concrete numbers on massive security breaches that affected millions of people.

Apple’s willingness to censor apps on behalf of authoritarian governments has been well-documented,[1] and enables human rights abuses around the world. This week, they unsuccessfully argued that their walled garden approach provides security and quality of experience to their customers. Unfortunately, Apple’s power to unilaterally censor human rights tools is one of the worst manifestations of their monopoly. Far from keeping customers safe, Apple is putting people in harm’s way by denying them modern tools of resistance and safety. 

During the trial, Apple posited that customers who are dissatisfied with the App Store can just get a new device. That is a deeply privileged perspective. iOS customers invest a significant amount of money in hardware and software, in addition to time and effort to learn how to use their devices. Leaving Apple’s ecosystem comes at prohibitive cost for many. A significant number of people who would like the freedom of choice that comes with other vendors are trapped in their costly iOS investment.

The choice to leave the App Store is fiscally impossible for developers as well—for many, leaving the App Store means renouncing their main source of revenue. Apple’s monopoly works against the creative freedom of developers by being the only meaningful option available.

Unfortunately, despite their massively profitable monopoly, Apple is unable to keep up with even the most basic review of apps submitted for their store. App Store reviewers are not required to have substantive technical skill, and yet are the only safeguard between malicious apps and over a billion people. Apple’s 500-person review team must process 100,000 apps per week—an astronomical amount that truly demonstrates the fallacy of their walled garden approach. 

Just because the Apple review team verifies that an app launches without crashing does not mean it is safe from security breaches, frauds, and scams. On the stand, Apple’s own security professionals admitted that the company’s app review process would not deter a sophisticated attacker, and listed multiple examples of approved apps that not only defrauded users, but posed grave health dangers. These harms are happening to millions of users.

During this first week of trial, Apple admitted the stunning full extent of a 2015 XcodeGhost malware attack that infected 2,500+ apps on the App Store. Over 128 million customers were affected: 70 million in China, and 18 million in the US. 

The App Store is pure security theater that only creates a false sense of safety among people who use it. The iOS operating system, just like the operating system of any other digital device, is what ultimately determines customer safety. This is why Apple’s walled garden doesn’t extend to Mac laptop users. Apple’s primary argument for the App Store is hollow.

Through the process of the US legal system, we have definitively learned that the App Store is not, as its website says, “designed to be a safe and trusted place for users to discover apps created by talented developers around the world,” and that some things, such as profit, are indeed “more important than maintaining users’ trust.”[2]

In his testimony last Monday, economist David Evans noted that Apple’s App Store profits are “vastly higher” than most online stores. We have been giving Apple the power to decide what news we read, what shows we watch, what games we play, and what digital tools we use for too long—all while contributing to Apple’s astronomical profits. It is time to end Apple’s monopoly and reclaim our freedoms and fundamental rights. 

“None of Apple’s attempts to convince us that they act fairly in a highly competitive environment can pass scrutiny,” added Benjamin Ismail, of GreatFire’s AppleCensorship.com project. “Apple’s behavior is authoritarian and one only needs to read the App Store review guidelines to see the company’s claims itself. There is no competition between Apple and other companies when it comes to the App Store. Apple owns the App Store, which is the only marketplace for iOS devices, and exercises its right to life and death over apps, sometimes to axe a competitor and others to please repressive regimes. In the latter cases, Apple’s right might literally become one of life and death when applied to Chinese activists, which is terrifying but first and foremost intolerable”.    

“When one of the largest companies in the world is abusing one billion people and a whole ecosystem of creators, no one should tell people to ‘just buy a new phone,’” added Lia Holland (she/they) Campaigns and Communications Director with Fight for the Future. “Big Tech companies have been allowed to reap unfathomable profits by decimating human rights and exploiting creative people. A whole generation of innovators who grew up on inspiring stories of how Steve Jobs thought outside the box are being denied the right to do so themselves—and a whole generation of activists in authoritarian countries are being harmed in the name of eking out even more profit. Apple’s security charade has gone on for far too long.”

“This issue has largely been portrayed as a spat between big companies: mobile giants like Apple and Google vs app giants like Epic and Spotify”, said Evan Greer, Deputy Director at Fight for the Future (she/her). “But this issue is much bigger than that: it’s about whether the future of technology is open and accessible or locked down into walled gardens that benefit incumbents and elites. Apple’s stranglehold over what software can run on iPhones creates a choke point that governments have used to crack down on political dissent, target marginalized people like LGBTQ folks, and worse. App store monopolies aren’t just a competition issue, they’re a human rights issue.”

[1] https://www.techtransparencyproject.org/articles/apple-censoring-its-app-store-china 

[2] https://developer.apple.com/app-store/user-privacy-and-data-use/

For press inquiries, please contact us at:

+33 663137613 or contact@applecensorship.com

Credit: https://www.fightforthefuture.org/

For press inquiries, please contact us at:

(508) 474-5248 or press@fightforthefuture.org

All other inquiries, contact team@fightforthefuture.org

https://www.abolishtheappstore.org/

This trial will be watched by the media and the tech community as precedent-setting. Depending on the trial’s outcome, the rules could change for companies like Apple, Amazon and Google concerning how they control the value chain, from production to distribution, and how open they should be to their competition.

While this case could “could alter the business model of the country’s most valuable company and serve as a catalyst for new antitrust laws”, it is crucial not to lose sight of the potential impact such a court case could have on millions of Apple customers whose concerns go well beyond the commercial freedom of a video game company.

Epic Games noted in documents submitted to the court in early April, 2020:

“[Apple] has built an ecosystem to restrict the distribution of apps, exclude its rivals, harm competition and consumers.” 

Focusing solely on debate surrounding Apple’s 30% commission on app sales and purchases of digital goods and services would be a terrible mistake. At GreatFire, we believe that this Court case is a unique and unexpected chance to consider the wider impact of Apple’s App Store policy. 

Apple’s ecosystem can be blamed for the company’s unfair business practices but that same ecosystem also enables the company to abuse the fundamental rights and freedoms of millions of the company’s customers around the world. While Apple dictates to developers how much revenue they can keep through the sale of their apps, Apple uses its control of its App Store to expose at-risk populations to further danger. For citizens who live under authoritarian regimes, journalists, human rights defenders and dissidents, Apple’s “unfair practices” deprive them of uncensored news, privacy tools and secure channels of communication.

Apple abuses the fundamental human rights of their customers. This is evident in the company’s contempt for the “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights” set out by the United Nations: 

These Guiding Principles should be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner, “with particular attention to the rights and needs of, as well as the challenges faced by, individuals from groups or populations that may be at heightened risk of becoming vulnerable or marginalized”. 

These are the principles Apple should abide by, not only in the US, but everywhere the company does business.

If a judge decides that Apple must reinstate Fortnite in the App Store without forcing Epic to use Apple’s in-app payment system, this would be hailed as a victory for app developers, and we at GreatFire will cheer as well. 

But such an outcome would fall short of addressing the bigger and considerably more crucial issues at stake, and would change nothing for the lives of millions of Apple customers who live in authoritarian countries. Their rights to access information freely, to enjoy privacy, and to protect themselves with digital security, are currently being denied by Apple. Any decision to restrict Apple’s control of its App Store should also be an opportunity to end Apple’s abhorrent practice of censoring its customers around the world. 

Dear candidates: We really appreciate the time and effort you put in throughout our selection process. As of today, this position is no longer vacant. If more opportunities come up in the future, we will also post them on Applecensorship.com

An open invitation to open minds.

Come to AppleCensorship, where few individual imaginations gather together to pave the way to a digital world free from censorship. Here, you’ll do more than join something — you’ll add something.

Job Title: Researcher/Writer (Part-Time)

Location: (Flexible)

Date of Joining: May 2021

Duration: 12 months

Reporting to: Campaign and Advocacy Director

Summary:  

The mission of AppleCensorship is to track down and expose occurrences of censorship and arbitrary removals of apps from Apple’s App Store. We monitor and report on instances when Apple removes apps from certain country-based app stores, often in compliance with requests from repressive governments. We also advocate for Apple to change their App Store Review Guidelines, which in their current form violate the fundamental human rights of millions of Apple users around the world. Most notably, human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers and activists who operate in China and other repressive environments are most impacted by Apple’s arbitrary censorship and compliance with authoritarian governments worldwide. In accordance with the U.N Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, AppleCensorship seeks to encourage Apple to place respect of human rights ahead of its financial interests. AppleCensorship is actively engaging with stakeholders on these issues, including human rights organizations and community members, app developers, and local groups most affected by Apple’s harm. AppleCensorship is a project of GreatFire.org, which monitors and challenges internet censorship in China.  

Duties/Assignments:

The Researcher/Writer (Part-Time) will:

• Write in-depth reports and supervise the editorial and translation processes.
• Produce high quality and varied research for a range of audiences including analysis, report writing and visual presentations.
• Identify and frame research topics to conduct in-depth studies and investigations, using data gathered using AppleCensorship.com’s App Store Monitor tool. as well as external sources and materials.
• Conduct online and offline research on censorship of apps by Apple as well as on the impact of the company’s processes which lead to such cases of censorship.
• Interview and engage with stakeholders (end-users, developers, human rights organizations, tech specialists, Apple executives, etc.) to collect information. 
• Analyze the local context and environment on both macro and micro levels as it relates to censorship by Apple. Conduct quantitative and qualitative analysis on specific apps and cases of confirmed or alleged arbitrary removal of apps and their impact.
• Conduct legal analysis and comparative studies of the legal framework in authoritarian regimes and countries where cases of app censorship have been reported and how this relates to Apple’s business practices in these countries.
•  Provide recommendations and suggest best practices in order to expand or adjust AppleCensorship’s advocacy efforts with the end goal of ending Apple censorship.
• Maintain record of research process, including written log of methods and actions employed, data sourced used, and raw data produced for subsequent analysis.
• Supervise illustration (including data visualization, charts, graphs, tables, pictures, infographics, and diagrams) work throughout the editorial process.
•  Assist in report dissemination and the creation of promotional materials, such as press releases, social media posts, and media blurbs…

Qualifications (must have):

• There is no degree requirement for this position. However, we will consider applicants with relevant skills and experience, including those with degrees in political science, International law, or a closely related field. Current Master’s or PhD degree seekers are welcome to apply.
• Ability and willingness to work under tight deadlines;
• Familiarity with MS Office applications or Google suite, data analysis;
• Excellent English oral and written communication skills;

Qualifications (nice to have): Specializations in digital mobile industry OR human rights and censorship OR Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) OR International law; Advanced knowledge of iOS and the App Store environment; Advanced knowledge of China is helpful, including Chinese language skills;  

Job level: Early Career to Experienced

Hours: Part-time

Contract: Freelance Contract / fixed term contract

Salary:  750 – 1250 $

Application process: Send an email with your resume and cover letter to contact@applecensorship.com

All applications are handled with utmost care for privacy and security of applicant. For additional security, create a free ProtonMail account before sending your email to us.

