Tell Apple: Stop enabling censorship of LGBTQ+ apps

Unveiling the Extent of VPN App Removals by Apple from the Russia App Store: An Analysis of Silent Removals and the Need for Transparency

Damus, a decentralized social networking app powered by the Nostr protocol, was removed from China's App Store by Apple on February 2, 2023, just two days after launching, due to directives from the Chinese government. 

The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the country's top internet regulation body, requested Apple to remove it from the China App Store, <a href="https://njump.me/nevent1qqs2xj0lh37tsducmdtvq225gvklvy7cxssapytldw40xte6q08myeqprpmhxue69uhhyetvv9ujumn0wdmksetjv5hxxmmdqgsr9cvzwc652r4m83d86ykplrnm9dg5gwdvzzn8ameanlvut35wy3gqzhx0m" target="_self"><ins>citing illegal content</ins></a>. The CAC stated that Damus did not meet China's requirements for social networks to incorporate censorship tools and link user signups to real identities. This direct communication channel between the CAC and Apple led to the app's immediate removal following the takedown notice.

Damus is powered by the <a href="https://nostr.com/" target="_self"><ins>Nostr</ins></a> protocol, a decentralized social media protocol designed for censorship-resistant communication. Unlike traditional social media platforms such as X or Facebook, which are centralized and controlled by single entities, Nostr operates on a decentralized network of relays that can be run by anyone. This decentralization ensures that no single authority can censor or control the information flow, giving users full control over their data and communications.

In June 2023, Apple <a href="https://appleinsider.com/articles/23/06/14/apple-threatens-to-remove-jack-dorsey-backed-damus-app-over-in-app-transactions" target="_self"><ins>threatened</ins></a> to remove Damus from its App Store over its tipping feature, which allowed users to trade Bitcoin directly without using other apps. Although this dispute primarily arose from a conflict with Apple's payment guidelines, Damus ultimately <a href="https://www.ccn.com/damus-apple-app-bitcoin-tipping/" target="_self"><ins>removed</ins></a> the tipping feature, which it considers equivalent to having a censored version of the app, just to remain on the App Store.

We sat down with William Casarin, the developer and founder of Damus to discuss their challenges with app censorship. Casarin shared their experiences, detailing their engagement with Apple after being censored in China. He explained how the CAC swiftly ordered Apple to remove Damus from the Chinese App Store, affecting around 24,000 initial users. Casarin also discussed challenges with Apple's stringent policies, particularly regarding Bitcoin tipping features, emphasizing Damus’ commitment to providing a free speech platform despite these obstacles.

AC: Could you explain what happened when <a href="https://damus.io" target="_self"><ins>Damus</ins></a> was initially launched in the China and Hong Kong App Stores?

D: After launching Damus in China and Hong Kong on January 31, 2023, the app quickly went viral in the Hong Kong App Store, reaching the <a href="https://x.com/Mandrik/status/1621139020997885953" target="_self"><ins>second most popular spot</ins></a> within a few days. During this time, the cybersecurity division in China sent an official notice through Apple, which was unusual. I assume they have some sort of direct integration with Apple to act quickly on such matters. They didn't want our app to spread any further, so we managed to get around 24,000 downloads from users in mainland China before it was pulled from the China App Store. The app was never removed from the Hong Kong App Store, only from the mainland. Despite not having any Bitcoin or overtly controversial features, the app was censored and cut off.

AC: Did Apple forward you the notice from the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) to take down the app?

D: Yes, exactly. It was an <a href="https://njump.me/nevent1qqs2xj0lh37tsducmdtvq225gvklvy7cxssapytldw40xte6q08myeqprpmhxue69uhhyetvv9ujumn0wdmksetjv5hxxmmdqgsr9cvzwc652r4m83d86ykplrnm9dg5gwdvzzn8ameanlvut35wy3gqzhx0m" target="_self"><ins>email from Apple</ins></a> stating that the cybersecurity division of China had instructed them to take our app down. There was no opportunity to appeal either; the notice basically stated that our app was deemed against the law in China, and we had to remove it from the App Store, without specifying any actual law or legal statute. We are really just providing a free speech platform, which seems to be the biggest problem for the Chinese government's restrictions.

