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Damus, a decentralized social networking app powered by the Nostr protocol, was removed from China's App Store by Apple on February 2, 2023, just two days after launching, due to directives from the Chinese government. 

The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the country's top internet regulation body, requested Apple to remove it from the China App Store, <a href="https://njump.me/nevent1qqs2xj0lh37tsducmdtvq225gvklvy7cxssapytldw40xte6q08myeqprpmhxue69uhhyetvv9ujumn0wdmksetjv5hxxmmdqgsr9cvzwc652r4m83d86ykplrnm9dg5gwdvzzn8ameanlvut35wy3gqzhx0m" target="_self"><ins>citing illegal content</ins></a>. The CAC stated that Damus did not meet China's requirements for social networks to incorporate censorship tools and link user signups to real identities. This direct communication channel between the CAC and Apple led to the app's immediate removal following the takedown notice.

Damus is powered by the <a href="https://nostr.com/" target="_self"><ins>Nostr</ins></a> protocol, a decentralized social media protocol designed for censorship-resistant communication. Unlike traditional social media platforms such as X or Facebook, which are centralized and controlled by single entities, Nostr operates on a decentralized network of relays that can be run by anyone. This decentralization ensures that no single authority can censor or control the information flow, giving users full control over their data and communications.

In June 2023, Apple <a href="https://appleinsider.com/articles/23/06/14/apple-threatens-to-remove-jack-dorsey-backed-damus-app-over-in-app-transactions" target="_self"><ins>threatened</ins></a> to remove Damus from its App Store over its tipping feature, which allowed users to trade Bitcoin directly without using other apps. Although this dispute primarily arose from a conflict with Apple's payment guidelines, Damus ultimately <a href="https://www.ccn.com/damus-apple-app-bitcoin-tipping/" target="_self"><ins>removed</ins></a> the tipping feature, which it considers equivalent to having a censored version of the app, just to remain on the App Store.

We sat down with William Casarin, the developer and founder of Damus to discuss their challenges with app censorship. Casarin shared their experiences, detailing their engagement with Apple after being censored in China. He explained how the CAC swiftly ordered Apple to remove Damus from the Chinese App Store, affecting around 24,000 initial users. Casarin also discussed challenges with Apple's stringent policies, particularly regarding Bitcoin tipping features, emphasizing Damus’ commitment to providing a free speech platform despite these obstacles.

AC: Could you explain what happened when <a href="https://damus.io" target="_self"><ins>Damus</ins></a> was initially launched in the China and Hong Kong App Stores?

D: After launching Damus in China and Hong Kong on January 31, 2023, the app quickly went viral in the Hong Kong App Store, reaching the <a href="https://x.com/Mandrik/status/1621139020997885953" target="_self"><ins>second most popular spot</ins></a> within a few days. During this time, the cybersecurity division in China sent an official notice through Apple, which was unusual. I assume they have some sort of direct integration with Apple to act quickly on such matters. They didn't want our app to spread any further, so we managed to get around 24,000 downloads from users in mainland China before it was pulled from the China App Store. The app was never removed from the Hong Kong App Store, only from the mainland. Despite not having any Bitcoin or overtly controversial features, the app was censored and cut off.

AC: Did Apple forward you the notice from the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) to take down the app?

D: Yes, exactly. It was an <a href="https://njump.me/nevent1qqs2xj0lh37tsducmdtvq225gvklvy7cxssapytldw40xte6q08myeqprpmhxue69uhhyetvv9ujumn0wdmksetjv5hxxmmdqgsr9cvzwc652r4m83d86ykplrnm9dg5gwdvzzn8ameanlvut35wy3gqzhx0m" target="_self"><ins>email from Apple</ins></a> stating that the cybersecurity division of China had instructed them to take our app down. There was no opportunity to appeal either; the notice basically stated that our app was deemed against the law in China, and we had to remove it from the App Store, without specifying any actual law or legal statute. We are really just providing a free speech platform, which seems to be the biggest problem for the Chinese government's restrictions.

AC: What about the initial 24,000 users in China who downloaded Damus before the ban?

D: Well, those who already had the app installed on their device could still use that old version. But the real power comes from the ability for them to interact with users on any of the other client apps, making it extremely difficult for the Chinese Communist Party to completely cut off access to the entire network.

In response to censorship, I implemented more countermeasures, with a key discovery being that individuals in mainland China with Hong Kong accounts could potentially continue using the app. This suggested that a Hong Kong account could serve as a simple firewall bypass. However, the CAC began to scrutinize the Nostr protocol more closely a month or two later, leading to a ban on the relay. As we were using basic tools like web sockets and servers, they could target the IP of the servers. An interesting aspect was the ability to switch out the relays, meaning users weren't tied to the Damus relay and could even set up a private social network. 