This is a polarizing debate, and one without clear-cut answers. While this particular episode is one with no shortage of nuance and perspective to consider, this event serves to highlight Apple’s opaque and arbitrary management of its App Store, and what threats that poses for free speech and freedom of information – not just in the U.S., but worldwide.

The Dangers of Apple Censorship

The questions of how, when, and why private companies moderate content on their online platforms is a fraught one. The instance of Parler is no exception, with some claiming its takedown constitutes corporate censorship, while others point to the violence of January 6th as evidence of the real-world harm such an app can cause. This dynamic can encourage people to focus on the nature of the content that was suppressed rather than the broader, ecosystem-wide effects that we need to simultaneously consider.

As Kara Swisher, whose interview with the Parler CEO was cited by Big Tech as justification for Parler’s removal, notes:

There is nothing that Parler was doing that companies like Facebook were not guilty of too and in larger measure and for a very long time. While I would not go as far as calling the company a scapegoat, as it did allow its system to be used in dangerous ways, it certainly got a lion’s share of the hurt that rained down on tech and that others probably deserved even more.

Similarly, regarding Amazon’s removal of Parler from its cloud service, Amazon Web Services, free expression activist Jillian York noted in a Twitter thread that “if we just give this a pass without question and fail to have a societal-level conversation about this, then we’d also better be ok with Zoom censoring Leila Khaled’s talk at SFSU too” – a reference to this event. While York noted that these two scenarios “are not the same,” it is through this similar lens of precedent and practical implications which we view the story of Parler.

And it is that “societal-level conversation” mentioned by York which we are most interested in. Since Apple removed GreatFire’s FreeWeibo iOS app in 2013, we have been monitoring how Apple manages its App Store and shedding a light on the opaque ways in which the company delists certain apps from certain country-based Apple App Stores, often at the behest of authoritarian governments. 

In the case of Parler, it was Apple, a private-sector company, who decided themselves to remove the app, with no prodding from any government. In fact, it is no stretch to say that certain actors in the federal government probably would have wanted to see the app remain available. This speaks to the level of nuance that comes with the “censorship” debate and how differently these situations play out in different contexts. 

However unsavory one might consider the Parler app to be, it is worth assessing this situation from the perspective of what it shows us about Apple’s power and the dangers that come with how the company makes these types of decisions. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has similarly reviewed the situation to take into consideration what it means when “a group of companies comes together to ensure that forums for speech or speakers are effectively taken offline altogether.” We take a similar view while narrowing our focus to Apple. We believe it is risky as a society to hold our noses and say that, “well, in this one case, Apple was justified for x and y reasons”. The way in which Apple removed Parler from its App Stores is nonetheless troubling in terms of process and precedent. 

The Black Box of App Removal 

A warning, a twenty-four-hour deadline, and a single-page verdict is all that Apple presented to proceed with and justify its decision to remove the Parler app from all of its 175 App Stores worldwide. The opacity of the decision-making process which triggered Apple’s warning and enforcement of the company’s App Store review guidelines is concerning. While it may be tempting to look away this one time, it is not hard to imagine a future wherein a similar justification is imposed upon an app that isn’t Parler; there is, of course, “dangerous and objectionable content” on other apps, ranging from those of other social media sites to encrypted communication platforms. If we’re ok with Parler’s removal, then we should be ready for Telegram or Signal to potentially suffer the same fate for a similar justification. 

The opacity of the decision-making process which triggered Apple’s warning and the company’s review guidelines are characteristic of all cases of censorship by the Cupertino-based firm in terms of the inconsistency at play; Apple actually gave Parler more information than it usually does to developers whose apps are removed. But as is the case with the developers of, for example, apps focused on Tibet that are removed, no criteria for what would have been a satisfying plan to moderate content, was ever shared by Apple.

With such opacity, Apple can remove apps for virtually any reason, including reasons that differ from what they are telling app developers, since the company shares no details nor is obliged to demonstrate the legitimacy of their decisions.

Apple’s Walled Garden

There is another element that makes Apple’s censorship decisions especially severe relative to those of Google and even Amazon; Apple holds a monopoly over its own hardware products. When Google decides to remove an app from the Play Store, it only means that an app loses one distribution channel and platform (albeit the main one) to advertise its services and reach new users. Android users can still download the app, just not via the official Google Play Store. Indeed, such “sideloading” means a slightly more complicated installation process but nothing too restrictive, even for novice users. In Amazon’s case, although shutting down the servers used by a customer has a more direct and immediate effect – if hosting is terminated it usually means that the platform will not be available for all users of that platform across all devices – alternatives to Amazon servers exist. If an Amazon customer moves to another hosting provider, their users would likely not notice any difference. 

On the contrary, being kicked out from the Apple App Store means that an app developer immediately loses all possibilities to reach new iOS users and current users would not receive updates. This means that all owners of iOS devices who want to download a specific app that has been removed from the App Store by Apple are unable to bypass Apple’s decision. Sideloading is impossible on iOS devices without “jailbreaking” the device, and jailbreaking is a fairly complicated and risky procedure for both the device and user in terms of security. For these reasons, Apple’s censorship powers are arguably the most problematic and powerful among any Big Tech company.

The Need for Transparency

In order to prevent politically motivated removals, Apple should only be able to enforce removal within a clearly defined framework. By rewriting the company’s “App Store Review Guidelines,” and including an exhaustive list of criteria used to assess apps, Apple would significantly reduce the number of times it has to opaquely and arbitrarily curate content and services on the App Store. 

Vague paragraphs and expressions, such as the ones that follow, which give “carte blanche” to Apple to remove anything not to their taste, should be removed from the “App Store Review Guidelines”:

• “We will reject Apps for any content or behavior that we believe is over the line. What line, you ask? Well, as a Supreme Court Justice once said, ‘I’ll know it when I see it’. And we think that you will also know it when you cross it.”
• “1.1 Objectionable Content: Apps should not include content that is offensive, insensitive, upsetting, intended to disgust, in exceptionally poor taste, or just plain creepy.”
• “1.1.6 False information and features, …”

Additionally, Apple should produce and publish new internal procedures for reviewing Apps submitted by developers and for reviewing appeals from developers, should their apps be refused for inclusion in the App Store or removed from it. The existing, opaque procedures inevitably lead to arbitrary enforcement decisions. And while we know little about apps that are removed by Apple following government requests, we know even less about apps that are removed at Apple’s own discretion. 

The immediate, coherent and efficient way to change Apple’s behavior is to demand changes of its internal rules and in particular the end of the reign of the opacity regime that dominates Apple’s decision making. Apple censorship can only be fought by imposing a set of very specific rules, rules which likely won’t fit into any single regulatory solution if it is aimed at all of Big Tech as a whole. The Apple ecosystem is unique.

Consistent Inconsistency

This is far from the first time that Apple’s opaque App Store practices have drawn scrutiny. The case of HKmap.live, an app which crowdsources and tracks the location of protesters and police in Hong Kong, illustrates best how Apple was able to, under the guise of protecting people and abiding by the law, remove an app after pressure from Beijing.

Apple claimed that the app violated their guidelines and local laws, and that it had “been used to target and ambush police” and “threaten public safety”, without substantiating its claims. As Apple accounts for around 45 percent of the smartphone market in Hong Kong, the impact of the removal of HKmap.live was significant. 

In other cases, such as the December, 2016 removal of both the English and Chinese-language versions of the New York Times app from the China App Store, Apple directly blamed mandatory requests from the Chinese authorities to justify its censorship: 

For some time now the New York Times app has not been permitted to display content to most users in China and we have been informed that the app is in violation of local regulations. As a result, the app must be taken down off the China App Store. 

Apple provided no details as to what local regulations had been supposedly breached by the New York Times. This is especially surprising given that the New York Times operates legally in China. It has offices, legally employs people in the country, and adheres to the many stipulations and restrictions imposed by the Chinese authorities so that it can continue to operate on the ground in the country.  

According to the Tech Transparency Project, Apple has fallen short when it comes to providing details to explain similar removals for no less than 964 apps which contained politically sensitive content. It is very likely that the number of politically motivated removals is higher since Apple has removed tens of thousands of apps from the Chinese app store, including more than 47,000 apps in August 2020 alone, frequently claiming that these apps contain “porn or illegal gambling”.

In the case of both the HKmap.live and New York Times apps, Apple acted in direct response to a request of the Chinese government, albeit in different circumstances; whereas in the case of Parler, Apple acted on its own accord. What is consistent, though, is the inconsistency; in these and so many other cases, the app review process and decision to reject or remove an app from some or all of its global App Stores is utterly murky, leaving no discernable path for app developers to follow in order to ensure compliance. The only precedent worth noting is Apple’s unilateral power.  

Looking Forward

It is urgent that we take full measure of the issues posed by Apple’s policies of maximizing its financial gain to the detriment of human rights. Only by forcing Apple to define objective, non-discriminatory, and politically unbiased criteria by which it assesses apps on the App Store can Apple users and app developers understand the company’s decisions and why it makes them. Apple should set up transparent and detailed internal procedures for reviewing apps, and publicly justify its actions when it is restricting the fundamental freedoms of its users. This needs to happen if we can hope to prevent Apple from trampling on its users’ basic human rights of free speech and access to free information. 

This letter was sent a week before Apple CEO TIm Cook will be called for questioning in front of the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law. The CEOs of Amazon, Google and Facebook will also be questioned on July 27, as part of the Committee’s ongoing investigation into competition in the digital marketplace.

This hearing offers an opportunity to detail to the Subcommittee how Apple uses its closed operating ecosystem to not only abuse its market position but also to deprive certain users, most notably those in China, of their right to download and use apps related to privacy, secure communication, and censorship circumvention.

We hope that U.S. House representatives agree with our view that Apple should not be allowed to do elsewhere what would be considered as unacceptable in the U.S. Chinese citizens are not second class citizens. Private companies such as Apple compromise themselves and their self-proclaimed values of freedom and privacy when they collaborate with the Chinese government and its censors.

GreatFire sent a list of nine questions that it hopes Subcommittee members will ask of Tim Cook during the hearing. We have specifically suggested that the subcommittee ask Apple’s CEO to confirm how many of the more than 3000 apps that are not available in the China app store were removed at Apple’s discretion and how many apps were removed at the request of the Chinese authorities.

GreatFire has also outlined recommendations for Apple that encourage the company to respect freedom of expression and other fundamental rights for all of their customers, everywhere in the world.

Click here to read GreatFire’s full letter to the Subcommittee or use the button below to download it.

Highlights

• Significant Discrepancy Uncovered: While media reports indicated that Roskomnadzor ordered the removal of 25 VPN apps, our study found that over 50 VPN apps were removed by Apple from the Russia App Store during the summer of 2024, bringing the total number of unavailable VPN apps to 98. This significant unavailability contradicts official reports and suggests that the scale of VPN app removals is much larger than publicly acknowledged.
•  Ongoing Silent Removals: Evidence shows that Apple continues to remove VPN apps from the Russia App Store without public acknowledgment, affecting more than 20% of identified VPN apps.
• Coordinated Removal Patterns: The concentration of removals on specific dates suggests coordinated actions, possibly exceeding Roskomnadzor's official requests.
• Impact on Digital Access: Major VPN providers have been removed, significantly limiting Russian users' access to secure communication tools.
• Call for Transparency: The findings highlight a critical need for transparency and accountability from both Apple and Roskomnadzor regarding app removals that impact digital rights.