AC: What about the initial 24,000 users in China who downloaded Damus before the ban?

D: Well, those who already had the app installed on their device could still use that old version. But the real power comes from the ability for them to interact with users on any of the other client apps, making it extremely difficult for the Chinese Communist Party to completely cut off access to the entire network.

In response to censorship, I implemented more countermeasures, with a key discovery being that individuals in mainland China with Hong Kong accounts could potentially continue using the app. This suggested that a Hong Kong account could serve as a simple firewall bypass. However, the CAC began to scrutinize the Nostr protocol more closely a month or two later, leading to a ban on the relay. As we were using basic tools like web sockets and servers, they could target the IP of the servers. An interesting aspect was the ability to switch out the relays, meaning users weren't tied to the Damus relay and could even set up a private social network. 

To counter the censorship, the app code was modified. Initially, the app always used a hardcoded set of bootstrap relays, which were all banned, causing the app to fail to load. With the code update, if a user switched out their relay set, this new set would be used as the bootstrap relay, potentially enabling continued use of Damus within China, possibly with their own relays.

Users in Mainland China can, for instance, simply use a web client, which is quite hard to ban, and still be able to interact with the Damus users. That's the strength of building on decentralized protocols, and I've always been a strong advocate of protocols over platforms. So, I think it's probably a major nuisance for the CCP if we continue to make it increasingly difficult for them. However, it's a cat and mouse game as they can keep banning relays. 

AC: Could you detail the direct censorship from Apple regarding the Bitcoin features added to your app and share your thoughts on Apple's rules about permissible app functionality?

D: We tried to add features related to Bitcoin and tipping, and they explicitly banned certain things. For example, I can't put a tip button on posts, so I had to remove that. In a way, I have a censored version of the app in the App Store, just so I can stay on the App Store, which is disappointing. On June 13, 2023, we unexpectedly received a notice from Apple stating that our app <a href="https://x.com/damusapp/status/1673578169281003520/photo/1" target="_self"><ins>would be removed</ins></a> from the App Store if we didn't remove the zap feature—considered "tipping" digital content—within two weeks. Despite our efforts to explain that the content was already present and users weren't paying for digital content, Apple wouldn't relent. We had to remove the zapping feature, completely restructuring the app within the given timeframe. Regarding Apple's guidelines, it's evident that they don't apply their rules consistently, leaving enough ambiguity for arbitrary enforcement.

Damus: A Decentralized Social Network's Battle Against Censorship

Tuesday, September 24, 2024

GreatFire Releases Groundbreaking Study on VPN App Removals in Russia
GreatFire has published a groundbreaking study revealing the widespread removal of VPN apps by Apple from its Russia App Store. Utilizing data from the App Store Monitor (ASM) on<a href="https://applecensorship.com/" target="_self"> <ins>AppleCensorship.com</ins></a>—a platform dedicated to monitoring app availability in Apple's App Stores—the research highlights significant discrepancies between media-reported figures and the actual number of VPN app removals, particularly during the summer of 2024. The findings emphasize the urgent need for transparency and accountability from both Apple and Russian authorities.

<a href="https://applecensorship.com/news/unveiling-the-extent-of-vpn-app-removals-by-apple-from-the-russia-app-store-an-analysis-of-silent-removals-and-the-need-for-transparency" target="_self"><ins>You can read the study here </ins></a>&nbsp;


Key Findings
<ul>
<li>Significant Discrepancy with Official Reports: While Roskomnadzor, Russia’s communications regulator, officially reported the removal of 25 VPN apps, our research uncovered that close to 60 VPN apps were silently removed by Apple between early July and September 18, 2024, bringing the total number of unavailable VPN apps to 98.</li>
<li>Ongoing Silent Removals: More than 20% of the VPN apps tested were quietly removed without public acknowledgment, undermining transparency in the Russia App Store.</li>
<li>Coordinated Removal Patterns: The removals were concentrated on specific dates, suggesting coordinated actions by Apple—potentially exceeding Roskomnadzor’s requests—and not voluntary withdrawals by VPN developers.</li>
<li>Impact on Digital Access: Major VPN providers have been removed, severely limiting Russian users' ability to access secure communication channels and bypass government censorship.</li>
</ul>