To counter the censorship, the app code was modified. Initially, the app always used a hardcoded set of bootstrap relays, which were all banned, causing the app to fail to load. With the code update, if a user switched out their relay set, this new set would be used as the bootstrap relay, potentially enabling continued use of Damus within China, possibly with their own relays.

Users in Mainland China can, for instance, simply use a web client, which is quite hard to ban, and still be able to interact with the Damus users. That's the strength of building on decentralized protocols, and I've always been a strong advocate of protocols over platforms. So, I think it's probably a major nuisance for the CCP if we continue to make it increasingly difficult for them. However, it's a cat and mouse game as they can keep banning relays. 

AC: Could you detail the direct censorship from Apple regarding the Bitcoin features added to your app and share your thoughts on Apple's rules about permissible app functionality?

D: We tried to add features related to Bitcoin and tipping, and they explicitly banned certain things. For example, I can't put a tip button on posts, so I had to remove that. In a way, I have a censored version of the app in the App Store, just so I can stay on the App Store, which is disappointing. On June 13, 2023, we unexpectedly received a notice from Apple stating that our app <a href="https://x.com/damusapp/status/1673578169281003520/photo/1" target="_self"><ins>would be removed</ins></a> from the App Store if we didn't remove the zap feature—considered "tipping" digital content—within two weeks. Despite our efforts to explain that the content was already present and users weren't paying for digital content, Apple wouldn't relent. We had to remove the zapping feature, completely restructuring the app within the given timeframe. Regarding Apple's guidelines, it's evident that they don't apply their rules consistently, leaving enough ambiguity for arbitrary enforcement.

Damus: A Decentralized Social Network's Battle Against Censorship

Unveiling the Extent of VPN App Removals by Apple from the Russia App Store: An Analysis of Silent Removals and the Need for Transparency

On December 22, 2022 AppleCensorship releases two reports simultaneously, both highlighting Apple’s censorship of its App Stores and the company’s many compromises with authoritarian regimes.

The first report focuses on how Apple censors in Hong Kong.  As human rights and fundamental freedoms in the territory shrink, including digital rights, Apple is reluctant to take any commitment to uphold its users rights to access information freely and express their views online. The second report looks at Apple’s presence in Russia up until the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022 and highlights the issues posed by Apple’s lack of transparency surrounding its App Store policies, including compliance with international sanctions.

Both reports highlight how far Apple is willing to go to safeguard its relationship with authoritarian regimes and maintain access to those markets.

“In the name of profit, Apple censors millions of users from all aspects of society: from activists and political figures to members of vulnerable minorities such as the LGBTQ+ community in Russia or religious and ethnic minorities in China,” said Benjamin Ismail, Director of the AppleCensorship project.&nbsp;

“<a href="https://applecensorship.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/AppleCensorship_Report_United-Apple-c.pdf" target="_self">United Apple: Apple’s censorship and compromises in Russia</a>“&nbsp;

<img src="https://imagedelivery.net/NHMgb1rcyLEYLdoYfPVw7Q/d33c9583-357f-4f72-a338-11616e05ed00/public" alt="undefined" style="height: auto;width: 30%"/>
In AppleCensorship’s report focusing on Russia, entitled “United Apple” in reference to Russian president Vladimir Putin’s party “United Russia”, the organization has taken a deeper look at Russia’s App Store, where many LGBTQ+ related apps are blocked.

While many “Shopping”, “Finance” and “Business” apps were removed from the Russian App Store shortly after the start of the war in Ukraine, AppleCensorship’s research has revealed much more worrying trends:

●          Patterns of app removals from Russia’s App Store detected by the App Store Monitor (ASM) suggest that specific groups of apps have been targeted by the Russian authorities and that a system of Apple-enforced targeted censorship is in place in Russia’s App Store.
●          LGBTQ+ related apps constitute the most prominent type of apps being unavailable in Russia’s App Store, with at least 25 apps currently unavailable, including some of the most popular LGBTQ+ apps in the world.
●          More than 30 VPN and private browsing apps have been taken down since the start of the war in Ukraine, while the Russian authorities were announcing that “measures were being taken to limit access to VPN services that violate Russian law”.
●          Although Russia’s App Store does not reflect the present government-controlled media landscape, the list of unavailable news apps continues to grow as the App Store Monitor unveils new foreign media blocked or removed from Russia’s App Store.
●          Apple’s recent actions regarding several other apps operated by companies owned by Russian oligarchs who have been sanctioned, point towards contradictory behavior from Apple, and raise questions whether Apple’s opaque management of its App Store is compatible with the necessary scrutiny and respect for human rights principles and values that is required of private companies.