Introduction

Following reports that Apple had removed several VPN apps from its Russia App Store at the request of Roskomnadzor—Russia’s Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media (RKN)—we utilized the AppleCensorship.com App Store Monitor (ASM) to conduct a study on the availability of VPN apps. Media outlets, citing Roskomnadzor, reported that 25 VPNs had been removed. Our primary goal was to verify this figure and identify the VPNs purportedly removed on Roskomnadzor's orders. Our secondary objective was to assess the current number of VPNs unavailable in the Russia App Store to monitor potential future changes.

Methodology

Our research methodology was structured around a multistep process:

1. Compilation of VPN Applications: We compiled a list of VPN applications based on their names—often including the acronym "VPN"—and their descriptions in the App Store, specifically when the description claims that the app offers a VPN solution to its users. We included apps that are not primarily VPN apps but offer VPN functionality (like private browser apps) or similar encryption protocols (like Shadowsocks). We did not verify the functionality of the apps by installing and using them, as this was not necessary for the purpose of this research. For example, some apps listed as available in the China App Store are assumed to be non-functional VPNs, but this was not confirmed or disproven during our research.
2. Data Collection and Testing: The initial list compiled on July 6 included more than 250 VPNs. This does not mean that the App Store Monitor (ASM) only had data for these apps but simply that among all apps tested by the ASM (more than 70,000 apps), we identified 250 that claimed to be VPNs. All these apps were tested worldwide across 175 App Stores, and their availability in the Russia App Store was noted. We augmented this list on August 10, increasing it to more than 350 VPN apps, and conducted further tests. Finally, from September 16 to September 18, we retested all apps in the Russia App Store to verify their status.
3. Analysis of App Availability and Removal Dates: We analyzed the results, searching for the potential date of removal for each unavailable VPN app. To do this, we looked at the last date when the app was found available by the ASM, followed by the first test when the app was found unavailable. The actual removal of the app can be inferred to have occurred between these two tests. The closer these two tests are in time, the more accurately we can determine the date and time of removal for a given app.
4. Classification of Unavailable Apps: A significant number of VPN apps—close to 30—that had been previously identified were found to have disappeared entirely from any App Store. We listed these apps separately to provide additional information on the high level of "volatility" associated with this type of app, where the lifespan can be quite short.
   

All data and test results are available here .

• Total Apps Tested: In total, more than 360 VPN apps have been tested worldwide, resulting in over 63,000 individual tests.
• Current Availability: As of September 16, 2024, 348 VPN apps have been identified and tested worldwide.
• Availability in Russia App Store: Out of these 348 apps, 250 were found to be available in the Russia App Store. Another 98 apps were found to be unavailable as of September 16, 2024

Grouping of Unavailable VPN Apps

Unavailable apps were grouped according to their estimated date of removal. The following groups were established (the color indicated fills the “Availability in Russia App Store” column in the table accompanying this report):

1. Pre-War Removals (Light Yellow): 14 VPN apps were found to be unavailable or had been removed before the onset of the war in Ukraine in February 2022. Notably among these are Norton Secure VPN, SurfEasy VPN, and Avast Secureline VPN + Proxy. Except for these three mentioned apps, all others had been unavailable since the ASM began monitoring their status in 2019, 2020, or 2021. This suggests that these VPNs were possibly always unavailable and might never have been released on the Russia App Store, although this cannot be conclusively confirmed by the ASM.
   
   
2. Early War Removals (Yellow): 17 VPN apps became unavailable or were removed after the war commenced—an event that was followed by intensified efforts by Russian authorities to block VPN services—but before the "ban on VPN advertisement" issued by Roskomnadzor on March 1, 2024. This group includes prominent apps such as Nord VPN, Proton VPN, and Bitdefender VPN. Seven VPN apps were included in this group, even though it is possible that their unavailability predates this time window (February 2022–March 2024). Due to the absence of ASM data before the first observed unavailability, they were categorized here. It is noteworthy that this group may contain VPN apps that were voluntarily removed by their developers following the start of the war, particularly those whose removal was observed in the weeks or months immediately after the conflict began (e.g., VPN Hotspot or VPN App).
   
   
3. Mid-2024 Removals (Dark Yellow): The removal of one VPN app, Free VPN Proxy by Planet VPN, was confirmed to have occurred between May 13 and June 11, 2024. Although it is possible that eleven other apps (currently included in the Orange group) were also removed before July 2024, our data indicates that these apps were more likely removed in early July.
   
   
4. Early July Removals (Orange): 13 VPN apps were likely removed at the beginning of July 2024, between July 4 and July 7—that is, within three days after the news emerged about Apple's removal of 25 VPN apps. Within this group, the removals of two VPN apps—VPN by CyberGhost and ExpressVPN—can be accurately pinpointed to have occurred between July 5 and July 7. Eleven other VPNs, including Red Shield VPN and Le VPN, which confirmed their removal on July 4, were found by the ASM to be no longer available by July 6.
   
   
5. Post-July 7 Removals (Red): 30 VPN apps were definitely removed after July 7, 2024, and on or before August 11. Early July Removals: Eight apps were removed between July 8 and July 10, with four removed precisely on July 8. These include Turbo VPN, VPN Proxy Master – Unlimited, VPN - Free VPN Super, and VPNIFY - Unlimited VPN. Late July Removals: Two VPNs, Wirevpn-Unlimited vpn Proxy and VPN + TOR Browser and Ad Block, were removed on July 22, followed closely by three more that were removed before the end of July. Unspecified July-August Removals: An additional 17 VPN apps could have been removed at any time between July 7 and August 11.6.
   
   

6. Late Removals (Purple): 15 VPN apps were removed after August 11, with four of them confirmed to be still available in the early days of September. All were removed on or before September 18.

7. Uncertain Removal Dates (White): There are eight VPN apps for which it is difficult to estimate the date of removal due to insufficient test records or because the dates of "available" and "unavailable" test results are too far apart to infer a probable removal date. These VPNs could have been removed at any time between January 2024 and August 2024, or even before January for four of them.

Analysis and comments

Although Russian authorities have not enforced a total ban on VPN apps, the number of VPNs currently unavailable in the Russia App Store is significant. With 98 VPN apps—including major players such as Proton VPN, NordVPN, ExpressVPN, and VPN by CyberGhost—Russia now stands out as the second most restrictive App Store environment, surpassed only by the China App Store. In China, all VPNs were purged by Apple in 2017 and have since been prevented from appearing. According to data from app market intelligence companies, at least a third of the VPNs unavailable in Russia belong to the top 200 most popular VPN apps in Apple's App Store.

The availability of VPN apps in Russia has changed dramatically over the past few years. From just 14 VPNs confirmed unavailable before the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (and potentially several more apps for which data do not rule out unavailability prior to 2022), the number of unavailable apps rose to 32 by June 2024.

While the removals in the summer of 2024 appear scattered throughout July, August, and early September, we identified specific time windows during which several removals were concentrated. ASM data clearly establishes that 18 VPN apps (5 from the Orange group, including Le VPN and Redshield VPN, which reported their removal, and 13 from the Red group) were removed in July.

An analysis of the data reveals that certain dates in July were particularly significant for VPN app removals from the Russia App Store.

During July 4 and 5, there was a notable concentration of removals. Super VPN Hotspot VPN Master, Plato VPN and Safe VPN were already unavailable shortly after midnight on July 5, indicating that, like Red Shield VPN and Le VPN, they had been removed on July 4. Additionally, ExpressVPN and CyberGhost VPN appear to have been removed in the evening of July 5.

The date July 8 also stands out, as eight VPNs seem to have been removed on this day, with data confirming this definitively for four of them.

Furthermore, July 22 and 24 appear significant in the pattern of removals. Wirevpn and VPN + TOR Browser and Ad Block can only have been removed on July 22. Similarly, the removals of Free VPN by Free VPN .org™, VPN Proxy by Seed4.Me VPN and VPN` point to a removal date of July 24.

For the other 17 apps, the fact that five were still available after July 24 suggests that additional "sessions" of group removals occurred in early August. The removal of Ostrich VPN - Fast Proxy Master, which occurred between August 9 and 11, along with the confirmed unavailability by August 9 of seven other VPNs, indicates that August 9 may have been another significant "day of removals."

Finally, for the 15 VPNs removed in late August or September, removals seem less concentrated on specific days compared to July. While data for X-VPN - Best VPN Proxy master indicates a removal between August 26 and 29, others could have been removed in the latter half of August or in September. Four VPNs were confirmed to be still available as of September 2: VPN ゜, FlyVPN - Secure & Fast, VPN - fast, secure, no limits, and f3 vpn - simple VPN. However, all could have been removed any time up to September 18. In only one case—that of f3 vpn - simple VPN—is the removal confirmed to have occurred between September 2 and September 4.

Observations of these recent and unprecedented waves of removals in July, August, and September 2024 are significant for several reasons. First, they demonstrate a 200% increase in the unavailability of VPN apps in the Russia App Store during this period, indicating that the situation is far more extensive than the 25 VPN removals reported in the media. Second, the concentration of these removals suggests that they are not predominantly the result of deliberate withdrawals by VPN developers. If voluntary, it would be highly improbable for multiple VPN owners to decide independently to withdraw their apps from Russia on the same specific days.

Therefore, there are two plausible interpretations of these observations in relation to reports by the Russian news agency Interfax stating that Roskomnadzor had directed Apple to remove 25 VPN apps from the App Store:

1. Underreporting by Roskomnadzor: Roskomnadzor may have deliberately provided a lower figure for the number of VPNs it targeted.
   
   
2. Proactive Measures by Apple: Apple may be proactively removing more VPN apps than actually requested by Roskomnadzor.
   
   

Either interpretation suggests a discrepancy between official communications and the observed scale of VPN app removals from the Russia App Store. This raises concerns about transparency, as both Roskomnadzor and Apple appear to be misrepresenting the reality of the situation.

Since the media reports on July 4 and the days that followed, neither Roskomnadzor nor Apple have issued communications to correct the number of VPNs targeted by Roskomnadzor's requests or to identify which VPNs have been removed from the App Store.

Conclusion

Our study reveals a significant and ongoing reduction in the availability of VPN apps in Apple's Russia App Store, far exceeding the official reports of 25 removals. The findings underscore a critical need for transparency and accountability from both Roskomnadzor and Apple. Transparent disclosure of app removal policies and actions is essential to uphold digital rights and inform users about changes that impact their access to secure communication tools. As digital censorship becomes increasingly sophisticated, stakeholders must advocate for openness to ensure that users are not left unaware of restrictions affecting their online freedoms.