Apple’s Accountability and the Need for Transparency
"Apple's silent removal of close to 60 VPN apps from the Russia App Store is not just alarming—it's a direct threat to digital freedom and privacy," said Benjamin Ismail, Director of the App Censorship Project at GreatFire. "By unilaterally restricting access to these essential tools without transparency or due process, Apple is complicit in enabling government censorship. We demand that Apple uphold its commitment to human rights and provide a clear explanation for these actions.”

The findings have raised concerns among digital rights advocates worldwide. Evan Greer, Director of Fight for the Future, the group behind the campaign at <a href="http://freetheiphone.com" target="_self"><ins>FreetheIphone.com</ins></a>, emphasized the broader implications:

"The fact that nearly 100 VPN apps are now unavailable in Russia's App Store highlights a disturbing trend of corporate complicity in state-sponsored censorship. VPNs are lifelines for journalists, activists, and everyday citizens striving to access information and communicate securely. Apple's actions not only undermine the privacy and security of millions but also set a dangerous precedent for how tech companies may collaborate with authoritarian regimes. It's imperative that Apple reverses this course and stands up for the rights of its users."


Study Overview
The study aimed to verify claims made by Roskomnadzor and relayed by Russian news agency Interfax that the regulator had ordered Apple to remove 25 VPN apps from its App Store. It also sought to assess the scale of VPN blocking by Russian authorities and determine the number of VPN removals and the extent of VPN unavailability in the Russia App Store.


Key Data
<ul>
<li>Apps Tested: Over 360 VPN apps were monitored globally, with more than 63,000 individual tests conducted across 175 App Stores.</li>
<li>Unavailable VPN Apps in Russia: As of September 2024, 98 VPN apps were found to be unavailable from the Russia App Store.</li>
</ul>


Removal Timeline
The research identified a pattern of removals predominantly occurring in July, August, and September 2024, following the first public reports of VPN removals by Roskomnadzor:
<ul>
<li>Pre-July 2024: 32 VPN apps were already unavailable prior to the summer.</li>
<li>Early July 2024: A wave of removals took place between July 4 and July 7, targeting over a dozen apps, including major services like CyberGhost VPN and ExpressVPN.</li>
<li>Post-July 7 Removals: 30 more apps were removed between July 8 and August 11.</li>
</ul>


Implications for Digital Rights
VPNs play a crucial role in securing internet privacy and circumventing censorship. Their removal significantly restricts users' ability to access free information, especially in nations with extensive censorship like Russia. The research underscores that these VPN removals were not isolated incidents but part of a broader, coordinated effort.


Call to Action
GreatFire calls for full transparency from both Apple and Roskomnadzor:
<ul>
<li>Disclosure of App Removal Requests: Roskomnadzor should clarify the specific VPN apps it requested to be removed and the rationale behind such decisions.</li>
<li>Apple’s Proactive Role: Apple must provide an explanation for its removal of VPN apps, especially if it acted beyond the official requests made by Roskomnadzor.</li>
<li>Restoration of Digital Access: Efforts should be made to reinstate VPN apps to ensure users have unrestricted access to the tools they need to protect their online freedoms.</li>
</ul>


Contact Information
<ul>
<li>Benjamin Ismail Director, App Censorship Project, GreatFire Email: benjamin@greatfire.org</li>
</ul>


GreatFire is committed to advocating for freedom of information online and transparency in the tech industry. This effort underscores the critical importance of holding corporations and governments accountable for actions that impact users' access to information and online fundamental freedoms.

Apple is Silently Removing VPN Apps from Russia's App Store

June 20, 2024

New Report Unveils App Censorship in China’s Apple App Store Amid Recent Developments

GreatFire’s AppleCensorship.com (now part of <ins>The App Censorship Project</ins>), in collaboration with ARTICLE 19 ASIA, is releasing a comprehensive report titled "<a href="https://applecensorship.com/pdf/Isolation-By-Design.pdf" target="_blank">Isolation by Design: Censorship in Apple's App Store in China and Human Rights Implications."</a> This report meticulously examines the intricate landscape of app censorship within China's Apple App Store, highlighting significant patterns of app removals and the broader human rights concerns arising from these practices.