“Apple’s content curation policies represent a denial of the company’s stated principles and values and show a lack of respect for privacy and the protection of users’ rights. In Russia, Apple has enabled censorship of vulnerable communities while promoting apps that are used by the government for surveillance purposes,” added Ismail.&nbsp;


“<a href="https://applecensorship.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Apps-at-Risk_-Apples-Censorship-and-Compromises-in-Hong-Kong.pdf" target="_self">Apps at Risk: Apple’s censorship and compromises in Hong Kong</a>“


<img src="https://imagedelivery.net/NHMgb1rcyLEYLdoYfPVw7Q/a18460bb-1068-4e90-3877-c2cdd018ea00/public" alt="undefined" style="height: auto;width: 30%"/>

<h2>&nbsp;“Apps at risk” investigates Apple’s censorship in Hong Kong’s App Store and assesses the compromises that Apple has made in the special administrative region.</h2>

Whether pressed by Hong Kong local administration or by the Chinese central government, on a number of occasions Apple has complied with demands to censor content deemed in violation of local laws or simply critical of Beijing.  

“Apps at risk” highlights threats to freedom of information that Apple’s predominance in Hong Kong poses. Some of the key findings included in the report include:

●          Hong Kongers’ reliance on mobile apps that are banned in China to communicate and access information make Apple a defect “kill switch” at the disposal of the Chinese censors.
●          While Hong Kong’s App Store remains relatively free compared to China’s App Store, a series of tests conducted in 2022 reveal that Hong Kong’s App Store is more restrictive than other App Stores considered “free”. The unavailability of apps in the Hong Kong App Store is higher than most of the 173 App Stores monitored by AppleCensorship.
●          In November 2022, a surprisingly high number of VPN and private browsing apps (more than 50) were found to be unavailable in Hong Kong’s App Store.
●          A number of apps related to media and information have been removed globally over the last two years, raising the possibility that self-censorship or censorship by Apple on behalf of the authorities are affecting apps’ availability globally.
●          Apple has not made any public commitment to uphold Hong Kongers’ fundamental rights to access information and express their opinion online. If the Chinese authorities were to increase digital censorship in the region, nobody knows how Apple will respond.

AppleCensorship has issued a set of recommendations for Apple, including demands that Apple declare publicly what measures it will take if Beijing increases its crackdown on digital freedoms and access to information in Hong Kong.

“Apple should make it very clear what actions it will, or will not take, to resist app takedown requests from Beijing or from Hong Kong’s government agencies,” said Ismail.

AppleCensorship has also made a similar demand regarding the company’s presence in Russia, asking that Apple “take measures to prevent any return to a normalization of its relationship with the Russian government.”

“As our two reports show, examples of Apple’s censorship abound. Apple’s temporary withdrawal from Russia following the start of the war in Ukraine, and Apple’s decision to move part of its production out of China, have not provided tangible evidence of any improvement of the situation in the App Store so far. For all we know, Apple is still willing to collaborate with repressive regimes.

We need to ensure that Apple will not contribute further to censorship and the erosion of democracy worldwide. This is why we will continue to monitor and highlight all cases of censorship, as well as to support any legislation that would reduce Apple’s dangerous hegemony over the peoples’ digital space”, Ismail concluded.


Read “<a href="https://applecensorship.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/AppleCensorship_Report_United-Apple-c.pdf" target="_self">United Apple: Apple’s censorship and compromises in Russia</a>“
Read “<a href="https://applecensorship.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Apps-at-Risk_-Apples-Censorship-and-Compromises-in-Hong-Kong.pdf" target="_self">Apps at Risk: Apple’s censorship and compromises in Hong Kong</a>“&nbsp;

The fundamental rights of millions are impacted when Apple does business with authoritarian regimes

Tuesday, September 24, 2024

GreatFire Releases Groundbreaking Study on VPN App Removals in Russia
GreatFire has published a groundbreaking study revealing the widespread removal of VPN apps by Apple from its Russia App Store. Utilizing data from the App Store Monitor (ASM) on<a href="https://applecensorship.com/" target="_self"> <ins>AppleCensorship.com</ins></a>—a platform dedicated to monitoring app availability in Apple's App Stores—the research highlights significant discrepancies between media-reported figures and the actual number of VPN app removals, particularly during the summer of 2024. The findings emphasize the urgent need for transparency and accountability from both Apple and Russian authorities.