VPNs, or Virtual Private Networks, are essential tools for individuals in authoritarian contexts, enabling them to bypass censorship and protect their anonymity through encrypted internet traffic. These tools are critical in safeguarding against surveillance, retaliation, and prosecution, thereby supporting the rights to freedom of information, freedom of speech and privacy. The accessibility and functionality of these apps in Apple’s App Store and Google’s Play Store have significant implications for global users and their human rights. We conducted an exploratory and comparative study to analyze the availability of 50 of the most popular VPNs across 175 App Stores, and 176* Play Stores.

Methodology

Our research methodology was structured around a two-step process: First, we compiled a list of the top 50 VPN applications, selected based on their popularity and availability on both Apple's App Store and Google's Play Store, to ensure comparison across the two major mobile app distribution platforms. Secondly, we tested the availability of these VPN apps across all 175 App Stores and 176 Play Stores. We analyzed the results, comparing the availability of VPN apps across Apple's App Store and Google's Play Store, and examined how each platform's offerings vary by geographical and national context.

Data and Findings

All data and test results are available here. 

General figures:

• A total of 17,550 tests were conducted across two platforms, involving 50 VPN apps tested in 175 Apple App Stores and 176 Google Play Sores.
• In the Apple App Store, out of 8,750 tests across 175 stores, apps were unavailable 108 times, representing 1.23% of the total tests.
• In the Google Play Store, out of 8,800 tests across 176 stores, including the 'Rest of the World' category, apps were unavailable 277 times, representing 3.15%, of the total tests.
• Overall, we detected 385 instances of unavailability, resulting in a combined cross-platform unavailability rate of 2.19% (385/17,550). This indicates a relatively high rate of VPN accessibility worldwide upon initial examination.
  
  

Apps and Platforms:

• Due to the existence of a categorical ban of VPN apps in China, none of the 50 VPN apps tested are available globally across the two platforms, as all iOS versions of the apps are, at least, unavailable in the China App Store.
• On Google’s Play Store:
• 17 VPNs are available in all 176 Play Stores, including the China Play Store (blocked in China).
• 11 VPNs are only unavailable in one store: 9 apps in China’s store and 2 apps in Russia’s store.
• 16 VPNs are unavailable in 2 to 11 stores.
• 6 VPNs are unavailable in 18 to 42 stores.
• On Apple’s App Store:
• 39 VPNs are only unavailable in 1 App Store: China.
• 10 VPNs are unavailable in 2 to 10 App Stores.
• 1 VPN is unavailable in 25 App Stores.
  
• Disregarding the availability of apps in the China Play Store, which cannot be accessed from mainland China, we looked at the consistency of regions of unavailability across platforms for each app. The following can be observed:
• 27 VPNs show the exact same unavailability across both platforms. These 24 VPNs are only unavailable in 2 stores or fewer. (13 of these are actually available in China’s Play Store while they are unavailable in the App Store.)
• 23 VPNs show discrepancies in unavailability, presenting a different number of unavailable stores on the 2 platforms. Those discrepancies can sometimes be very significant.
• Only 3 of these 23 apps show more unavailability in Apple’s App Stores compared to the Play Store. For all 20 other apps, the VPNs are unavailable in more Play Stores.
• However, Play Stores which are unavailable are often countries and territories which do not have iOS App Stores, such as: Bangladesh, Comoros, Cuba, Eritrea, Guinea, the Vatican, Iran, Monaco, Samoa, San Marino, Somalia and Sudan. The Rest of the World Play Store also includes territories which do not have App Stores. In total, 79 instances of unavailability in the Play Store concern territories which have no App Store.
• Apps with the biggest discrepancies include VPN Vault (unavailable in 25 App Stores vs. 2 Play Stores), VPN by Private Internet Access, (10AS vs.42PS), Surfshark (2AS vs. 37PS), Encrypt.me (1AS vs. 42PS), VyprVPN (1AS vs. 41PS) and HotspotShield (1AS vs. 23PS). Unavailability in the Play Stores for these apps includes 4 of the 5 instances for the “Rest of the World” Play Store observed in this study.
  

Geographical trends

• VPN unavailability by region shows that Asia-Pacific has the highest number of incidents, with 63 instances across 12 countries on Apple’s App Store and 77 (16 countries) on the Google Play Store, totaling 140 instances out of 386. This is primarily driven by China, which accounts for 78 of these instances across both platforms.
• Africa is next with 87 instances of unavailability (across 26 countries), followed by the Americas with 49 instances (across 13 countries) and the Middle East and Northern Africa region, also 49 cases across 11 countries. From these, Iran totals 16 instances (all in the Play Store as there is no App Store in Iran), putting the country in second position behind China in terms of unavailable VPN apps.
• After China and Iran, Turkmenistan and Russia have the highest instances of VPN unavailability, with 12 occurrences each.
  
  

Analysis and Comments

The data indicates that VPN apps continue to face systematic unavailability in China on Apple’s App Store, the only one of the two platforms available in China. In 2017, Apple began removing all VPN apps from its China App Store at the request of Chinese authorities. This led to a swift decrease in the number of VPN apps available in the country, culminating in a complete categorical ban that has been maintained to this day.

Countries like Iran, Russia, and Turkmenistan also exhibit significant instances of VPN unavailability due to government censorship. These countries have strict controls over internet access and often block VPNs to restrict access to global information and maintain control over online content. Russia’s figures for VPN unavailability align with the country’s regulatory framework, which includes laws against technologies that enable bypassing official censorship.

When comparing the unavailability of VPN apps on the App Store and the Play Store, notable differences emerge in geographical spread and access levels. The Google Play Store has a significantly higher and broader total number of unavailability instances (277) compared to the App Store (108). The App Store mainly reflects app restrictions in China, with sporadic temporary restrictions also occurring in other countries. For example, in Vietnam, the ‘VPN - fast, secure, no limits’ app was available from December 18, 2023, to January 3, 2024, but became unavailable on March 21, 2024. In India, the ‘TunnelBear’ app was available from June 29, 2021, to June 30, 2022, and then became unavailable on December 28, 2022. Typically, these restrictions or unavailability affect only one or two countries per app.

In contrast, some Google Play apps are unavailable in up to 42 Play Stores (including the ‘Rest of the World’ one), like ‘VPN by Private Internet Access’ and ‘Encrypt.me,’ possibly indicating a higher degree of restriction.

At first glance, the Play Store demonstrates more extensive access restrictions, pointing to potentially stricter enforcement of internal or government-led app availability policies compared to the App Store. This is mostly true for territories with access to both Apple and Google platforms. When comparing territories with both platforms, 62 territories have more instances of unavailability in the Google Play Store (231 instances of unavailability) compared to the App Store (only 28 instances). Only 13 countries see more unavailability in the App Store (18 instances) compared to the Play Store (5 instances).

However, the Play Store’s global availability (224 countries and territories worldwide) is significantly higher than the App Store (175 App Stores). This means that many instances of unavailability counted in the Play Store should be considered differently. For example, in Iran, where 16 instances of unavailability are observed, the App Store is not available in the country, and the Play Store offers 34 VPNs to Android users while no VPNs are available to iOS device users. The same applies to users in Bangladesh, Comoros, Cuba, Eritrea, Guinea, the Vatican, Monaco, Samoa, San Marino, Somalia, Sudan, and many other countries included in the Rest of the World Play Store.

Ultimately, apart from China, no country or region is affected by widespread restriction over VPN apps, and most VPNs are available even in the countries that restrict digital rights the most. This suggests that governments most concerned about VPN usage in their countries tend to block the servers used by VPNs rather than restricting access to VPNs themselves. Unavailability of specific VPNs in the most authoritarian regimes, unless attributed to the app owners/publishers, might indicate that authorities need to restrict access to an app in addition to blocking its servers due to the VPN owners' ability to adapt or circumvent the blocks.

Further research, notably by reaching out to VPN companies, is needed to understand these instances of unavailability better and differentiate between potentially very different situations despite similar observations in terms of availability/unavailability of VPN apps.

(* The 176 Play Stores include a 'rest of the world' category, which refers to a default grouping used by Google to manage the distribution of apps in territories that do not have a dedicated national Play Store. The ‘rest of the world’ Play Store actually includes 49 countries/regions, which are not individually listed among the countries Google explicitly supports with a local Play Store. For the purposes of this short study, this Play Store is counted like any other.)

New Report Unveils App Censorship in China’s Apple App Store Amid Recent Developments

GreatFire’s AppleCensorship.com (now part of The App Censorship Project), in collaboration with ARTICLE 19 ASIA, is releasing a comprehensive report titled "Isolation by Design: Censorship in Apple's App Store in China and Human Rights Implications." This report meticulously examines the intricate landscape of app censorship within China's Apple App Store, highlighting significant patterns of app removals and the broader human rights concerns arising from these practices.

The full report can be accessed here . Detailed data supporting the report's findings can be found here, here, and here.

Key Findings:

The Isolation of Chinese Mobile Users:

• Among the 100 most downloaded apps worldwide:
• Only four are also among the most downloaded in China’s App Store, all of which are Chinese.
• 66 were found unavailable to Chinese iOS users.
• In contrast, only 8 apps were unavailable in the U.S. App Store.
• This demonstrates a significant digital isolation of Chinese users compared to their global counterparts.

Unavailable Apps in China:

• As of March 20, 2023, the App Store Monitor has recorded 11,026 unavailable apps in China's App Store.
• China’s ratio of unavailability—the number of unavailable apps compared to the total number of apps tested—is the highest of the 175 App Stores run by Apple, at 27.53%. The average ratio of unavailability for other App Stores is around 13%.
• Categories such as Games, Utilities, Education, Entertainment, and Lifestyle are proportionally represented in the list of unavailable apps in China, aligning with their prevalence in the App Store. However, News, Books, and Social Networking categories are disproportionately unavailable, suggesting targeted censorship.