The full report can be accessed <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1P9MZzODEaqDYu8TlqZwmbxNa6-NWLgEc/view?usp=sharing" target="_self">here</a> . Detailed data supporting the report's findings can be found <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Fm_PXMoSQ-7pW2RsUvoVUEYZuKYk7t2k/edit?usp=sharing&ouid=116585089298051198127&rtpof=true&sd=true" target="_self">here</a>, <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/154rQk27sNEpYGVA5H0GzQtmfyXlsy4FT/edit?usp=sharing&ouid=116585089298051198127&rtpof=true&sd=true" target="_self">here</a>, and <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1KWvb7zYM1kDVRnmgpoLhCEalN1f7Fe84/edit?usp=sharing&ouid=116585089298051198127&rtpof=true&sd=true" target="_self">here</a>.

Key Findings:

The Isolation of Chinese Mobile Users:
<ul>
<li>Among the 100 most downloaded apps worldwide:</li>
<ul>
<li>Only four are also among the most downloaded in China’s App Store, all of which are Chinese.</li>
<li>66 were found unavailable to Chinese iOS users. </li>
<li>In contrast, only 8 apps were unavailable in the U.S. App Store.</li>
</ul>
<li>This demonstrates a significant digital isolation of Chinese users compared to their global counterparts.</li>
</ul>

Unavailable Apps in China:
<ul>
<li>As of March 20, 2023, the App Store Monitor has recorded 11,026 unavailable apps in China's App Store.</li>
<li>China’s ratio of unavailability—the number of unavailable apps compared to the total number of apps tested—is the highest of the 175 App Stores run by Apple, at 27.53%. The average ratio of unavailability for other App Stores is around 13%.</li>
<li>Categories such as Games, Utilities, Education, Entertainment, and Lifestyle are proportionally represented in the list of unavailable apps in China, aligning with their prevalence in the App Store. However, News, Books, and Social Networking categories are disproportionately unavailable, suggesting targeted censorship.</li>
</ul>

Sensitive Categories:
<ul>
<li>VPN: Every VPN app tested (240) was unavailable in China, confirming a comprehensive ban to prevent circumvention of the Great Firewall.</li>
<ul>
<li>Noteworthy examples: Lantern VPN, ProtonVPN, ExpressVPN, Nord VPN;</li>
</ul>
<li>Privacy &amp; Digital Security: 29 apps focusing on privacy and digital security were unavailable, potentially impacting members of civil society organizations who need to safeguard their personal information.</li>
<ul>
<li>Noteworthy examples: Signal, ProtonMail, DuckDuckGo;</li>
</ul>
<li>LGBTQ+ &amp; Dating: Out of 67 unavailable LGBTQ+ related apps, most impacted were social networking and dating apps.</li>
<ul>
<li>Noteworthy examples: Hinge, Adam4Adam, weBelong, and Grindr;</li>
</ul>
<li>News, Media &amp; Information: 170 unavailable apps were listed, including <a href="https://applecensorship.com/app-store-monitor/app/1561888712" target="_self"><ins>Taiwan+</ins></a>, removed from China’s App Store in November 2022. The number of News apps unavailable has consistently grown since the AppleCensorship project began in 2019.</li>
<ul>
<li>Noteworthy examples: NYTimes, BBC News, Reuters;</li>
</ul>
<li>Social Media &amp; Communication: 96 apps, including some of the major platforms. The only few popular apps worldwide, like Twitter and Facebook, that were available are blocked by China's Great Firewall, making them inoperative without a VPN.</li>
<ul>
<li>Noteworthy examples: Skype, LinkedIn, Viber, Damus, Line;</li>
</ul>
<li>Tibet &amp; Buddhism: 41 apps related to Tibetan culture and Buddhism were unavailable, suggesting meticulous scrutiny by Chinese authorities.</li>
<ul>
<li>Noteworthy examples: Himalaya Lib, MonlamGrandTibetanDictionary;</li>
</ul>
<li>Uyghur: Out of the 72 Uyghur-related apps identified, 12, including those for religious texts, were blocked. Among them were two Book apps housing thousands of Uyghur-language books and audiobooks.</li>
<ul>
<li>Noteworthy examples:RFA Uyghur, Hayatnuri, Awazliq Kitap, UYGHUR MAN</li>
</ul>
<li>Religion: 144 apps related to various religions were unavailable. Various versions of the Bible are inconsistently available, with no specific version targeted more than others.</li>
<ul>
<li>Noteworthy examples: Bible App by Olive Tree, Quran Majeed, TORAH, JW Library</li>
</ul>
</ul>

