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Unveiling the Extent of VPN App Removals by Apple from the Russia App Store: An Analysis of Silent Removals and the Need for Transparency
2024-09-24 12:26
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To read the press release related to this report, click here. 

Highlights

  • Significant Discrepancy Uncovered: While media reports indicated that Roskomnadzor ordered the removal of 25 VPN apps, our study found that over 50 VPN apps were removed by Apple from the Russia App Store during the summer of 2024, bringing the total number of unavailable VPN apps to 98. This significant unavailability contradicts official reports and suggests that the scale of VPN app removals is much larger than publicly acknowledged.
  •  Ongoing Silent Removals: Evidence shows that Apple continues to remove VPN apps from the Russia App Store without public acknowledgment, affecting more than 20% of identified VPN apps.
  • Coordinated Removal Patterns: The concentration of removals on specific dates suggests coordinated actions, possibly exceeding Roskomnadzor's official requests.
  • Impact on Digital Access: Major VPN providers have been removed, significantly limiting Russian users' access to secure communication tools.
  • Call for Transparency: The findings highlight a critical need for transparency and accountability from both Apple and Roskomnadzor regarding app removals that impact digital rights.

Introduction

Following reports that Apple had removed several VPN apps from its Russia App Store at the request of Roskomnadzor—Russia’s Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media (RKN)—we utilized the AppleCensorship.com App Store Monitor (ASM) to conduct a study on the availability of VPN apps. Media outlets, citing Roskomnadzor, reported that 25 VPNs had been removed. Our primary goal was to verify this figure and identify the VPNs purportedly removed on Roskomnadzor's orders. Our secondary objective was to assess the current number of VPNs unavailable in the Russia App Store to monitor potential future changes.


 

Methodology

Our research methodology was structured around a multistep process:

  1. Compilation of VPN Applications: We compiled a list of VPN applications based on their names—often including the acronym "VPN"—and their descriptions in the App Store, specifically when the description claims that the app offers a VPN solution to its users. We included apps that are not primarily VPN apps but offer VPN functionality (like private browser apps) or similar encryption protocols (like Shadowsocks). We did not verify the functionality of the apps by installing and using them, as this was not necessary for the purpose of this research. For example, some apps listed as available in the China App Store are assumed to be non-functional VPNs, but this was not confirmed or disproven during our research.
  2. Data Collection and Testing: The initial list compiled on July 6 included more than 250 VPNs. This does not mean that the App Store Monitor (ASM) only had data for these apps but simply that among all apps tested by the ASM (more than 70,000 apps), we identified 250 that claimed to be VPNs. All these apps were tested worldwide across 175 App Stores, and their availability in the Russia App Store was noted. We augmented this list on August 10, increasing it to more than 350 VPN apps, and conducted further tests. Finally, from September 16 to September 18, we retested all apps in the Russia App Store to verify their status.
  3. Analysis of App Availability and Removal Dates: We analyzed the results, searching for the potential date of removal for each unavailable VPN app. To do this, we looked at the last date when the app was found available by the ASM, followed by the first test when the app was found unavailable. The actual removal of the app can be inferred to have occurred between these two tests. The closer these two tests are in time, the more accurately we can determine the date and time of removal for a given app.
  4. Classification of Unavailable Apps: A significant number of VPN apps—close to 30—that had been previously identified were found to have disappeared entirely from any App Store. We listed these apps separately to provide additional information on the high level of "volatility" associated with this type of app, where the lifespan can be quite short.

All data and test results are available here .