Sensitive Categories:

• VPN: Every VPN app tested (240) was unavailable in China, confirming a comprehensive ban to prevent circumvention of the Great Firewall.
• Noteworthy examples: Lantern VPN, ProtonVPN, ExpressVPN, Nord VPN;
• Privacy & Digital Security: 29 apps focusing on privacy and digital security were unavailable, potentially impacting members of civil society organizations who need to safeguard their personal information.
• Noteworthy examples: Signal, ProtonMail, DuckDuckGo;
• LGBTQ+ & Dating: Out of 67 unavailable LGBTQ+ related apps, most impacted were social networking and dating apps.
• Noteworthy examples: Hinge, Adam4Adam, weBelong, and Grindr;
• News, Media & Information: 170 unavailable apps were listed, including Taiwan+, removed from China’s App Store in November 2022. The number of News apps unavailable has consistently grown since the AppleCensorship project began in 2019.
• Noteworthy examples: NYTimes, BBC News, Reuters;
• Social Media & Communication: 96 apps, including some of the major platforms. The only few popular apps worldwide, like Twitter and Facebook, that were available are blocked by China's Great Firewall, making them inoperative without a VPN.
• Noteworthy examples: Skype, LinkedIn, Viber, Damus, Line;
• Tibet & Buddhism: 41 apps related to Tibetan culture and Buddhism were unavailable, suggesting meticulous scrutiny by Chinese authorities.
• Noteworthy examples: Himalaya Lib, MonlamGrandTibetanDictionary;
• Uyghur: Out of the 72 Uyghur-related apps identified, 12, including those for religious texts, were blocked. Among them were two Book apps housing thousands of Uyghur-language books and audiobooks.
• Noteworthy examples:RFA Uyghur, Hayatnuri, Awazliq Kitap, UYGHUR MAN
• Religion: 144 apps related to various religions were unavailable. Various versions of the Bible are inconsistently available, with no specific version targeted more than others.
• Noteworthy examples: Bible App by Olive Tree, Quran Majeed, TORAH, JW Library

Recent Developments: 

Adding to the report's urgency, recent actions by Apple have intensified the conversation about digital freedom and censorship. As of April 19, 2024, Apple has removed widely-used apps such as WhatsApp and Instagram from its China App Store, citing national security concerns in line with the Chinese government's stringent regulations. This move highlights an increasing trend of digital isolation for Chinese iOS users, creating even more barriers for foreign journalists and other members of civil society.

Key Recommendations:

Apple:

• Improve Transparency: Disclose detailed information about the apps targeted by government takedown requests, the legal basis for app takedowns, details about Apple’s own app review processes, and appeal mechanisms.
• Strengthen Human Rights Commitments: Ensure users can access unfiltered information. Advocate for digital freedom by challenging blanket bans on VPN apps and other privacy tools.
• Ensure Genuine Appeal Procedures: Establish transparent and accessible appeal processes for developers to contest app removals and rejections, ensuring fairness and accountability in App Store operations.
• Implement Sideloading: Allow alternative app distribution channels to mitigate impact on fundamental freedoms and reduce dependency on the App Store.

Government and Lawmakers:

• Investigate and Regulate: Scrutinize Apple’s practices and enact laws to ensure global digital and human rights standards.

International Community:

• Promote Human Rights Policies: Advocate for human rights-based guidelines and demand transparency from tech companies.
  

About The App Censorship Project: AppleCensorship.com is dedicated to monitoring and reporting on app availability and censorship across Apple's App Stores worldwide. The website is now under the aegis of The App Censorship Project, an initiative that aims to expose censorship in Apple’s App Store and Google’s Play Store. Collaborating with various human rights organizations, it aims to foster a more open and transparent digital future.

About ARTICLE 19: ARTICLE 19 is an international human rights organization that works to defend and promote freedom of expression and freedom of information worldwide.

The findings are striking: Over half of the apps studied were unavailable in at least one App Store. Notably, China emerged as the only country where there is a significant, widespread blockage of religion-related apps of all kinds. The reason behind this – whether a specific targeting by Chinese authorities or a broader policy affecting numerous app categories – remains unclear.

Benjamin Ismail, Director of GreatFire's AppCensorship project, stated, “It's challenging to ascertain the total number of religion-related apps on the App Store globally; the extent of their availability is equally uncertain. Our research suggests that locating apps universally available is more difficult than finding those restricted in one or more App Stores.”

Ismail further proposed, “A confirmation from Apple regarding the inclusion of religious content in their ‘China blacklist’, which governs content accessibility for iOS users in China, would be enlightening.”

The AppCensorship project has released a list of 155 religion-related apps currently unavailable in one or more of the 175 App Stores operated by Apple globally.

This list, subject to updates, is available here .

“The list will expand to cover more apps for minority religious groups, such as the Ahmadiyya Muslim community, facing persecution in countries like Pakistan. Our ultimate goal is to enable the public to generate these lists directly on AppleCensorship.com, and we are actively working towards this,” added Ismail.

This study presents a stark contrast to previous research on the availability of other “sensitive” app categories. A June 2021 report by GreatFire examined popular LGBTQ+ apps globally , revealing a significant reduction in their availability. Notably, in this case, China was not the sole country restricting access; for instance, Saudi Arabia topped the list with the highest number of unavailable LGBTQ+ apps, followed by China.

Ismail concluded, “While China's record on human rights, including religious freedom, is problematic, other countries with strict religious regulations do not show a systemic ban on Bible apps, as seen in China. This disparity raises important questions about Apple's policies on religious app availability in China and across the world.”

On December 22, 2022, AppleCensorship released a report highlighting Apple’s censorship of its Russia’s App Store and the company’s many compromises with the authorities which have impacted freedom of information and expression in the country.

The report investigates Russia’s App Store, where many LGBTQ+ related apps are blocked.

Read the December 2022 report: “United Apple: Apple’s censorship and compromises in Russia“

Based on data collected from 2019 until the end of 2022 and tests on more than 15,000 apps, the report highlighted the following facts:

• Patterns of app removals from Russia’s App Store detected by the App Store Monitor (ASM) suggest that specific groups of apps have been targeted by the Russian authorities and that a system of Apple-enforced targeted censorship is in place in Russia’s App Store.
• LGBTQ+ related apps constitute the most prominent type of apps being unavailable in Russia’s App Store, with at least 25 apps currently unavailable, including some of the most popular LGBTQ+ apps in the world.
• More than 30 VPN and private browsing apps have been taken down since the start of the war in Ukraine, while the Russian authorities were announcing that “measures were being taken to limit access to VPN services that violate Russian law”.
• Although Russia’s App Store does not reflect the ongoing crackdown on online information led by the Russian government, the list of unavailable apps continues to grow as the App Store Monitor unveils new instances of apps’ unavailability or removals from Russia’s App Store.

Goals of the survey

Following up on the report published in December last year, which pointed to an increase of removals since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, this study aims at investigating Russia’s App Store further. Comparing Russia’s App Store with China’s App Store can help us assess if some apps or categories of apps are considered as sensitive apps/content for both countries, in addition to providing an indication on the extent of Russia’s App Store censorship and on its ratio of apps’ unavailability.

Method

Between December 23 and December 26, 2022, the App Store Monitor’s routine scan of the 175 App Stores operated by Apple worldwide, was interrupted and replaced by the following instructions:

1. We checked all the apps unavailable in mainland China’s App Store, in Russia’s App Store:

By the end of 2022, more than 38,000 apps had been tested in China’s App Store, while around 20,000 apps had been tested in Russia’s App Store. Since the ASM does not maintain a list of all apps tested in a given App Store, It is impossible to conduct identical tests in both App Stores. However, it is possible to test unavailable apps from a given App Store, in another App Store. By doing so, we not only obtain further data on apps which were possibly unavailable due to censorship (i.e. sensitive apps), but also increase the comparability between the two App Stores, decreasing the risk of discrepancies due to one App Store having more relevant apps tested for availability than the other.

2. We tested availability of all the apps unavailable in Russia’s App Store, in China’s App Store:

By repeating the same process in reverse, we strengthen further the data set, reaching a satisfying level of comparability which allows us to look into specific categories of apps in more detail.

3. Comparing the App Stores, and identify potential trends in terms of unavailable apps’ categories, content and function.

After both batteries of tests, we can export the data and start analyzing it. We try to identify if China’s App Store and Russia’s App Store each have their own specific types of unavailable apps or if the shared unavailability of some apps have significance or are merely incidental.

Results

1. Testing each other’s unavailable apps and augmenting comparability

Click here to see all the data on unavailable apps in Russia's App Store and China's App Store 

We started by testing apps from China’s list of unavailable apps in Russia’s App Store, as the latter had much fewer apps tested. After all 10,481 apps were tested, Russia’s list of unavailable apps did not change significantly. Although it appears that, out of the 10,481 apps from China’s list of unavailable apps, around 3,600 had never been tested in Russia’s App Store, only 507 new unavailable apps were recorded, indicating that the vast majority of “new” apps tested in Russia’s App Store were available. This even led to a slight decrease of the unavailability percentage of 0.56% from 17.75% to 17.19%. Very few “local apps” have been added to Russia’s list (only 39) which confirms that “local apps” constitute a small part of China’s list of unavailable apps. This is also due to Russia’s App Store having recorded a significant number of unavailable local Chinese apps (apps only available in China’s App Store).

The movements that are observed in China’s App Store after the series of tests are attributed to external users which continue to use the website to test new apps, as well as to additional tests run by the App Store Monitor, as the algorithm extends its testing in more App Stores when encountering apps which test unavailable in a given App Store.

We subsequently tested apps unavailable in Russia’s App Store, to verify their availability in China’s App Store. We were aiming at equalizing the data set with this step rather than exploring the availability of apps from Russia’s list, as most of them had already been tested in China’s App Store. However, the addition of 689 new apps out of which 183 were found to be unavailable, came as a surprise and is significant enough to be noted.

2. China’s App Store vs. Russia’s App Store

Similar unavailable apps

In order to identify apps which were unavailable in both App Stores, we aggregated the two lists and looked for duplicate apps. In total, we found 2,926 apps.

Looking at the aggregated list in more detail, we can sort apps by category and see if certain types of apps are more often blocked by one or the other App Store.

Some categories are composed of a majority of apps that are blocked in both App Stores. 66% to 86% of the apps which belong to the “Food & Drink”, “Shopping”, “Medical”, “Sports”, “Weather” and "Navigation” categories, are unavailable in both Russia and China’s App Stores.

These high percentages could have been interpreted as an indication that these categories, which usually do not include sensitive content, are not subjected to targeted censorship but rather contain apps that are unavailable in multiple App Stores for reasons other than censorship. However, the presence of the “Shopping” category in the list, which we know contain many apps that were specifically removed by their owners from Russia’s App Store after the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, comes as a contradiction to this interpretation. See our report “United Apple: Apple’s censorship and compromises in Russia” for more information on the unavailability of apps from the Shopping category.

Categories with the smallest proportion of apps unavailable in both App Stores include:

Developer Tools (0.00%) ; Book (10.06%) ; Education (12.30%) ; Games (13.45%) ; Stickers (14.29%) ; Reference (14.53%) ; Magazines & Newspapers (15.15%) ; Productivity (19.80%) ; Photo & Video (20.78%) ; News (26.62%)

In each case, China’s App Store list has significantly more apps than Russia’s App Store list:

Developer Tools (Cn: 7 ; Ru: 2) ; Book (Cn: 262 ; Ru: 15) ; Education (Cn: 327 ; Ru: 58) ; Games (Cn: 4943 ; Ru: 294) ; Stickers (Cn:6 ; Ru: 0) ; Reference (Cn: 84 ; Ru: 16) ; Magazines & Newspapers (Cn: 25 ; Ru: 3) ; Productivity (Cn: 284 ; Ru: 44) ; Photo & Video (Cn: 79 ; Ru: 43) ; News (Cn: 176 ; Ru: 28)

Three categories stand out from this list: Book, News and Productivity apps. News apps are widely unavailable in China, with 176 unavailable apps, a figure which consistently reflects China’s control of the press and information. Although Russia’s crackdown on press freedom has increased in the past year, this is not immediately evident in Russia’s iOS App Store.