Recent Developments:&nbsp;
Adding to the report's urgency, recent actions by Apple have intensified the conversation about digital freedom and censorship. As of April 19, 2024, Apple has removed widely-used apps such as WhatsApp and Instagram from its China App Store, citing national security concerns in line with the Chinese government's stringent regulations. This move highlights an increasing trend of digital isolation for Chinese iOS users, creating even more barriers for foreign journalists and other members of civil society.

Key Recommendations:

Apple:
<ul>
<li>Improve Transparency: Disclose detailed information about the apps targeted by government takedown requests, the legal basis for app takedowns, details about Apple’s own app review processes, and appeal mechanisms.</li>
<li>Strengthen Human Rights Commitments: Ensure users can access unfiltered information. Advocate for digital freedom by challenging blanket bans on VPN apps and other privacy tools.</li>
<li>Ensure Genuine Appeal Procedures: Establish transparent and accessible appeal processes for developers to contest app removals and rejections, ensuring fairness and accountability in App Store operations.</li>
<li>Implement Sideloading: Allow alternative app distribution channels to mitigate impact on fundamental freedoms and reduce dependency on the App Store.</li>
</ul>

Government and Lawmakers:
<ul>
<li>Investigate and Regulate: Scrutinize Apple’s practices and enact laws to ensure global digital and human rights standards.</li>
</ul>

International Community:
<ul>
<li>Promote Human Rights Policies: Advocate for human rights-based guidelines and demand transparency from tech companies. </li>
</ul>

About The App Censorship Project: AppleCensorship.com is dedicated to monitoring and reporting on app availability and censorship across Apple's App Stores worldwide. The website is now under the aegis of The App Censorship Project, an initiative that aims to expose censorship in Apple’s App Store and Google’s Play Store. Collaborating with various human rights organizations, it aims to foster a more open and transparent digital future.

About ARTICLE 19: ARTICLE 19 is an international human rights organization that works to defend and promote freedom of expression and freedom of information worldwide.

New Report Unveils App Censorship in China’s Apple App Store Amid Recent Developments

Introduction 

VPNs, or Virtual Private Networks, are essential tools for individuals in authoritarian contexts, enabling them to bypass censorship and protect their anonymity through encrypted internet traffic. These tools are critical in safeguarding against surveillance, retaliation, and prosecution, thereby supporting the rights to freedom of information, freedom of speech and privacy. The accessibility and functionality of these apps in Apple’s App Store and Google’s Play Store have significant implications for global users and their human rights. We conducted an exploratory and comparative study to analyze the availability of 50 of the most popular VPNs across 175 App Stores, and 176* Play Stores. 
Methodology 

Our research methodology was structured around a two-step process: First, we compiled a list of the top 50 VPN applications, selected based on their popularity and availability on both Apple's App Store and Google's Play Store, to ensure comparison across the two major mobile app distribution platforms. Secondly, we tested the availability of these VPN apps across all 175 App Stores and 176 Play Stores. We analyzed the results, comparing the availability of VPN apps across Apple's App Store and Google's Play Store, and examined how each platform's offerings vary by geographical and national context. 