<a href="https://applecensorship.com/news/unveiling-the-extent-of-vpn-app-removals-by-apple-from-the-russia-app-store-an-analysis-of-silent-removals-and-the-need-for-transparency" target="_self"><ins>You can read the study here </ins></a>&nbsp;


Key Findings
<ul>
<li>Significant Discrepancy with Official Reports: While Roskomnadzor, Russia’s communications regulator, officially reported the removal of 25 VPN apps, our research uncovered that close to 60 VPN apps were silently removed by Apple between early July and September 18, 2024, bringing the total number of unavailable VPN apps to 98.</li>
<li>Ongoing Silent Removals: More than 20% of the VPN apps tested were quietly removed without public acknowledgment, undermining transparency in the Russia App Store.</li>
<li>Coordinated Removal Patterns: The removals were concentrated on specific dates, suggesting coordinated actions by Apple—potentially exceeding Roskomnadzor’s requests—and not voluntary withdrawals by VPN developers.</li>
<li>Impact on Digital Access: Major VPN providers have been removed, severely limiting Russian users' ability to access secure communication channels and bypass government censorship.</li>
</ul>


Apple’s Accountability and the Need for Transparency
"Apple's silent removal of close to 60 VPN apps from the Russia App Store is not just alarming—it's a direct threat to digital freedom and privacy," said Benjamin Ismail, Director of the App Censorship Project at GreatFire. "By unilaterally restricting access to these essential tools without transparency or due process, Apple is complicit in enabling government censorship. We demand that Apple uphold its commitment to human rights and provide a clear explanation for these actions.”

The findings have raised concerns among digital rights advocates worldwide. Evan Greer, Director of Fight for the Future, the group behind the campaign at <a href="http://freetheiphone.com" target="_self"><ins>FreetheIphone.com</ins></a>, emphasized the broader implications:

"The fact that nearly 100 VPN apps are now unavailable in Russia's App Store highlights a disturbing trend of corporate complicity in state-sponsored censorship. VPNs are lifelines for journalists, activists, and everyday citizens striving to access information and communicate securely. Apple's actions not only undermine the privacy and security of millions but also set a dangerous precedent for how tech companies may collaborate with authoritarian regimes. It's imperative that Apple reverses this course and stands up for the rights of its users."


Study Overview
The study aimed to verify claims made by Roskomnadzor and relayed by Russian news agency Interfax that the regulator had ordered Apple to remove 25 VPN apps from its App Store. It also sought to assess the scale of VPN blocking by Russian authorities and determine the number of VPN removals and the extent of VPN unavailability in the Russia App Store.


Key Data
<ul>
<li>Apps Tested: Over 360 VPN apps were monitored globally, with more than 63,000 individual tests conducted across 175 App Stores.</li>
<li>Unavailable VPN Apps in Russia: As of September 2024, 98 VPN apps were found to be unavailable from the Russia App Store.</li>
</ul>


Removal Timeline
The research identified a pattern of removals predominantly occurring in July, August, and September 2024, following the first public reports of VPN removals by Roskomnadzor:
<ul>
<li>Pre-July 2024: 32 VPN apps were already unavailable prior to the summer.</li>
<li>Early July 2024: A wave of removals took place between July 4 and July 7, targeting over a dozen apps, including major services like CyberGhost VPN and ExpressVPN.</li>
<li>Post-July 7 Removals: 30 more apps were removed between July 8 and August 11.</li>
</ul>


Implications for Digital Rights
VPNs play a crucial role in securing internet privacy and circumventing censorship. Their removal significantly restricts users' ability to access free information, especially in nations with extensive censorship like Russia. The research underscores that these VPN removals were not isolated incidents but part of a broader, coordinated effort.


Call to Action
GreatFire calls for full transparency from both Apple and Roskomnadzor:
<ul>
<li>Disclosure of App Removal Requests: Roskomnadzor should clarify the specific VPN apps it requested to be removed and the rationale behind such decisions.</li>
<li>Apple’s Proactive Role: Apple must provide an explanation for its removal of VPN apps, especially if it acted beyond the official requests made by Roskomnadzor.</li>
<li>Restoration of Digital Access: Efforts should be made to reinstate VPN apps to ensure users have unrestricted access to the tools they need to protect their online freedoms.</li>
</ul>


Contact Information
<ul>
<li>Benjamin Ismail Director, App Censorship Project, GreatFire Email: benjamin@greatfire.org</li>
</ul>


GreatFire is committed to advocating for freedom of information online and transparency in the tech industry. This effort underscores the critical importance of holding corporations and governments accountable for actions that impact users' access to information and online fundamental freedoms.