China’s App Store has almost 20 times more Book apps than Russia’s App Store. As for Productivity apps, China’s categorical ban of VPN apps explains the difference, although Russia’s number of unavailable Productivity apps remains non-negligible. With 44 unavailable apps, Productivity ranks 9th in Russia’s App Store, in terms of unavailable apps.

When comparing most unavailable categories in each App Store, we can see immediately that Games and Utilities apps ranks first and second in both App Stores. Similarly, Stickers, Graphics & Design, Weather, Developer Tools and Navigation apps rank at the bottom of both App Stores.

Despite the fact that China’s App Store always has more unavailable apps than Russia, ranking categories by number of unavailable apps allows us to notice three categories that hold a particular position in Russia’s App Store. Contrary to China’s App Store, Lifestyle, Business and Shopping categories rank rather high in Russia’s App Store. If reasons are already put forward for the unavailability of apps belonging to the Shopping category, looking at Business and Lifestyle apps in detail reveals a significant number of Chinese owned apps in both App Stores. Rather than pointing at a targeted block in Russia’s App Store, this indicates that China’s App Store includes a number of apps only available in China and which, when tested in Russia’s App Store, were logically found unavailable, as they would have been in any App Store outside of China.

Monitoring censorship in Russia’s and China’s App Store

At the moment, Russia’s App Store does not seem to be concerned by categorical bans. However, it has already been established that certain types of apps, spread across various categories, such as LGBTQ+ related apps, are subjects of widespread unavailability. Monitoring of Russia’s App Store in the future thus needs to be conducted by using ad hoc categories of apps or apps related to specific keywords (such as “LGBTQ+”, “human rights”) as well as by identifying individual apps (ex: U.S. media apps, popular VPN apps, etc.) and apps’ developers (ex: political opposition leader Navalny’s apps), in order to detect more efficiently future app removals ordered by Roskomnadzor and enforced by Apple.

Additionally, while China’s App Store remains the most severely censored App Store worldwide, and continues to require constant and widespread monitoring, the present study suggests that there could be an interest in looking at apps which are released only in China’s App Store, and sometimes in other Chinese-speaking territories such as Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and Singapore, in order to better understand China’s strategy for information control and apps which aim at replacing the void left by the widespread removal of categories of apps and specific content.

 

On December 22, 2022, AppleCensorship released a report highlighting Apple’s censorship of its Hong Kong’s App Store and the company’s many compromises with Beijing which have impacted freedom of information and expression in the special administrative region.

The report investigates Apple’s censorship in Hong Kong’s App Store and assesses the compromises that Apple has made to safeguard its relationship with China and maintain access to the market. As human rights and fundamental freedoms in the territory shrink, including digital rights, Apple has been reluctant to publicly commit to uphold user rights to access information freely and express their views online.

Read the December 2022 report: https://reports.applecensorship.com/hk/ 

“Apps at Risk: Apple’s censorship and compromises in Hong Kong“ 

The report shows that on a number of occasions, Apple has complied with demands to censor content deemed in violation of local laws or simply critical of Beijing. The report also highlights a number of individual apps, including Hong Kong based media and social platforms, at risk of being targeted by the authorities and therefore removed by Apple.

Some of the key findings of the report are as follows:

 ● While Hong Kong’s App Store remains relatively free compared to China’s App Store, a series of tests conducted in 2022 reveal that Hong Kong’s App Store is more restrictive than other App Stores considered “free”. The unavailability of apps in the Hong Kong App Store is higher than most of the 173 App Stores monitored by AppleCensorship.

● In November 2022, a surprisingly high number of VPN and private browsing apps (more than 50) were found to be unavailable in Hong Kong’s App Store.

● A number of apps related to media and information have been removed globally over the last two years, raising the possibility that self-censorship or censorship by Apple on behalf of the authorities is affecting the global availability of apps.

● Apple has not made any public commitment to uphold Hong Kongers’ fundamental rights to access information and express their opinions online. If the Chinese authorities were to increase digital censorship in the region, nobody knows how Apple will respond.

Goals of the survey

In this short study of mainland China’s App Store, AppleCensorship seeks to explore apps belonging to “sensitive categories” which are unavailable in mainland China and to verify their availability in Hong Kong App Store. Such sensitive categories include apps which are related to:

• Tibet, Buddhism, and the Dalai Lama
• Uyghurs, Uyghur language, culture and religion
• Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and Private browsing apps
• Religion: Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and other religions and religious groups
• Media and Information: News, and other apps with informative content
• Social media: online forums, social networking apps
• Dating apps & LGBTQ+ apps
• Privacy and digital security

The goal is to establish reference lists to evaluate the current situation of Hong Kong’s App Store. These lists can also be used in the future in order to monitor the evolution of freedom of expression and information in Hong Kong’s App Store beyond the potential removal of the most popular apps.

To that end, we seek to obtain lists of apps where we believe that Chinese national laws or government intervention (through its Cyberspace Administration or other official organ) are the most probable causes for app unavailability. Some parameters such as apps’ availability worldwide, apps’ categories, content and functionality were taken into account to ensure a low probability that the apps are unavailable in mainland China for coincidental reasons (e.g. developer’s choice to release the app in one or few App Stores).

The nature of the apps, the topics or functions to which they are related, and the already established facts regarding the Chinese government’s censorship of Apple’s App Store and products (e.g. notorious cases of censorship, censored keywords), were used as parameters to pinpoint apps which are unavailable because of government-led censorship. This is particularly true for all VPN apps, for which a systemic categorical ban was confirmed by Apple itself in 2017.

Method

China’s list of unavailable apps

For each of the 175 App Stores it monitors, Apple Censorship’s App Store Monitor (ASM) maintains lists of apps currently unavailable. Mainland China’s list currently includes more than 10,000 apps. Such a list could have been used as a starting point for this research. However, we decided to identify sensitive apps in mainland China’s App Store using a different exploratory method - by searching the App Store directly, using sensitive keywords and testing at the same time availability in both mainland China and Hong Kong’s App Stores. Such an approach also allows us to verify the efficiency of keyword-based “live searches” in the App Store, as well as to estimate the performance of the App Store Monitor’s algorithm, which currently conducts around 15,000 tests per day in the App Store worldwide.

As a new version of AppleCensorship.com was recently launched, we are progressively “tagging” apps with multiple keywords, thus creating custom-made categories of apps (similar to those used in the present research). When a majority of apps included in China’s list of unavailable apps have been tagged, it will then be possible to extract “relevant” apps from the list without needing to verify the content of the apps one by one.

Exploring mainland China’s App Store using sensitive keywords

We searched apps unavailable in China’s App Store by looking for sensitive apps in other App Stores (primarily U.S. and Hong Kong) while testing for their availability in mainland China’s App Store at the same time. This allows us to identify apps which respond to multiple criteria at once:

1. The apps’ title and/or content are related to the keyword used in input. For example:

 Voice of Tibet (keyword: Tibet), or 84000 (keywords: Tibetan / Buddhism)

2. All apps that are selected are unavailable in mainland China’s App Store.

3. When searching within Hong Kong’s App Store, the apps which are listed in keyword search results are amongst the most popular apps used in the territory.

4. Additionally, for each app selected, AppleCensorship’s team verifies the unavailability of the app in other App Stores where it has been tested:

a) In many cases, the identified app is only unavailable in China, which increases the probability of a targeted block as the reason for unavailability.

b) In other cases, the app is also unavailable in a limited number of App Stores. When this is the case, we select apps which are also unavailable in App Stores of countries known to restrict online freedom of information and to severely repress human rights.

c) Apps which are widely unavailable and which do not seem to offer sensitive content or functionality, were excluded during the search.

5. In some cases, apps belonging to the sensitive categories investigated by AppleCensorship were found to be unavailable in both mainland China and Hong Kong’s App Stores. Those apps were included to highlight the potential extension of censorship policies enforced by Apple in mainland China, to Hong Kong.

The creation of the “sensitive categories” and classification of apps within those categories are merely a way to present the data and reflect the method we used to identify apps using the App Store Monitor. For each category, keywords relating to the topics or functions encompassed by the categories were used. For example, to search apps relating to Tibet, keywords such as “Tibet”, “Lhasa”, “Dalai Lama”, “Buddhism” or “西藏” (“Tibet” in Mandarin), were used to search apps within the App Store. The ASM is able to provide up to 200 results and presents the apps in the same order as they would be presented to a user searching for apps on an iOS device in his/her own country.

Some apps could have been included in several tables at the same time (e.g. an LGBTQ+ social networking app could have been in “Social Media” or in “Dating & LGBTQ+” categories), but were eventually included in one table only for presentation purposes. The new tagging system used on AppleCensorship.com addresses the multiplicity of nature and function that many apps possess.

Results

All results are published here. (Links for specific categories are provided below)

Image: Screenshot of the VPNs category list. For each app, its logo, ID number, official App Store category, availability in mainland China and Hong Kong’s App Stores, as well as a link to AppleCensorship’s website, are provided.

A total of 561 apps were identified, all currently unavailable in mainland China’s App Store.

The difficulty of identifying sensitive apps varies for each category. First, the (unknown) total number of existing apps for each category varies greatly from one category to another. For example, it is assumed that there are much more Bible or Quran apps in the App Store than apps related to Uyghur or Tibetan cultures and religion. Some apps might also be easier to identify because they use very specific keywords in their names and/or description. For example, the vast majority of VPN apps use the acronym “VPN” directly in their name. Those which do not use the acronym in the name, are almost guaranteed to use it in the app’s description, which is used by the App Store to offer relevant results.

Category name: Tibet

Total # of apps: 41

Unavailable in Hong Kong: 1

Most recent removal from Hong Kong: N/A

Link to table: Link 

Category name: VPNs & Private Browsers

Total # of apps: 234

Unavailable in Hong Kong: 16

Most recent removal from Hong Kong: Between 06/2022 and 12/2022 (VPN FUN - Best Unlimited Proxy) 

Link to table: Link 

Category name: Uyghur

Total # of apps: 11

Unavailable in Hong Kong: 1

Most recent removal from Hong Kong: N/A 

Link to table: Link

Category name: Religion

Total # of apps: 125

Unavailable in Hong Kong: 8

Most recent removal from Hong Kong: N/A 

Link to table: Link

Category name: Media & information 

Total # of apps: 54

Unavailable in Hong Kong: 1

Most recent removal from Hong Kong: Between 03/2021 and 01/2022 (Webull) 

Link to table: Link

Category name: Social media 

Total # of apps: 45

Unavailable in Hong Kong: 5

Most recent removal from Hong Kong: Between 11/2022 and 02/2023 (GroupMe) 

Link to table: Link

Category name: Privacy

Total # of apps: 22

Unavailable in Hong Kong: 0

Most recent removal from Hong Kong: N/A

Link to table: Link 

Almost all the apps that were identified are still available in Hong Kong’s App Store. The table above highlights the number of apps unavailable in Hong Kong. Only two categories, Religion and VPNs, include more than five apps unavailable in Hong Kong. These results indicate that Hong Kong’s App Store is not subject to widespread censorship enforced by Apple and that users continue to have access to the same apps that were available before the passing of the National Security Law (NSL) in 2020.