 

  • Total Apps Tested: In total, more than 360 VPN apps have been tested worldwide, resulting in over 63,000 individual tests.
  • Current Availability: As of September 16, 2024, 348 VPN apps have been identified and tested worldwide.
  • Availability in Russia App Store: Out of these 348 apps, 250 were found to be available in the Russia App Store. Another 98 apps were found to be unavailable as of September 16, 2024

Grouping of Unavailable VPN Apps

Unavailable apps were grouped according to their estimated date of removal. The following groups were established (the color indicated fills the “Availability in Russia App Store” column in the table accompanying this report):

  1. Pre-War Removals (Light Yellow): 14 VPN apps were found to be unavailable or had been removed before the onset of the war in Ukraine in February 2022. Notably among these are Norton Secure VPN, SurfEasy VPN, and Avast Secureline VPN + Proxy. Except for these three mentioned apps, all others had been unavailable since the ASM began monitoring their status in 2019, 2020, or 2021. This suggests that these VPNs were possibly always unavailable and might never have been released on the Russia App Store, although this cannot be conclusively confirmed by the ASM.

  2. Early War Removals (Yellow): 17 VPN apps became unavailable or were removed after the war commenced—an event that was followed by intensified efforts by Russian authorities to block VPN services—but before the "ban on VPN advertisement" issued by Roskomnadzor on March 1, 2024. This group includes prominent apps such as Nord VPN, Proton VPN, and Bitdefender VPN. Seven VPN apps were included in this group, even though it is possible that their unavailability predates this time window (February 2022–March 2024). Due to the absence of ASM data before the first observed unavailability, they were categorized here. It is noteworthy that this group may contain VPN apps that were voluntarily removed by their developers following the start of the war, particularly those whose removal was observed in the weeks or months immediately after the conflict began (e.g., VPN Hotspot or VPN App).

  3. Mid-2024 Removals (Dark Yellow): The removal of one VPN app, Free VPN Proxy by Planet VPN, was confirmed to have occurred between May 13 and June 11, 2024. Although it is possible that eleven other apps (currently included in the Orange group) were also removed before July 2024, our data indicates that these apps were more likely removed in early July.

  4. Early July Removals (Orange): 13 VPN apps were likely removed at the beginning of July 2024, between July 4 and July 7—that is, within three days after the news emerged about Apple's removal of 25 VPN apps. Within this group, the removals of two VPN apps—VPN by CyberGhost and ExpressVPN—can be accurately pinpointed to have occurred between July 5 and July 7. Eleven other VPNs, including Red Shield VPN and Le VPN, which confirmed their removal on July 4, were found by the ASM to be no longer available by July 6.

  5. Post-July 7 Removals (Red): 30 VPN apps were definitely removed after July 7, 2024, and on or before August 11. Early July Removals: Eight apps were removed between July 8 and July 10, with four removed precisely on July 8. These include Turbo VPN, VPN Proxy Master – Unlimited, VPN - Free VPN Super, and VPNIFY - Unlimited VPN. Late July Removals: Two VPNs, Wirevpn-Unlimited vpn Proxy and VPN + TOR Browser and Ad Block, were removed on July 22, followed closely by three more that were removed before the end of July. Unspecified July-August Removals: An additional 17 VPN apps could have been removed at any time between July 7 and August 11.6.

6. Late Removals (Purple): 15 VPN apps were removed after August 11, with four of them confirmed to be still available in the early days of September. All were removed on or before September 18.


7. Uncertain Removal Dates (White): There are eight VPN apps for which it is difficult to estimate the date of removal due to insufficient test records or because the dates of "available" and "unavailable" test results are too far apart to infer a probable removal date. These VPNs could have been removed at any time between January 2024 and August 2024, or even before January for four of them.



Analysis and comments


Although Russian authorities have not enforced a total ban on VPN apps, the number of VPNs currently unavailable in the Russia App Store is significant. With 98 VPN apps—including major players such as Proton VPN, NordVPN, ExpressVPN, and VPN by CyberGhost—Russia now stands out as the second most restrictive App Store environment, surpassed only by the China App Store. In China, all VPNs were purged by Apple in 2017 and have since been prevented from appearing. According to data from app market intelligence companies, at least a third of the VPNs unavailable in Russia belong to the top 200 most popular VPN apps in Apple's App Store.

The availability of VPN apps in Russia has changed dramatically over the past few years. From just 14 VPNs confirmed unavailable before the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (and potentially several more apps for which data do not rule out unavailability prior to 2022), the number of unavailable apps rose to 32 by June 2024.