Data and Findings 

All data and test results are available <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1l7rDZb8EEviALR48fK8kkSu50SgxGT4gvrfAy1rl-3Y/edit?usp=sharing" target="_blank"><ins>here</ins></a><ins>.</ins>&nbsp;

General figures: 

<ul>
<li>A total of 17,550 tests were conducted across two platforms, involving 50 VPN apps tested in 175 Apple App Stores and 176 Google Play Sores.</li>
<li>In the Apple App Store, out of 8,750 tests across 175 stores, apps were unavailable 108 times, representing 1.23% of the total tests.</li>
<li>In the Google Play Store, out of 8,800 tests across 176 stores, including the 'Rest of the World' category, apps were unavailable 277 times, representing 3.15%, of the total tests.</li>
<li>Overall, we detected 385 instances of unavailability, resulting in a combined cross-platform unavailability rate of 2.19% (385/17,550). This indicates a relatively high rate of VPN accessibility worldwide upon initial examination. </li>
</ul>
Apps and Platforms: 

<ul>
<li>Due to the existence of a categorical ban of VPN apps in China, none of the 50 VPN apps tested are available globally across the two platforms, as all iOS versions of the apps are, at least, unavailable in the China App Store.</li>
<li>On Google’s Play Store:</li>
<ul>
<li>17 VPNs are available in all 176 Play Stores, including the China Play Store (blocked in China).</li>
<li>11 VPNs are only unavailable in one store: 9 apps in China’s store and 2 apps in Russia’s store.</li>
<li>16 VPNs are unavailable in 2 to 11 stores.</li>
<li>6 VPNs are unavailable in 18 to 42 stores.</li>
</ul>
<li>On Apple’s App Store: </li>
<ul>
<li>39 VPNs are only unavailable in 1 App Store: China.</li>
<li>10 VPNs are unavailable in 2 to 10 App Stores.</li>
<li>1 VPN is unavailable in 25 App Stores. </li>
</ul>
<li>Disregarding the availability of apps in the China Play Store, which cannot be accessed from mainland China, we looked at the consistency of regions of unavailability across platforms for each app. The following can be observed:</li>
<ul>
<li>27 VPNs show the exact same unavailability across both platforms. These 24 VPNs are only unavailable in 2 stores or fewer. (13 of these are actually available in China’s Play Store while they are unavailable in the App Store.)</li>
<li>23 VPNs show discrepancies in unavailability, presenting a different number of unavailable stores on the 2 platforms. Those discrepancies can sometimes be very significant.</li>
<li>Only 3 of these 23 apps show more unavailability in Apple’s App Stores compared to the Play Store. For all 20 other apps, the VPNs are unavailable in more Play Stores. </li>
<li>However, Play Stores which are unavailable are often countries and territories which do not have iOS App Stores, such as: Bangladesh, Comoros, Cuba, Eritrea, Guinea, the Vatican, Iran, Monaco, Samoa, San Marino, Somalia and Sudan. The Rest of the World Play Store also includes territories which do not have App Stores. In total, 79 instances of unavailability in the Play Store concern territories which have no App Store.</li>
<li>Apps with the biggest discrepancies include VPN Vault (unavailable in 25 App Stores vs. 2 Play Stores), VPN by Private Internet Access, (10AS vs.42PS), Surfshark (2AS vs. 37PS), Encrypt.me (1AS vs. 42PS), VyprVPN (1AS vs. 41PS) and HotspotShield (1AS vs. 23PS). Unavailability in the Play Stores for these apps includes 4 of the 5 instances for the “Rest of the World” Play Store observed in this study. </li>
</ul>
</ul>

Geographical trends 

<ul>
<li>VPN unavailability by region shows that Asia-Pacific has the highest number of incidents, with 63 instances across 12 countries on Apple’s App Store and 77 (16 countries) on the Google Play Store, totaling 140 instances out of 386. This is primarily driven by China, which accounts for 78 of these instances across both platforms.</li>
<li>Africa is next with 87 instances of unavailability (across 26 countries), followed by the Americas with 49 instances (across 13 countries) and the Middle East and Northern Africa region, also 49 cases across 11 countries. From these, Iran totals 16 instances (all in the Play Store as there is no App Store in Iran), putting the country in second position behind China in terms of unavailable VPN apps. </li>
<li>After China and Iran, Turkmenistan and Russia have the highest instances of VPN unavailability, with 12 occurrences each. </li>
</ul>
Analysis and Comments 