Detecting the unavailability of an app is different from detecting a removal. For an app removal to be detected by the ASM, the app must have been monitored by the ASM at least once before it was removed. The time between the date of the latest test when the app was found available and the first test when the app was found to be unavailable, constitutes the time window in which the removal occurred. Such cases were identified in four categories: “VPNs and Private Browsers”, “Media & information”, “Social media” and “Dating & LGBTQ+”. These app removals occurred around the end of 2021 and throughout 2022.

For categories which include apps unavailable in Hong Kong but without any app removal detected, a “N/A” mention indicates that these apps were always unavailable in the Hong Kong App Store, whether they had been tested before the present study or tested for the first time during the course of it.

Out of the 561 apps identified, 121 (around 22%) were not included in mainland China’s list of currently unavailable apps, making the exploratory method we used a very promising approach for future measurements of app unavailability. In addition, by using Hong Kong’s App Store as a primary App Store for our keyword-based searches, we also ensure that the apps identified have a certain degree of popularity in Hong Kong, making them more probable as potential targets of censorship by the Chinese authorities.

Monitoring censorship in Hong Kong

The 8 lists compiled by AppleCensorship constitute a good starting point to monitor the evolution of App Store censorship in Hong Kong. The lists include apps related to keywords that are known to be censored in China, which are all unavailable in mainland China’s App Store and some of which are popular among users based in Hong Kong. While it is not known if the Chinese authorities intend to focus on Apple’s App Store to control information in the region, the lists provide useful information on the content that is already targeted in mainland China and could also serve to inform online censorship measurements in both mainland China and Hong Kong (i.e. the targeting of websites related to the apps could be a sign of an increase in information control).

More sensitive categories could be created. For example, apps related to Taiwan (i.e. Taiwan based media, social media, NGOs, etc.) or COVID19. Searching keywords censored on social media in mainland China might also offer unexpected results. For example, non-sensitive apps that are blocked because they include sensitive keywords in their name or description. This would address a potential scenario, although less probable, where the authorities do not ask Apple to block specific apps but instead ask the company to implement blocks based on a blacklist of “unwanted” keywords in the App Store.

Finally, one possibility to deepen investigation on information control would be to monitor apps that are promoted or endorsed by the government. Taking the example of VPNs, some apps developed by China-based entities remain accessible in the country. Should these apps become prevalent in Hong Kong’s App Store, they could signal an increased effort to direct Hong Kong users towards Chinese government-sanctioned apps with the aim of increasing surveillance or countering censorship circumvention attempts. Studying apps (news and social media apps in particular) that are only available in mainland China and Hong Kong’s App Stores could also provide information on propaganda efforts led by the government, via private companies.

View Hong Kong’s App Store’s list of currently unavailable apps

View mainland China’s App Store’s list of currently unavailable apps
 

The first report focuses on how Apple censors in Hong Kong.  As human rights and fundamental freedoms in the territory shrink, including digital rights, Apple is reluctant to take any commitment to uphold its users rights to access information freely and express their views online. The second report looks at Apple’s presence in Russia up until the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022 and highlights the issues posed by Apple’s lack of transparency surrounding its App Store policies, including compliance with international sanctions.

Both reports highlight how far Apple is willing to go to safeguard its relationship with authoritarian regimes and maintain access to those markets.

“In the name of profit, Apple censors millions of users from all aspects of society: from activists and political figures to members of vulnerable minorities such as the LGBTQ+ community in Russia or religious and ethnic minorities in China,” said Benjamin Ismail, Director of the AppleCensorship project. 

“United Apple: Apple’s censorship and compromises in Russia “ 

In AppleCensorship’s report focusing on Russia, entitled “United Apple” in reference to Russian president Vladimir Putin’s party “United Russia”, the organization has taken a deeper look at Russia’s App Store, where many LGBTQ+ related apps are blocked.

While many “Shopping”, “Finance” and “Business” apps were removed from the Russian App Store shortly after the start of the war in Ukraine, AppleCensorship’s research has revealed much more worrying trends:

●          Patterns of app removals from Russia’s App Store detected by the App Store Monitor (ASM) suggest that specific groups of apps have been targeted by the Russian authorities and that a system of Apple-enforced targeted censorship is in place in Russia’s App Store.

●          LGBTQ+ related apps constitute the most prominent type of apps being unavailable in Russia’s App Store, with at least 25 apps currently unavailable, including some of the most popular LGBTQ+ apps in the world.

●          More than 30 VPN and private browsing apps have been taken down since the start of the war in Ukraine, while the Russian authorities were announcing that “measures were being taken to limit access to VPN services that violate Russian law”.

●          Although Russia’s App Store does not reflect the present government-controlled media landscape, the list of unavailable news apps continues to grow as the App Store Monitor unveils new foreign media blocked or removed from Russia’s App Store.

●          Apple’s recent actions regarding several other apps operated by companies owned by Russian oligarchs who have been sanctioned, point towards contradictory behavior from Apple, and raise questions whether Apple’s opaque management of its App Store is compatible with the necessary scrutiny and respect for human rights principles and values that is required of private companies.

“Apple’s content curation policies represent a denial of the company’s stated principles and values and show a lack of respect for privacy and the protection of users’ rights. In Russia, Apple has enabled censorship of vulnerable communities while promoting apps that are used by the government for surveillance purposes,” added Ismail. 

“Apps at Risk: Apple’s censorship and compromises in Hong Kong “

 “Apps at risk” investigates Apple’s censorship in Hong Kong’s App Store and assesses the compromises that Apple has made in the special administrative region.

Whether pressed by Hong Kong local administration or by the Chinese central government, on a number of occasions Apple has complied with demands to censor content deemed in violation of local laws or simply critical of Beijing.  

“Apps at risk” highlights threats to freedom of information that Apple’s predominance in Hong Kong poses. Some of the key findings included in the report include:

●          Hong Kongers’ reliance on mobile apps that are banned in China to communicate and access information make Apple a defect “kill switch” at the disposal of the Chinese censors.

●          While Hong Kong’s App Store remains relatively free compared to China’s App Store, a series of tests conducted in 2022 reveal that Hong Kong’s App Store is more restrictive than other App Stores considered “free”. The unavailability of apps in the Hong Kong App Store is higher than most of the 173 App Stores monitored by AppleCensorship.

●          In November 2022, a surprisingly high number of VPN and private browsing apps (more than 50) were found to be unavailable in Hong Kong’s App Store.

●          A number of apps related to media and information have been removed globally over the last two years, raising the possibility that self-censorship or censorship by Apple on behalf of the authorities are affecting apps’ availability globally.

●          Apple has not made any public commitment to uphold Hong Kongers’ fundamental rights to access information and express their opinion online. If the Chinese authorities were to increase digital censorship in the region, nobody knows how Apple will respond.

AppleCensorship has issued a set of recommendations for Apple, including demands that Apple declare publicly what measures it will take if Beijing increases its crackdown on digital freedoms and access to information in Hong Kong.

“Apple should make it very clear what actions it will, or will not take, to resist app takedown requests from Beijing or from Hong Kong’s government agencies,” said Ismail.

AppleCensorship has also made a similar demand regarding the company’s presence in Russia, asking that Apple “take measures to prevent any return to a normalization of its relationship with the Russian government.”

“As our two reports show, examples of Apple’s censorship abound. Apple’s temporary withdrawal from Russia following the start of the war in Ukraine, and Apple’s decision to move part of its production out of China, have not provided tangible evidence of any improvement of the situation in the App Store so far. For all we know, Apple is still willing to collaborate with repressive regimes.

We need to ensure that Apple will not contribute further to censorship and the erosion of democracy worldwide. This is why we will continue to monitor and highlight all cases of censorship, as well as to support any legislation that would reduce Apple’s dangerous hegemony over the peoples’ digital space”, Ismail concluded.

Read “United Apple: Apple’s censorship and compromises in Russia“

Read “Apps at Risk: Apple’s censorship and compromises in Hong Kong“ 

Apple’s latest “Transparency Report” will be released soon, likely accompanied by a formidable Public Relations push. Apple will boast about how the company’s “foremost concern is user privacy and security, and [insert hollow buzzwords]…” Apple will also recite their classic leitmotif for app removals:

“Though the final decisions sometimes run contrary to our wishes, we believe that our customers are best served when we remain in the country providing them access to products that promote self-expression with world-class privacy protections.”

Behind this performance, we expect Apple will continue to infamously and intentionally hide its actual operations in the shadows.

In its report “Taken Down” A Look into Apple’s Transparency, published today, AppleCensorship reveals information that Apple does not want in the public domain, including:

● Apple receives an app take-down request from a government every 2.5 days, on average.

● Apple removes an app from the App Store every 16 hours, on average.

● Overall, Apple has complied with government app take-down requests 73.8% of the time. In 2020, Apple complied 100% of the time. 1,060 apps were removed as a result of these requests.

● Apple complied with the vast majority of app takedown requests made by the governments of China (98%) and Russia (95%).

● When countries request an app to be taken down worldwide, it results in an enormous amount of removals. Apple only reports on the requests (1,437) and apps removed (1,060), not the actual removals (more than 30,000).

What is the AppleCensorship Project?

GreatFire began monitoring Apple’s censorship in 2013. In 2019, it launched the AppleCensorship project along with the App Store Monitor (ASM) to track iOS apps that become unavailable in one or more App Stores. For some apps, such unavailability is at the discretion of the developer. But for many others, their absence from a given App Store is due to Apple’s censorship policies. The ASM allows AppleCensorship to compare Apple’s transparency statements to reality, looking for gaps and contradictions.

iOpacity

Apple deliberately presents irrelevant data in its Transparency Reports to the point that the real activity in the App Store is nearly unrecognizable. The data that Apple does provide diverts the attention of the reader and makes it difficult to notice what key information is missing. For example, Apple communicates on both the “number of requests” and “number of apps removed”. But the company does not provide more details. Readers of the Transparency Reports will not know what laws the apps allegedly violated, the type of apps (category) that were removed, the legitimacy of a government request, and the level of compliance from Apple.

While Apple reported only a small amount of apps having been taken down (1060), AppleCensorship identified significantly more removals that raise question over the real number of apps having been targeted by governments or by Apple itself. AppleCensorship’s App Store Monitor is only able to track a fraction of the millions of apps populating the App Store, but it still identified more than 9,000 app removals (3,000 targeted and 6,000 worldwide removals) including several hundred apps that may have been targeted by government-led censorship.

Similarly, Apple separates Legal Violation Takedown Requests (the alleged violation of law(s)) from Platform Policy Violations Takedown Requests (the alleged violation of Apple’s App Store Guidelines). Communicating on the number of apps instead of the number of app removals strongly misleads the public on the real impact of apps which are removed from all App Stores. Each app removed from all App Stores can generate 175 removals. Two reports are issued per year and no data is aggregated to provide an annual overview, thus concealing app removal trends and patterns.