While the removals in the summer of 2024 appear scattered throughout July, August, and early September, we identified specific time windows during which several removals were concentrated. ASM data clearly establishes that 18 VPN apps (5 from the Orange group, including Le VPN and Redshield VPN, which reported their removal, and 13 from the Red group) were removed in July.

An analysis of the data reveals that certain dates in July were particularly significant for VPN app removals from the Russia App Store.

During July 4 and 5, there was a notable concentration of removals. Super VPN Hotspot VPN Master, Plato VPN and Safe VPN were already unavailable shortly after midnight on July 5, indicating that, like Red Shield VPN and Le VPN, they had been removed on July 4. Additionally, ExpressVPN and CyberGhost VPN appear to have been removed in the evening of July 5.

The date July 8 also stands out, as eight VPNs seem to have been removed on this day, with data confirming this definitively for four of them.

Furthermore, July 22 and 24 appear significant in the pattern of removals. Wirevpn and VPN + TOR Browser and Ad Block can only have been removed on July 22. Similarly, the removals of Free VPN by Free VPN .org™, VPN Proxy by Seed4.Me VPN and VPN` point to a removal date of July 24.

For the other 17 apps, the fact that five were still available after July 24 suggests that additional "sessions" of group removals occurred in early August. The removal of Ostrich VPN - Fast Proxy Master, which occurred between August 9 and 11, along with the confirmed unavailability by August 9 of seven other VPNs, indicates that August 9 may have been another significant "day of removals."

Finally, for the 15 VPNs removed in late August or September, removals seem less concentrated on specific days compared to July. While data for X-VPN - Best VPN Proxy master indicates a removal between August 26 and 29, others could have been removed in the latter half of August or in September. Four VPNs were confirmed to be still available as of September 2: VPN ゜, FlyVPN - Secure & Fast, VPN - fast, secure, no limits, and f3 vpn - simple VPN. However, all could have been removed any time up to September 18. In only one case—that of f3 vpn - simple VPN—is the removal confirmed to have occurred between September 2 and September 4.

Observations of these recent and unprecedented waves of removals in July, August, and September 2024 are significant for several reasons. First, they demonstrate a 200% increase in the unavailability of VPN apps in the Russia App Store during this period, indicating that the situation is far more extensive than the 25 VPN removals reported in the media. Second, the concentration of these removals suggests that they are not predominantly the result of deliberate withdrawals by VPN developers. If voluntary, it would be highly improbable for multiple VPN owners to decide independently to withdraw their apps from Russia on the same specific days.

Therefore, there are two plausible interpretations of these observations in relation to reports by the Russian news agency Interfax stating that Roskomnadzor had directed Apple to remove 25 VPN apps from the App Store:

  1. Underreporting by Roskomnadzor: Roskomnadzor may have deliberately provided a lower figure for the number of VPNs it targeted.

  2. Proactive Measures by Apple: Apple may be proactively removing more VPN apps than actually requested by Roskomnadzor.

Either interpretation suggests a discrepancy between official communications and the observed scale of VPN app removals from the Russia App Store. This raises concerns about transparency, as both Roskomnadzor and Apple appear to be misrepresenting the reality of the situation.

Since the media reports on July 4 and the days that followed, neither Roskomnadzor nor Apple have issued communications to correct the number of VPNs targeted by Roskomnadzor's requests or to identify which VPNs have been removed from the App Store.

Conclusion

Our study reveals a significant and ongoing reduction in the availability of VPN apps in Apple's Russia App Store, far exceeding the official reports of 25 removals. The findings underscore a critical need for transparency and accountability from both Roskomnadzor and Apple. Transparent disclosure of app removal policies and actions is essential to uphold digital rights and inform users about changes that impact their access to secure communication tools. As digital censorship becomes increasingly sophisticated, stakeholders must advocate for openness to ensure that users are not left unaware of restrictions affecting their online freedoms.

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