The data indicates that VPN apps continue to face systematic unavailability in China on Apple’s App Store, the only one of the two platforms available in China. In 2017, Apple<a href="https://en.greatfire.org/blog/2017/11%E6%9C%88/%E5%85%B3%E4%BA%8E%E5%9C%A8%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E8%8B%B9%E6%9E%9C%E5%95%86%E5%BA%97%E8%A2%AB%E5%AE%A1%E6%9F%A5%E7%9A%84%E9%82%A3674%E4%B8%AA%E8%BD%AF%E4%BB%B6" target="_self"><ins> began removing all VPN apps from its China App Store</ins></a> at the request of Chinese authorities. This led to a swift decrease in the number of VPN apps available in the country, culminating in a complete categorical ban that has been maintained to this day. 

Countries like Iran, Russia, and Turkmenistan also exhibit significant instances of VPN unavailability due to government censorship. These countries have strict controls over internet access and often block VPNs to restrict access to global information and maintain control over online content. Russia’s figures for VPN unavailability align with the country’s regulatory framework, which includes laws against technologies that enable bypassing official censorship. 

When comparing the unavailability of VPN apps on the App Store and the Play Store, notable differences emerge in geographical spread and access levels. The Google Play Store has a significantly higher and broader total number of unavailability instances (277) compared to the App Store (108). The App Store mainly reflects app restrictions in China, with sporadic temporary restrictions also occurring in other countries. For example, in Vietnam, the ‘VPN - fast, secure, no limits’ app was available from December 18, 2023, to January 3, 2024, but became unavailable on March 21, 2024. In India, the ‘TunnelBear’ app was available from June 29, 2021, to June 30, 2022, and then became unavailable on December 28, 2022. Typically, these restrictions or unavailability affect only one or two countries per app. 

In contrast, some Google Play apps are unavailable in up to 42 Play Stores (including the ‘Rest of the World’ one), like ‘VPN by Private Internet Access’ and ‘Encrypt.me,’ possibly indicating a higher degree of restriction. 

At first glance, the Play Store demonstrates more extensive access restrictions, pointing to potentially stricter enforcement of internal or government-led app availability policies compared to the App Store. This is mostly true for territories with access to both Apple and Google platforms. When comparing territories with both platforms, 62 territories have more instances of unavailability in the Google Play Store (231 instances of unavailability) compared to the App Store (only 28 instances). Only 13 countries see more unavailability in the App Store (18 instances) compared to the Play Store (5 instances). 

However, the Play Store’s global availability (224 countries and territories worldwide) is significantly higher than the App Store (175 App Stores). This means that many instances of unavailability counted in the Play Store should be considered differently. For example, in Iran, where 16 instances of unavailability are observed, the App Store is not available in the country, and the Play Store offers 34 VPNs to Android users while no VPNs are available to iOS device users. The same applies to users in Bangladesh, Comoros, Cuba, Eritrea, Guinea, the Vatican, Monaco, Samoa, San Marino, Somalia, Sudan, and many other countries included in the Rest of the World Play Store. 

Ultimately, apart from China, no country or region is affected by widespread restriction over VPN apps, and most VPNs are available even in the countries that restrict digital rights the most. This suggests that governments most concerned about VPN usage in their countries tend to block the servers used by VPNs rather than restricting access to VPNs themselves. Unavailability of specific VPNs in the most authoritarian regimes, unless attributed to the app owners/publishers, might indicate that authorities need to restrict access to an app in addition to blocking its servers due to the VPN owners' ability to adapt or circumvent the blocks. 

Further research, notably by reaching out to VPN companies, is needed to understand these instances of unavailability better and differentiate between potentially very different situations despite similar observations in terms of availability/unavailability of VPN apps. 

(* The 176 Play Stores include a 'rest of the world' category, which refers to a default grouping used by Google to manage the distribution of apps in territories that do not have a dedicated national Play Store. The ‘rest of the world’ Play Store actually includes 49 countries/regions, which are not individually listed among the countries Google explicitly supports with a local Play Store. For the purposes of this short study, this Play Store is counted like any other.)