The latest AppleCensorship watchdog report from GreatFire shares information that Apple has never disclosed, as well as information the company attempts to obfuscate.

Hidden Figures

While AppleCensorship’s ASM cannot determine the reason behind each removal it detects, it does identify the apps which are removed, which is information that Apple refuses to provide. And a significant portion of the removed apps flagged by ASM are related to sensitive topics which are at-risk of being censored for political reasons by governments worldwide (religion, sexuality, etc). The data collected by the ASM brings to light some patterns in app removals pointing to Apple’s practice of “categorical bans”.

Refusing Transparency

In addition to major discrepancies in data, Apple’s Transparency Reports have been described as “woefully lacking.” Apple continues to provide no insight into which specific apps were removed, when they were removed, the reason for the removal, which law(s) the app(s) violated, which government body requested the removal, if Apple objected to the removal, and how Apple objected. This is all information Apple could provide if it wanted to. Watchdogs have asked Apple for years to be more transparent.

A shareholder resolution in 2020 asked Apple to commit to protecting freedom of expression. Another shareholder resolution submitted in 2021 asked Apple to:

“…revise the Company’s Transparency Reports to provide clear explanations of the number and categories of app removals from the app store, in response to or in anticipation of government requests, that may reasonably be expected to limit freedom of expression or access to information.”

Apple responded by asking the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to prevent the company’s shareholders from being able to vote on the resolution. Apple’s lack of transparency is clearly intentional. Opacity is Apple’s modus operandi.

Recommendations

Apple needs to start reporting the following information, retroactively and in all future reports:

Information that would allow the public to understand how governments are attempting to remove (or censor) content, the reasons they provide for their request(s), and how Apple handles these requests:

● Which government body / agency issued the takedown request.

● How the structure of these requests works.

● Whether all apps specified in a single takedown request must contain similar content, or break the same law.

● Apple should provide a breakdown of the requests listed: the number of apps included in each request, and the rules and procedures that Apple follows when dealing with these requests.

● Indication of the specific laws and/or guideline(s) the app(s) allegedly broke.

Information that would allow the public to understand how Apple is responding to these governmental requests, a copy of Apple’s internal procedures, and a breakdown on how Apple makes decisions on how to act on government requests:

● A timeline of the requests being filed, the length of time it took to consider each request, and the point at which the apps specified were removed from the country’s App Store.

● Whether the app(s) removed also broke one of the App Store’s content-specific guidelines, or whether they broke the App Store Guidelines insofar as they facilitated (or participated in) locally illegal activity.

● Whether all apps specified in a single takedown request must contain similar content, or break the same law.

Apple should also provide:

● Data on removals it makes according to categorical requests for governments, which do not specify apps but do function as blanket legal violation requests.

● Data on the rejection and removal decisions it makes after requests from third parties (other than government agencies or official bodies with legal powers).

● Details of the apps it removes of its own accord, whether these removals are due to guideline violations, proactive takedowns of apps which break local laws, or government-requested category bans. It should also categorize apps by the reason for their removal.

Information that would allow the public to understand which category of apps is subjected to the most censorship and the impact each removal had on the public’s access to the app:

● Details of the apps removed including the names of specific apps, the App Store categories, and the developers who made the apps.

● Apple should indicate whether the offending content was the result of a change or update to the app, or whether the app had always been in breach of the App Store Guidelines, without Apple noticing.

● The number of Stores in which an app was released before being taken down.

● A list of all apps which remain on the App Store but are blocked by governments. Apple should further inform users of such blocks directly on the app description page within the App Store.

We also recommend:

● Apple should publish data concerning government-requested and autonomous app removals in real time.

● Apple should model its Transparency Reports on the efforts of Twitter and Google to provide as much – rather than as little – useful information as possible.

● Apple should rewrite its guidelines in accordance with the important role they play in the availability of digital content worldwide. This is particularly pressing if Apple continues to allow governments to use the App Store Guidelines to request the removal of apps from all 175 App Stores.

● Apple should take the necessary steps to enable public access to the 20 App Stores which were added in 2020, thus allowing monitoring of apps’ availability in those App Stores.

Apple’s Corporate Policies Must Change

Benjamin Ismail, AppleCensorship Project Coordinator and GreatFire’s Campaign and Advocacy Director, said:

“Our report clearly establishes the lies and falsehoods of Apple’s Transparency Reports. It is time for Apple to drop the act. It must acknowledge the deeply flawed management of its App Store and start taking the necessary steps to prevent government-led and corporate censorship from depriving millions of users of their fundamental rights to access to information and freedom of expression.”

Ismail added:

“Many actors from civil society would be willing to help Apple implement changes to its corporate policies. Apple’s recent decisions regarding Russia show that the company’s leadership is well aware of what Corporate Social Responsibility and ethics call for. We just hope that, unlike in this case, Apple’s doesn’t wait until it’s too late to do the right thing”.

Ashley Gjøvik, Apple Whistleblower and human rights activist, contributed to this 2022 AppleCensorship report. Gjøvik volunteered to help with the project. She noted:

“Human rights are not determined by borders on maps, or by borders between the physical and online worlds. Freedom of expression is a fundamental right which must be protected: everywhere. Private corporations should not be allowed to deprive people of their rights, nor should we tolerate off-the-record, backroom discussions between corporations and authoritarian governments. We must demand transparency, respect, and dignity.”

Download the Report

“Taken Down” A Look Into Apple’s Transparency Reports -PrintDownload

View Online: “Taken Down” – A Look Into Apple’s Transparency Reports -Digital

Today, in “Censored on the App Store”, AppleCensorship reveals in its new report the scale of unavailability of apps in Apple’s App Store. This report is based on data collected from the AppleCensorship.com website.   

Using data from user tests conducted since 2019, we estimate that there are a staggering 29 million instances of app unavailability across Apple’s 155 App Stores. In its transparency reports, over the period from July, 2018 until December, 2020, Apple claims that there have been a total of 1470 app removals based on legal and platform violations. 1182 of these app removals occurred in mainland China. 

It is difficult to estimate how many of these removals are instances of direct censorship by Apple or instances of Apple acting at the request or on behalf of local governments. However, analysis of the data indicates that there are a number of countries, as well as app categories, that have a significantly high level of app unavailability. 

In particular, News and Social Networking apps are amongst the most censored. Given that these app categories are the most likely to contain political content, and to be used for political advocacy, the data from this report points towards a statistically significant pattern of politically motivated censorship in many countries. The removal by Apple of Alexei Navalny’s voting app at the request of the Russian government is a recent example of this type of censorship.

If Apple is to take its self-proclaimed values seriously, it should be more transparent about the patterns and cases highlighted in our report. Apple makes little effort to acknowledge or explain these anomalous figures, or the governmental pressures which underlie them. We can only predict that continued research, and increasing pressure from repressive governments around the world, will result in worsening censorship. This can only be stopped if Apple decides to prioritize its customers and their rights over corporate profit. 

To conduct this report, AppleCensorship.com collected data using the website’s primary feature, the App Store Monitor (ASM). The ASM allows visitors to the website to test the availability of any iOS app around the world by crawling the world’s 155 App Stores. To date, over 4 million tests have been conducted on the AppleCensorship.com website. The raw data from this research can be found here.

The ASM was used – both in targeted manual searches for specific apps and regional stores, and in automated periodic searches – to uncover instances of regional unavailability on the App Store. Collating data across the 155 regional App Stores, we are able to generate a picture of the scale of Apple’s regional app removals, where they happen most, and which app categories are most at risk of censorship. 

Misleadingly, Apple often refers to a single App Store, implicitly the US “storefront”, that has high rates of app availability, to conceal patterns of censorship in other countries. Users in one country remain largely oblivious to the unavailability of apps in other territories, unless they use the ASM or manually check the App Store pages of other regional App Stores. Furthermore, the App Store’s category system does not readily allow the public to focus attention on the most heavily censored subcategories – for instance, Tibetan apps or apps with an LGBTQ+ focus, both of which see disproportionately high rates of censorship. 

“The very need to build this tool to monitor Apple’s behaviour, and to conduct ongoing research into how often, and in what circumstances, Apple removes apps from regional stores due to governmental pressure, is itself an indictment of the company’s lack of transparency,” said Benjamin Ismail, AppleCensorship Project Director.

————–  Key findings ————–

1. Based on current data collected by the App Store Monitor, we estimate no less than 29 million cases of app unavailability in Apple’s App Stores.
   
2. This astronomical number of occurrences of unavailability is the equivalent to around 190,000 unique apps being removed from the App Store. But as the unavailability of most of the apps only concern a few specific and targeted App Stores, the widespread absence of hundreds of thousands of apps remains largely invisible to the general public.
   
3. Discrepancies in availability of apps between App Stores quashes the very idea of a unique App Store. There is not one App Store, there are 155 app stores. Each one is different, offers different apps, is managed by different rules, and enables targeted censorship.
   
4. In addition to the general opacity of Apple, 20 App Stores have additional opacity as they have no public-facing App Store APIs to monitor.
   
5. 10.46%: The average percentage of app unavailability (the ratio between the number of apps tested in a given App Store to the proportion of apps which were found to be unavailable in that App Store) among all 155 App Stores.
   
6. The three App Stores with the highest percentage of app unavailability are: 
1. China: (mainland) 22.02%
2. Liberia: 14.17%
3. South Korea: 14.10%
   
7. While some categories of apps are less likely to be censored, those categories which enable the spread of news, sharing of information, and political organization have proven to be targeted at a higher level by various governments and by Apple.
   
8. The Social Networking and News app categories rank 14th and 17th respectively out of the existing 26 app categories. These two categories combined account for less than 40,000 apps (around 2% of the 1.8 million apps in the App Store). However, these two app categories have the highest percentage of app unavailability in the App Store.

————–  About AppleCensorship ————–

Apple actively censors their own App Stores all around the world, yet reveals few details on which apps they censor and why they even censor in the first place. Instead of waiting for Apple to come clean about its censorship practices, in January, 2019, GreatFire.org launched AppleCensorship, allowing anybody to check for instances of Apple censorship in every Apple App Store around the world. 

To expose Apple’s widespread censorship, AppleCensorship uses the App Store Monitor (ASM), a web crawler that indexes all apps available in any of the countries and regions which currently have an App Store, and verifies availability of these apps on each of these App Stores. If an app is available in at least one App Store but remains unavailable in one or more App Stores, the ASM will mark that app as unavailable in those App Stores.

Apple must stop depriving its users of their fundamental rights and, at the same time, end its unethical practices which violate human rights principles and international standards. We simply ask that Apple operate according to their stated values – respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

————–  Press Contact ————–

Benjamin Ismail, Project Director

Email: benjamin@applecensorship.com

Mobile / Signal: +33 6 63 13 76 13

Website: AppleCensorship.com (a GreatFire’s project)

Twitter: @applecensorship

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/applecensorship

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/GreatFireAppleCensorship/